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1
“Kaplan	and	Norton’s	proposed	mode	is	…	relevant	to	analyze	not	only	
because	of	its	achieved	status	as	a	serious	and	interesting	alternative	to	
traditional	management	accounting.	It	is	also	an	unusually	explicit	expose	
of	 a	 combination	 of	 two	 constituting	 ideas	 in	 the	 field	 of	 accounting	
knowledge	 and	 practice	 –	 the	 desire	 to	 gain	 true	 knowledge	 and	 the	
plight	 to	govern	by	numbers.	 ...	 Accounting	practices,	 such	as	written	
reports,	 pictures,	 numbers,	 charts,	 statistics,	 etc.,	 are	 performative	
and	important	instances	of	organizing,	as	they	create	new	domains	of	
power/knowledge	at	the	same	time	as	they	provide	the	means	for	acting	
upon what is constructed” (Edenius and Hasselbladh, 2002: 253)
“Translation	 is	 a	 vehicle,	 imitation	 its	 motor,	 and	 fashion	 sits	 at	 the	
wheel” (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005: 7)
“Because	 theory	 is	 not	 about	 reference	 but	 about	 interpretation,	 the	
research	process	is	as	important	as	the	results,	in	fact,	there	is	no	way	
of	 distinguishing	 absolutely	 between	 them.	 The	process	 is	 part	 of	 the	
result;	the	field	of	study	is	an	experiential	space” (Hastrup, 1995: 184)
introduction
The above quotes may serve as a quick introduction to both the contents 
and approach in this study. The study is about ‘new’ forms of management 
accounting, or, more particularly, about ‘new’ forms of performance 
management as originally introduced by Kaplan and Norton. It seeks to produce 
knowledge on the processing of the original ideas, and it considers ‘translation’ 
(a process in which A, a translator, transforms B, a thing to translate by defining 
it, or even by explaining it to itself (Latour, 1986)) to be at the heart of such 
processing. The process of knowledge production is one of interpretation. The 
researcher tries to live the ‘world’ he is researching (Hastrup, 1995). 
The critique by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) that traditional management 
accounting has lost its relevance can be marked as a turning point in the 
management accounting and control discipline (Burns and Vaivio, 2001; Otley, 
2008). As Otley (2008: 230) observes “there has been more management 
accounting innovation over the past two decades than in the previous fifty 
years”. In particular, there has been a rise of multidimensional performance 
measurement by employing forward-looking non-financial performance 
measures that link operational practices with strategic intent (Ittner and Larcker, 
1998; Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; Neely, 1999).
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The balanced scorecard (BSC) has become the most dominant performance measurement/management 
innovation among both academia and practitioners (Neely, 1999; Malmi, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 
2003). In the year 1992, it was introduced to the management accounting and control literature by 
Robert Kaplan and David Norton. With the BSC, in order to better be able to evaluate performance, 
both financial and non-financial information is generated and providedi. “The balanced scorecard 
includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. Additionally, it complements 
the financial measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal processes, and 
the organization’s innovation and improvement activities – operational measures that are the drivers 
of future financial performance.” (Kaplan and Norton, 1992: 71). 
The introduction of the BSC has attracted a lot of attention from the academic world (e.g. Chenhall, 
2003; Hopper et al., 2007; Tuomela, 2005). Substantial attention has been paid to the implementation 
modes, and the barriers hindering the implementation of the BSC (e.g. Kasurinen, 2002; Oriot and 
Misiaszek, 2004). Other research investigates the purposes for which managers use the BSC. For 
instance, a survey undertaken by Wiersma among individual managers (Wiersma, 2009) revealed a 
number of drivers for different uses of the BSC. There also are papers that discuss the effectiveness and 
post-implementation effects of the BSC (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; Malina and Selto, 2001). 
There are also BSC studies from a critical perspective (Edenius and Hasselbladh, 2002; Lawrence and 
Sharma, 2002; Visscher, 2010). Nørreklit (2000) critically examines the underlying assumptions of the 
BSC and its claim to be a strategic control system. Moreover, because the BSC has been very well 
received and is used by an increasing number of organizations (Beiman and Johnson, 2007; Visscher, 
2010), some studies aim to explain the popularity of the BSC and why it is nowadays taken for granted 
(e.g. Dechow, 2006; Nørreklit, 2003; Qu, 2004).
gaps in literature and main aims of the research
Prior literature contains a number of voids that need to be further researched. Evident voids are 
a rather simplistic conceptualization of change in performance management as a consequence 
of a dominant functional perspective and, second, a relatively simple view on the diffusion and 
development of performance management. First of all, most accounting research with regard to 
management accounting change adopts a rational/functionalist perspective (e.g. Wickramasinghe 
and Alawattage, 2007). Management accounting change is seen as unproblematic and (with the 
exception of contingency theory) often isolated from the organizational context. This research has 
severe limitations. Accounting is seen as a ‘simple set of technical practices’ (Cobb et al., 1995: 158) 
and its narrow focus has led to a neglect of idiosyncratic elements and thereby failed to provide a 
thorough understanding of why and how management accounting change has come about within 
individual organizations. Although there has been an increasing number of interpretive management 
accounting change studies since the 1990’s (see chapter 2), good interpretive BSC change studies are 
Chapter 1
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still relatively scarce (notable exceptions are, for instance, Kasurinen, 2001, 2002 and Hansen and 
Mouritsen, 2005). 
Second, most accounting research adopts the diffusion model (Latour, 1987) for understanding how 
an innovation like the BSC travels around the world and is subsequently adopted and constructed in 
local settings. These studies (e.g. Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005; Malmi, 2001; Malina and Selto, 2001) let 
us believe that the BSC is a fixed concept that is used similarly by different users, implicitly assuming 
a passive attitude on behalf of organizational change agents. As a result, the diffusion model has 
become the primary model for understanding top-down planned change (Czarniawska, 2008). 
This study departs from a diametrically opposed model, namely the translation model (Latour, 1987). 
This model assumes a more active idea recipient and assumes that whenever an (administrative) 
innovation enters the organization, processes of translation unfold. The original idea is likely to be 
transformed (some elements/features are ‘lost in translation’ and/or the original idea is enriched by 
new elements/features) in order to make the innovation work in the local organizational context. The 
BSC innovation is studied in this study as a traveling idea: “ideas	do	not	diffuse,	it	is	people	who	pass	
them	on	to	each	other,	each	one	translating	them	to	their	own	frames	of	reference” (Czarniawska and 
Sevón, 1995:95). Traveling ideas are changed during the process of translation. As is reflected in one 
of the quotes at the beginning of this study, Czarniawska and Sevón (2005) argue that fashion can 
be the trigger for the travel of ideas. They see translation as the vehicle, imitation as the motor, and 
fashion as the wheel in the process of travel (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005). Fashion causes certain 
management ideas to travel around the globe: however, their local translation and the resulting local 
realities are different in order to fit the idiosyncratic needs of the organizational actors who make 
sense of them and make the new idea work (or not) (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1995: 96). 
Given the dominance of the diffusion model in the accounting literature, there is little understanding 
about why and how the (re)construction processes of the BSC unfold in individual organizations. As 
Otley (1999: 377) states: “The balanced scorecard literature also indicates that it is as much the process 
of establishing a scorecard that yields benefit as the resulting measurement schema. However, the 
literature is remarkably silent on this point.” In addition, Chenhall (2003, 2005) argues that given the 
ambiguity surrounding the BSC concept, the meaning of components, attributes and its construction 
are likely to vary across organizations and even across departments within one organization.
Therefore, these voids lead to the following first main research objective of this study:
The first objective of this study is to provide insights into the theoretical implications of context-
specific and time-specific dynamics in the shaping of a BSC performance management system
This study aims to generate insights into why and how the translation processes of the BSC unfold. 
The focus is on micro-processes on the level of individual organizations. Two case organizations in 
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the banking industry are selected. The why question not only refers to the reasons for change (why 
does the BSC idea ‘land’ in the two specific case organizations during its travel), it is also related to the 
understanding of the way in which change processes manifest themselves. As such, this study not only 
contains interpretations, but also explanatory elements. The how question refers to the way in which 
the BSC is emerging and developing within the two case organizations, thereby providing a descriptive 
picture of the change processes. Similar to the descriptions of Jones and Dugdale (2002), and Briers 
and Chua (2001) we ask questions like ‘what do people have to do to be recognized as using the BSC?’ 
and ‘what else besides the organizational practices of the BSC contributes to their shaping?’ These two 
studies were mentioned by Ahrens and Chapman (2006) as important examples of good processual 
analysis. Also we are concerned with the ways in which the BSC “was	assembled	as	a	practice,	socially,	
organizationally,	and	technically”	(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The first main research question will 
be the following:
rQ1: why and how do the translation processes of the BSC in the two case organizations unfold?
This research question requires attention for the interconnectedness between the global and the 
local. Such attention has already been revealed in prior studies (e.g. Briers and Chua, 2001; Jones and 
Dugdale, 2002). For example, Ahrens and Chapman (2006) argue that Briers and Chua (2001) explored 
the relationships between the technical aspects of accounting and political processes in organizations 
but point to the fact that, at the same time, “their	narrative	highlighted	the	possibilities	for	localising	
a	 global	 phenomenon”. Briers and Chua (2001) are concerned with the role of ‘boundary objects 
‘in management accounting change. ‘Boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989) are objects that 
belong to different realms, while remaining intrinsically the same. The BSC can be seen as an example 
of such a boundary object. Jones and Dugdale (2002) are more concerned with tracing the global 
networks of support of ABC as an abstract expert system. 
This study is particularly interested in how and why the BSC idea is born at the institutional level, how it 
travels and lands in two specific organizations, how it is made sense of and translated by local actors in 
these two specific contexts, and how certain elements are ‘going back to the globe’ (reborn BSC or ‘other’ 
idea at the institutional level). Our theoretical framework is based on Scandinavian institutionalism and 
ANT elements, combining discursive (e.g. Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) and material (e.g. Callon, 
1986) dimensions. In addition to Briers and Chua (2001) we stress the role of inscriptions (figures and 
numbers that become facts; see Robson, 1992) as objectification devices in the translation of abstract 
global techniques to concrete localities (Qu, 2006). It should be noted that the theories we use in our 
construction work on the empirical material (“data”) could be understood as repertoires	 of	 lenses 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 34; Deetz, 1992). In our view, theories and theoretical frameworks are 
instruments that provide illuminations, insight and understanding, but they cannot be fully controlled 
because “it is impossible to freeze-frame meaning” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 34). In that sense, 
our use of theory can be seen as a ‘struggle’ (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011; see chapter 4).
Chapter 1
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It is emphasized that our study not only reflects on the translation movement from the global to the 
local, but also on the translation movement from the local to the global. This leads to a second main 
research objective: 
The second objective of this study is to relate the micro translation processes to developments 
on organizational field level to draw inferences for theory building on performance management 
systems at an organizational overarching level 
In order to reach our research objectives, we try to “bring out the processual in the event of” (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006) the BSC. Any event can be broken down into an infinite number of smaller 
composing parts (Scapens and Yang, 2007). The translation of the BSC is not a single event, but a 
complicated, emerging process that “can be made sense of with reference to countless “events” that 
field researchers redeem as significant” (Scapens and Yang, 2007). The qualitative field research 
in this study uses and develops a theoretical framework that connects `constructs` (which can be 
events, institutions, etc.) in such a way that it brings about the emerging nature and dynamics of the 
translation processes of the BSC (compare Scapens and Yang, 2007: 6). The framework also helps to 
detach the researcher “from the contact zone” (Scapens and Yang, 2007; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006); 
see further chapter 4). The research strives to “look around” (Scapens and Yang, 2007) the translation 
processes, to seek connections between forces embedded in the field and to relate micro translation 
processes to developments at the organizational field level. After all, the process of institutionalization 
central in our theoretical framework (see chapter 3) is in fact the result of the interplay between 
the organizational field level and the organizational level (Zahir ul Hassan and Vosselman, 2010). The 
second main research question will be the following:
rQ2: why and how can the micro translation processes of the BSC be connected to forces on the 
organizational field level?
research design and methodology
This study seeks to generate a more comprehensive understanding of performance management 
innovation, by analyzing the organizational context in which organizational actors process BSC 
practices through sensemaking and localized translation. Gaining a holistic understanding of these local 
performance management dynamics requires a comprehensive focus on many aspects and levels of 
the organization, i.e. the social, cultural and political interplays between individuals, groups, divisions 
and organizations. To disentangle these different levels and aspects of the dynamics of BSC innovation 
this study relies on an in-depth, qualitative approach to reveal the general stories and narratives of 
change used by actors in making sense of and enacting performance management practices. 
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Research approaches
To understand how the interpretation of macro-level phenomena influences the micro-level practices 
of managers and other actors at the two case organizations, the following approaches were adopted:
-  An interpretive	 approach in order to reveal the conceptual lenses as well as the socially and 
culturally embedded meanings by which actors make sense of the BSC idea. The focus is on how 
the actors interpret, act upon, and experience the changes connected to the BSC as an idea. To 
this end, the researcher has to learn the field by way of experience, by ‘leaning by doing’ (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006). Of course, the researcher cannot share the experience of others in any 
literally manner, but may share a communicative space that enables him, by way of imaginative 
investment, to comprehend at least part of other people’s motives (Hastrup, 1997: 357). Beyond 
the understanding of local knowledge, the field researcher should have the ambition to produce 
theoretical knowledge, that transcends the singular, local instances (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; 
Hastrup, 1997): “The	interest	is	not	so	much	an	uncovering	of	particular	images	of	the	world	as	it	is	
an	understanding	of	their	motivational	force	in	the	daily	life	of	people” (Hastrup, 1997: 358). To get 
to the theoretical comprehension of motivation and dynamics, the field researcher has to invest 
in the process of understanding the wholeness of the situation. “Living another world” (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006; Hastrup, 1997) implies a merging	of	action	and	awareness (Hastrup, 1997: 
358). This merging of action and awareness is a theoretical point. It is derived from an experiential 
encounter with the reality of other people. Fieldwork literally brings us in touch with another 
reality (Hastrup, 1997: 359), ‘another’ in the sense of being viewed from our chosen theoretical 
suggestions. 
-		 A	 sensemaking	 approach (Weick, 1995). The study of sensemaking will illuminate how actors 
interpret and enact the BSC idea and will further our knowledge not merely of what people do 
when they translate the idea into the local context of the organization, but why they do it in that 
specific way. Moreover, a sensemaking perspective leaves room for analyzing and understanding 
the tensions, dilemmas, and uncertainties in the day-to-day practice of BSC translation.
Case study design
This study is based on a constructivist case study design (Stake, 1995). This design allowed me to study 
the interaction between the global and the local and the processes of sensemaking in a real-life context. 
This reveals how actors in two case organizations locally enact the BSC by interpreting characteristics 
of, and changes in, the context and dynamics of the organization. Through the narratives collected 
in this study, the interplays between the global (institutional field level) and the local (organizational 
level) and the experiences of the actors regarding the local translation of the BSC idea are disentangled. 
Flexible, manual coding enables the researcher to identify “patterns” or “themes”, thereby ordering 
data. When patterns observed in the case studies conflict with the theoretical framework, additional 
Chapter 1
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evidence is collected to explain deviations. If necessary, the theoretical framework needs to be 
modified in order to encompass new findings. As such, there is an iterative, two-way relationship 
between theory and observations. 
We also used a reflexive methodology (Alvesson and Skøldberg, 2000; Crang and Cook, 2007) rather 
than a fixed set of research instruments. The product of this study is an account reflecting the stories 
actors use for making sense of the idiosyncrasies of the organization and the practice of BSC translation, 
but also with the intent to relate the local translation processes to global developments. 
The overall goal of this approach was to provide more than a snapshot, but rather to obtain a holistic 
image of the dynamics of change.
outline of the study
The structure of the study is as follows. First, chapter 2 provides a mini-review of interpretive studies 
into management accounting change, particularly change in performance management using a 
BSC. Chapter 3 proceeds to sketch the outlining of a theoretical framework based on Scandinavian 
Institutionalism that uses elements from the Sociology of Translation. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
research methodology and methods used in this study. It provides arguments for the approach in 
this study and it presents the research design. From a global perspective, chapter 5 reflects on the 
circulation of the BSC idea in terms of the theoretical framework. Particularly, the chapter reflects on 
processes of disembedding and re-embedding. Chapter 6 does the same, but from a local perspective 
(that is, at the level of the two case organizations). Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and implications, 
and provides some suggestions for future research.
interpretive research in performance 
management: a literature review
Chapter
2
introduction
Interpretive research provides insights into how organizational reality 
subjectively emerges and how it is objectified in social interaction (Chua, 1986). 
As such, interpretive research concerns processes of becoming and enacting, 
or processes of change. Producing knowledge on the processes of change 
requires in-depth field research from an interpretive perspective (Vaivio, 1999). 
Longitudinal, interpretive case study research can account for the emerging 
nature of change (Hopwood, 1983; 1987; Quatrone and Hopper, 2001; 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). Management accounting change is then 
viewed as a social rather than a technical process (e.g. Ansari. 1977; Cobb et al., 
1995; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Vaivio, 1999, 2004). 
Interpretive research acknowledges that the specific social and organizational 
context actively shapes accounting and control practices and systems. Informed 
by new institutional sociology, some authors also emphasize the influence 
of external institutional pressures on management accounting change (e.g. 
Abernethy and Chua, 1996). The argument then is that accounting change is 
not only driven by functional reasons or institutional pressures originating in the 
internal environment of the organization, but also by institutional pressure for 
conformity from the external environment.
An interpretive perspective differs from a traditional rationalists (mainstream) 
perspective in that it problematizes the change process (see also Chua, 1986; 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007; Wickramasinghe, 2011). In a rationalists 
perspective (drawing on both contingency theory and (organizational) 
economics) the main focus is on the outcomes of change. Accounting change 
is described as unproblematic and isolated from the specific organizational 
context. Research from a rationalist’s perspective assumes individual rationality; 
change, then, is a direct and unproblematic result of rational decision making 
(and, thus, goal directed behavior). Contingency research and economics-based 
research, implicitly or explicitly, suggest that change is driven by effectiveness 
and/or efficiency and that it can be described as sequential with an identifiable 
beginning and end, preferably resulting in goal accomplishment (Quattrone 
and Hopper, 2001; Burns and Vaivio, 2001).The rationalists perspective has 
been subjected to considerable critique (e.g. Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999, 
2004; Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). It is accused of being too static, 
too technical, too functional, and hence, too unrealistic. According to Dechow 
(2006), the mainstream studies into performance management establish an 
image of ‘gaps’ between performance management in principle and practice, 
but they show no interest in the actions that produce these gaps. 
Interpretive	research	in	performance	management:	a	literature	review
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Interpretive research, on the other hand, challenges individual rationality and problematizes change. 
If there is rationality, it is assumed to be an effect of social interaction (an output), not an individual 
trait (an input) (see also van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2012). An interpretive perspective thus 
demonstrates how change is relationally effectuated in specific time-spaces. Interpretive studies aim 
to develop an understanding of what is happening in performance management practice, rather than 
explaining certain outcomes or prescribing what ought to be. Contrary to the rational perspective, 
these studies adopt a contextual view: it is assumed that performance management systems and 
practices are shaped by the interplay with the (internal and external) organizational context (e.g. 
Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999, 2004; Kasurinen, 2002; Wickramasinghe 
and Alawattage, 2007). It is acknowledged that performance management change cannot a priori be 
equated with progress (Hopwood, 1987; Burns and Vaivio, 2001). Instead, performance management 
change may have both intended and unintended effects. 
An interpretive perspective also differs from a critical perspective (also distinguished by Chua, 1986; 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). Whereas compared with studies that adopt a rational 
perspective interpretive studies put more emphasis on the internal and external organizational 
environment, the critical perspective examines accounting change from a wider political and social 
domain (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). The intended contribution of critical studies is to 
challenge the status quo (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). From a critical perspective accounting change 
is embedded in struggles of power and interests. Thus, critical research goes beyond interpretive 
research; its ethos is the critical scrutiny of forms of social domination encouraging emancipation/
resistance (Alvesson, 2008). It includes Foucauldian studies into both the ‘archaeology of accounting’ 
(Hopwood, 1987) and into the disciplinary practice of accounting (e.g. Hopper and Macintosh, 1993), 
as well as Habermasian studies demonstrating an undermining of communicative rationality (Townley 
et al, 2003). In general, research from a critical perspective aims to give voices to suppressed and/or 
dominated groups. 
In this chapter, a mini-review of interpretive research in the accounting and control discipline is given. 
This is done with the intention to develop and maintain an interpretive repertoire (Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2011; Alvesson and Skøldberg, 2009). The interpretive repertoire indicates the ‘academic’ 
part of the researcher’s pre-understanding (e.g. theories, vocabularies, knowledge) (Alvesson 
and Kärreman, 2011: 48). This spectrum of theoretical insights can be put to work ‘ex post’ when 
confronting the empirical material (“data”) that in itself has already been produced based on the 
interpretive inclinations of the researcher (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 48) with extant theory. The 
interpretive repertoire also gives ‘ex ante’ input to the struggles inherent in “getting control over how 
we see things, so that we are not simply the unknowing carriers of the conventional world’s thoughts” 
(Becker, 1996: 8; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 48). In other words: it helps in our struggle to open 
up our orientations. Also, as our study is an interpretive one, in subsequent chapters we will contrast 
insights from some studies discussed in this chapter with our case study findings.
Chapter 2
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interpretive studies into performance management change
Interpretive approaches to performance management change are strongly influenced by various 
branches of institutional theory, as well as by structuration theory and actor network theory (see also 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007; Wickramasinghe, 2011). The branches of institutional theory 
include Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and New Institutional Sociology (NIS) (Wickramasinghe 
and Alawattage, 2007). The various institutional theories share their concern for institutions and 
institutional change. Therefore, they offer valuable insights for studying management accounting 
change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Hopper et al. ( 2007: 349) point out that:
“The most important achievement of institutional research on management accounting 
change is its delineation of change as a continuous process rather than a series of discrete and 
identifiable events in organizational life.”
Old Institutional Economics and performance management change
OIE is a response to neoclassical (mainstream) economic studies. Studies in the field of performance 
management that employ OIE aim to develop a better understanding of the performance management 
practice. According to many authors, the emphasis on (extensions of) neo-classical economics in 
mainstream management accounting research has led to a ‘gap’ between management accounting 
theory and practice. As Burns and Scapens (2000) note, neo-classical economic theory aims to predict 
the optimal outcomes at a certain point in time, rather than explaining the transition processes from 
one equilibrium state to another. In their seminal papers, Scapens (1994) and Burns and Scapens 
(2000) develop their institutional perspective based on OIE as well as evolutionary economics. OIE is 
particularly useful for studying organizational change given its focus on organizational routines and 
their institutionalization (Veblen, 1899/1925; Commons, 1970; Klein, 1990; Tool, 1988). Performance 
management systems and practices are portrayed as a set of stable rules and routines. Burns and 
Scapens (2000) recognize that rules and routines may change. Performance management is seen 
as a routine practice that is potentially institutionalized. Performance management change that 
is consistent with the rules and routines in place is more likely to institutionalize than change that 
deviates from the set of rules and routines.  
A number of studies have employed Scapens’ (1994) and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) institutional 
framework in order to study management accounting change (e.g. Kasurinen, 2001; Lukka, 2007). 
Kasurinen (2001) conducted a case study in a Finnish marketing and logistics company, using the 
Burns and Scapens (2000) framework. He tries to explain why the BSC implementation in his case 
organization only had a limited influence on the management processes in the organization: 
“The	reports,	for	example,	were	very	soon	after	the	introduction	written	in	the	intended	form,	
and	the	data	was	gathered	as	had	been	 instructed.	On	the	other	hand,	the	analyses	of	the	
business	unit	as	a	whole	and	unprompted	discussions	on	the	unit’s	strategic	situation,	which	
can	 be	 considered	 important	 characteristics	 of	 a	 balanced	 scorecard	 based	 management	
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system,	did	not	follow.	This	is	to	say	that	only	the	implementation	of	the	particular	features	
which	were	 in	alignment	with	 the	 institutionalized	patterns	of	behavior	 in	 the	organization	
seemed	to	have	succeeded” (Kasurinen, 2001: 476/477).
 
Kasurinen concludes with a figure that clarifies routinization as an essential part of the management 
accounting change process. This process is illustrated in figure	1.
FIGURE 1: THE PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING CHANGE (KASURINEN, 2001:476)
Figure 1 expresses that during the change process only a fraction of the new rule (i.e. the BSC) survives 
the routinization process and leads to a new routine in the organization. The case analysis indicated 
that due to the implicit encoding process, which seemed to have begun immediately after the BSC 
introduction, business unit managers reacted to the new rule almost automatically. The encoded 
institutional principles emphasized, among other things, the identity of business unit management 
as a “doer” rather than as a “thinker”. In line with this the managers focused on the renewals in the 
formal reporting and approval procedures. The role of the BSC in strategy work did not get very much 
attention, though. This led to a situation where the enactment process did not completely support 
the original goal of an improved understanding of the business. Furthermore, focusing on the formal 
requirements directed the reproducing process only towards changes in the planning system, not to 
the management system at large.
Kasurinen (2001) concludes that only a fraction of new performance management ideas seem to 
be able to “survive” the entire process of routinization. This type of “evolution” is particularly likely, 
since the conscious or unconscious resistance often plays a role in change projects. Furthermore, the 
evolutionary process easily leads to a situation where only the particular characteristics of the new tool 
that “suit” the organizational behavioral patterns will be implemented. Unfortunately, however, these 
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characteristics do not necessarily include the fundamental parts of the new management accounting 
idea, and the organizational realization of the innovation may turn out to be only a modification of an 
existing system.
Lukka (2007) elaborates on Burns and Scapens’ institutional framework in relation to management 
accounting change and stability. His case study illustrates the simultaneous emergence of change 
and stability and explains it by demonstrating ‘loose coupling’ between the formal accounting system 
and informal routines. As a consequence, his study refines the relation between rules and routines. 
A series of informal arrangements were made to make them informal routines and these informal 
routines proved to have the potential, at least in the short run, to smooth the frictions of the formal 
rule systems related to management accounting.
New Institutional Sociology and performance management change
A NIS-approach to performance management change differs from an OIE-approach to performance 
management change. Whereas OIE attributes the understanding and motivation of performance 
management change to routines at the organizational level, NIS takes into account the institutional 
context within which firms operate. NIS, also called ‘New Institutionalism’ and ‘institutional theory’, 
emphasizes the influence of the institutional environment on organizational practices and systems 
including performance management practices and systems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1988) The selection of control structures is not so much driven by efficiency; 
instead legitimacy is the overriding principle (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Wickramasinghe and 
Alawattage, 2007). According to new institutionalists, change in organizational design or control 
structure/performance management practices is a result of pressures from the external environment 
that determine which designs and practices are legitimate (e.g. Meyer et	al., 1983; Abernethy and 
Chua, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Dillard et al., 2004). Organizations are 
likely to select control structures from a set of legitimate alternatives in order to enhance legitimacy 
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996).  
   
The institutional environment is analytically distinct from the technical environment (Meyer et 
al., 1983; Abernathy and Chua, 1996). Whereas the technical environment refers to the market in 
which the firm operates, the institutional environment is characterized by “the elaboration of rules, 
practices, symbols, beliefs and normative requirements to which individual organizations must 
conform to receive support and legitimacy” (Abernathy and Chua, 1996: 574). The central concept 
in NIS is isomorphism, which implies the conformation to a set of institutionalized beliefs that render 
organizations to become similar to each other. The pressure to become isomorphic renders the 
tendency for organizations to conform to institutional beliefs. In their seminal work, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) distinguish between three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. 
Coercive isomorphism is the pressure exerted by organizations on other organizations that they are 
dependent on, as well by the cultural societal expectations. In case organizations model themselves 
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to other organizations, for instance by adopting management practices in order to enhance legitimacy 
there is mimetic isomorphism. Normative isomorphism is related to the role of professionals in 
organizations. Professionals are subject to pressure to conform to professional norms that are taught 
by training or universities.      
The prevalence of the concept of isomorphism initially led neo-instutionalist studies to examine 
homogeneity and convergence of organizational structures and practices (Scheuer and Scheuer, 
2008). Meyer and Rowan (1977) came up with the concept of rationalized myths as an expression of 
the function of adopted legitimized organizational structures and practices. As Scheuer and Scheuer 
(2008: 12) note, the rationale of adopting rationalized myths “is that the organization is perceived 
as legitimate by its environment, which in turn is supposed to affect the flow of resources to the 
organization from the environment.” 
Carruthers (1995) elaborates the relationship between New Institutionalism and accounting. He 
argues that at that time NIS was still under construction. In addition, Carruthers refers to Meyer 
and Rowan’s concept of rationalized myth. This concept is important to interpretive researchers, 
because it challenges the rather narrow instrumental character of performance management and the 
instrumental rationality that is involved in choosing performance management practices and system. 
   
Several studies (e.g. Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Brignall and Modell, 2000) 
employ New Institutionalism to explore the emergence of new control systems in organizations in the 
public sector. They argue that NIS-explanations of management accounting change are appropriate 
given the strong pressures in the institutional environment in which public sector agencies operate. 
These authors take a rather broad institutional perspective by arguing that NIS should incorporate 
the idea that accounting change can be initiated intentionally and pro-actively by management. 
Institutional pressures do not exclude strategic choice made by management to initiate and create 
performance management change.         
   
As a further development in the approach taken by these authors, more recently, apart from isomorphic 
pressures, neo-institutional studies also aim to explore the effects of local contexts for the further 
processing of performance management change. These studies portray heterogeneity and variation in 
organizational structures and practices given the idiosyncrasies of the organizational context (Scheuer 
and Scheuer, 2008). Scandinavian institutionalists (e.g. Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996), adopted Latour 
(1987) and Callon (1986)’s concept of translation given its connotation with change. The concept of 
translation suggests a more pro-active role of change agents in the institutional change process than 
has been considered by other new institutionalists (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008). As such, Scandinavion 
Institutionalism combines the concepts of translation and organizational change with elements of 
New Institutionalism. Dillard et al. (2004) also expand the institutional theory in management 
accounting in order to develop a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of accounting and 
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control change. They employ Giddens’ structuration theory by elaborating on the three structural 
dimensions: signification, legitimation and domination. Institutionalization, de-institutionalization 
or re-institutionalization processes would be generated through choosing important norms, values, 
beliefs (signification), through justifying the choices (legitimation), and through maintaining the same 
(domination) (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). It is noted that structuration theory has the 
potential to expand NIS by means of the three structural concepts that relate actions both to the 
organizational and higher-level environments like the socio-economic and political environment. 
The model by Dillard et al. also offers a broader perspective when compared to Old Institutionalism 
(Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). It could also account for the adoption processes of 
management accounting innovations, next to the further processing/ implementation processes.
Actor network theory and performance management change
Actor network theory (ANT) is another research stream in the interpretive perspective (for a recent 
literature review of ANT in accounting research, see Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011). This theory is 
based on the notion of translation as addressed by Latour (1987; 2005) and Callon and Latour (1981) 
(Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; Andon et al., 2007; Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). What is 
more, interaction between human and non-human elements plays a central role in explaining the 
evolutionary nature of performance management change. Non-human elements refer to the systems 
and practices in place, like performance management systems and accounting practices. Organizations 
are seen as networks of human and non-human elements (Latour, 1987; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). 
ANT explains how these networks come together to act as a whole. These networks are not intrinsically 
coherent and therefore may indeed contain conflicts. Outcomes of change are unpredictable.  
An increasing body of literature in the field of management accounting and performance management 
change employs ANT (e.g. Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; Andon et al., 2007). Quattrone and Hopper 
(2001) employ concepts from ANT for understanding the evolutionary nature of performance 
management change processes. The ties of varying strength in networks of human and non-human 
elements drive performance management change in unpredictable ways. Even though performance 
management change is initiated centrally, the unfolding process has an a-centered character given 
the interaction between human and non-human elements that render unpredictable outcomes. 
They claim that performance management change can better be portrayed as a drift rather than 
a rational and guided top down process. Drift refers to performance management change as an 
uncontrolled process instead of an orderly guided process with well-defined outcomes. Andon et al. 
(2007) emphasize the experimental and relational nature of accounting drift. Experimental, because 
the outcomes of change are unpredictable, hence a trial and error approach is required in order to 
improve performance management practices. Relational because “accounting change is connected 
to wide ranging networks of human and non-human elements, which variously informed and 
influenced change” (Andon et al., 2007: 281). Justesen and Mouritsen (2011) describe how three 
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main characteristics of ANT accounting research have inspired new lines of inquiry. First, the use of the 
concept of translation has given a new view on accounting and performance management change. A 
number of studies use this inspiration to analyze what happens when accounting innovations ‘travel’ 
from one context to another (e.g. Briers and Chua, 2001; Preston et al., 1992). Second, accounting 
technologies and calculative devices are given a new and important role because they are regarded 
as non-human actors that help constructing and often stabilize organizational activities. For instance 
Robson (1991, 1992) demonstrates that inscriptions are interesting because of the kind of action they 
enable, by being material, mobile and combinable. Inscription refers to a material textual translation 
of any setting, such as written texts, tables and charts, numbers, lists and so on, that is to be acted 
upon (Latour, 1987). Third, ANT accounting research rejects traditional sociological dichotomies, such 
as micro/macro, technical/social and structure/agency. The explanation is not reduced to one of the 
sides of such dualisms, but ANT focuses on the detailed description of empirical processes. Quattrone 
and Hopper (2005) is an example of a study that, through detailed empirical analysis, comes up with a 
lot of interesting and surprising candidates for explaining accounting change (Justesen and Mouritsen, 
2011).
Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) studied the mobilization of the BSC in four Danish firms taking a 
performative perspective (Latour, 1986; Callon, 1986), seeing the BSC as a ‘boundary object’ (cf. Briers 
and Chua, 2001). Boundary objects are plastic enough to adapt to local needs, yet robust enough 
to maintain a common identity (Star and Griesemer, 1989). In an earlier publication, Mouritsen 
(2005) suggests that mobilization is involved in making the BSC design perform in accordance 
with organizational concerns. Managers mobilize the design by intervening and adding to it. They 
supplement the BSC with processes and procedures in order to handle unexpected effects. Thus, 
managers sometimes make decisions not in accordance with the original BSC design. This is not to 
discard the design but to renegotiate and rectify its assumptions and consequences (Mouritsen, 
2005). Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) focus on the ‘problematization’ facet of the translation processes 
of the BSC (compare our theoretical framework in chapter 3 of this study). Organizational problems 
translate, and problematization “describes systems of alliances, or associations between entities, 
thereby defining the identity and what they ‘want’” (Callon, 1986: 206). The problems were the barrier 
to the development of corporate value and coherence, and were an input to staging the concerns 
and justifications about what the BSC was supposed to achieve for the firms. In case A the problem 
was ‘silo thinking’ (sub-optimization due to functional orientation). The solution was cross-functional 
integration and the BSC was seen as a mechanism that could give visibility to the mutual dependency 
between organizational entities. In case B the innovative and creative culture was a barrier for growth. 
There was a need for a planning culture and the BSC was seen as a mechanism to initiate individual 
goal setting and planning. Employees could better identify themselves with goals and measures when 
the terminology was a non-financial language about activities. In case C the problems were growth, 
heterogeneity, and a lack of structure in the sales divisions. There was a need to standardize the sales 
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divisions (internal benchmarking) and the BSC was seen as a mechanism to enable comparison of 
process and performance in different sales divisions. In case D the problem was poor performance 
(too high process time and costs). There was a need to reengineer certain processes within the 
organization and the BSC was seen as a mechanism to facilitate control of reengineered processes and 
the possibility to document success. 
The four cases suggest that BSC’s are mobilized vis-à-vis organizational problems that colour the BSC’s 
identity. The BSC was bent around organizational problems, and the role of strategic performance 
management in the four firms differed considerably. In the translation processes the problems and 
solutions were closely related: the problems were connected to a method of their rectification. In 
all four cases this method of rectification involved performance (which justified the problem), 
delegation (that makes things happen), and coordination (how elements are related). Here the BSC 
came in as a mechanism to tie together performance, delegation, and coordination, and to express 
them coherently; it helped to create this integration and intertwined singular management areas (e.g. 
marketing and production) through a “representational space where ‘administrative ’obligations and 
duties were drawn up” (Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005: 147). Hansen and Mouritsen conclude that 
the BSC was ‘functional’ as it was able to put the issues of cross-functional integration, individual 
goal-setting, benchmarking and process reengineering into solutions of decentralization, planning, 
control, performance, and change. As a boundary object, the BSC is plastic enough to stand for cross-
functional integration, a planning culture, benchmarking, and BPR. It gets its ‘colour’ from the specific 
problem in the specific situation. However, it is also robust enough to keep an identity that travels 
between the contexts of its application (e.g. features like the four perspectives and causal relations). 
The practice perspective in this paper turns the relationship between strategic designs and intentions 
and daily action on its head (see also Ahrens and Chapman, 2005). Design and intentions are the 
outcomes of action. Action does not follow design. A design like a BSC is regarded as a loosely related 
array of activities, held together by the purposes of the practitioners (Ahrens and Chapman, 2005: 12; 
Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005).
Relatively recent ANT-informed contributions to our knowledge on performance management are 
those by Qu and Cooper (2011) and Dambrin and Robson (2011). Qu and Cooper (2011), extending 
Robson (1992), analyze a detailed process of inscription building where diverse actors in a consulting 
firm and in the client organization attempt to edit local specifics to make a balanced scorecard 
acceptable. Dambrin and Robson (2011) demonstrate how ambivalence, opacity, bricolage, and 
practical actions enabled by inscription devices strengthen networks of performance measurement. 
Some additional examples of BSC change studies from an interpretive perspective
There also are a number of interesting studies that are less strictly related to a specific (social) theory. 
Kasurinen (2002) analyzed a BSC project in a strategic business unit of a multinational Finnish based 
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metals group. The paper aimed to further develop the accounting change model by Cobb et al. (1995) 
by specifying the types of barriers that may hinder, delay, or even prevent the management accounting 
change in practice. The study affirmed the importance of distinguishing between factors triggering 
and creating a potential for change. However, the study also identified a broad range of barriers to 
change. Kasurinen found that one of the encountered problems in the case organization was related 
to a fundamental characteristic of the BSC model. It is required that strategies are developed in great 
detail, explicitly and over a long period of time. However, it can be questioned whether it is sensible 
– or possible – to accomplish such a feat. Kasurinen (2002) also argued that one could place question 
marks with the directive that the organization should create strong and coherent BSC ‘cultures’ in all 
sub-units and in the individuals that form these sub-units. Not all people may be willing to invest the 
needed time and resources in the implementation process. The case study by Kasurinen suggests that 
the balanced scorecard building process, as presented by Kaplan and Norton (1996a: 300-308), does 
not pay enough explicit attention to the context of change implementation. The lack of this contextual 
analysis at an early stage of the project may be one reason why the change attempts do not always 
lead to a successful implementation, regardless of how skilfully they are managed in other respects 
(cf. Malmi, 1997). The revised accounting change model as proposed by Kasurinen (2002) offers a way 
to analyze the context of change. According to Kasurinen (2002), a crucial decision at the early stage 
of the BSC project is whether the focus of the project is on the measurement system characteristics or 
on the management system characteristics of the BSC (i.e. the ‘cockpit approach’ where connections 
between measures and strategies do not need to be very tight versus the ‘strategic approach’). 
In their interpretive study, Wickramasinghe, Gooneratne and Jayakody (2008) describe the “rise and 
fall” of a BSC project in a Sri Lankan family firm, occupied in importing, manufacturing, and sale of 
electrical accessories. The “rise” of the BSC was due to continuing efforts of CIMA (Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants) Sri Lanka to popularize the BSC practice among business leaders and local 
consultants, the wish of the owner-manager to change the organization from an informal organization 
into a formal and systematic organization, the intuitive appeal of the writings of Kaplan and Norton, 
and the one-sided (“positive”) attitude of the consultant with regard to the BSC. At the initial stage, 
the BSC was seen as an effective management control system by the functional managers. Managers 
were “disciplined” to see “different perspectives”, instead of only financial outcomes. However, this 
new situation did not last long (Wickramasinghe, Gooneratne and Jayakody, 2008: 241). The “fall” 
of the BSC was due to power struggles between the consultant and the accountants, and between 
engineering managers and the accountants, and due to the rise of and experimentation with other 
management fads (e.g. TQM, Six Sigma). Moreover, the owner-manager realized that he needed to 
see the “bottom-line” profits and “sales”, rather than many “perspectives”. The BSC ended up with an 
information-processing function: only some residuals remained alive through the Corvu system with 
little impact on management control (Wickramasinghe, Gooneratne and Jayakody, 2008: 265). 
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Summary
This chapter provided a mini-review of interpretive research into performance management change. As 
such, it was positioned against both research from a rationalists or mainstream perspective and research 
from a critical perspective. From a mainstream perspective research is informed by both organizational 
economics and contingency theory. It is acknowledged that both organizational economics and 
contingency approaches downplay processes of change. From an interpretive perspective, processes 
of change are highlighted by placing performance management in a relational perspective. The notion 
of translation is central in such interpretive approaches. These approaches reveal how performance 
management comes to be locally shaped and how it is enacted. Moreover, interpretive approaches 
are sensitive to developments in the institutional environment. To a lesser or higher extent there may 
be isomorphic pressures entailing legitimacy considerations. An interpretive approach to performance 
management inter alia differs from a critical perspective in that the latter analyses the archaeology of 
performance management in order to highlight its disciplinary consequences, or demonstrates how 
performance management systems rely on abstracted, disembodied and disembedded approaches to 
management and subordinates the communicative to the instrumental.
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researching change in performance 
management: a theoretical framework
introduction
This research aims to study the (re)construction process of the BSC at the level 
of the individual organization. Given the substantial degrees of freedom offered 
by the BSC concept as well as the relative autonomy and freedom the two case 
organizations have in shaping the BSC to their needs, it is meaningful to consider 
the (re)construction process as a translation process (e.g. Doorewaard and van 
Bijsterveld, 2001; Sandhu et	al., 2008). Scandinavian	Institutionalism combines 
the concept of translation and organizational change with elements of New 
Institutionalism to develop a translation framework (Funck, 2007; Sahlin and 
Wedlin, 2008). Scandinavian Institutionalism approaches change in a pragmatic 
way (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996). It goes beyond modernist dichotomies, 
such as social/technical, intentional/deterministic, global/local. It studies 
change processes from a constructivist perspective, relying on narratives. 
According to this perspective, preferences, norms and perceptions of reality 
are shaped in institutional contexts, and cannot be understood outside these 
(Johnson and Hagstrøm, 2005). Also, according to this perspective, something 
is real and in existence once it has been constructed. Another basic tenet 
of the constructivist perspective is that it raises awareness of the fact that 
constructed phenomena are not inevitable, thus demonstrating the importance 
of the interaction between ideas and actions (Johnson and Hagstrøm, 2005). 
Scandinavian Institutionalism provides an alternative conception of change; 
change as the travel of ideas. It shows how ideas spread from one organization 
to another, and how they are subsequently adopted and translated differently 
in different organizational contexts. The theory is meaningful for understanding 
how original ideas are translated within organizations to make them work, to 
make them practicable. In this way, it opens up what is usually regarded as the 
black box. 
Scandinavian Institutionalism, consistent with institutional research (Hopper et 
al., 2007), perceives change as a continuous process rather than a discrete event 
with an identifiable beginning and end. It complements traditional institutional 
theory as it considers the dialectic relationship between isomorphism and 
metamorphism (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). It is meaningless to make a distinction 
between ‘imitation’ (isomorphism) and ‘innovation’ (metamorphism) because 
‘imitation’ can hardly be thought of without ‘translation’ bearing traces of 
‘innovation’ (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). The other way around, innovation can 
hardly be imagined without reference to something existing and its ‘translation’ 
to new situations (Becker-Rittersbach, 2006; Sevón, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 
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1996). Scandinavian Institutionalism also challenges the New Institutionalists’ notion of ‘diffusion’. 
According to the diffusion model of change, movements start by some ‘initial energy’ (e.g. command 
by top management) and ideas move until they meet resistance to change (‘friction’; Czarniawska, 
2008). Friction in the social as well as in the technical world is seen as a negative phenomenon when 
movement is desired. Also, changes in the original idea must be prevented as they mean distortions 
(Czarniawska, 2008).
According to the translation model of change, used by Scandinavian Institutionalism, it is difficult to 
trace back to ‘the original movement’. There is no initial energy. All ideas exist all the time and they do 
not ’diffuse’ by themselves. The role of agency is important here. It is the people who pass the ideas 
on to each other, each one translating them according to their own frame of reference (Czarniawska, 
2008). Encounters between frames of reference (i.e. ideas in residence) and traveling	 ideas can be 
called ‘friction’. But now friction has a positive connotation. Energy results from friction (the clash 
between ideas in residence and traveling ideas), leading to the transformation of both (Czarniawska, 
2008). This notion that when an idea is transferred to a new context, the idea as much as the context 
undergo change is called ‘dialectical	transformation’ by Becker-Ritterspach (2006). The translators and 
their context change, but also changes in the original/traveling idea are inevitable; they transform and 
often enrich it (Czarniawska, 2008, 2012). The translation model is interesting because translation is 
seen as a collective act of (re)creation and (re)construction, and not as a bothersome impediment of 
a swift diffusion (Czarniawska, 2008): 
“...the model of diffusion offers an illusion – or is it a hope?- of control, whereas the translation 
model permits the unexpected and unforeseeable, thus promising ambiguity and uncertainty 
in the process” (Czarniawska, 2008: 88).
The travel of ideas
The process of translation
Ideas are defined as “images which become known in the form of pictures or sounds (words can be 
either one or another)” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 20). Those ideas can become objects by 
means of materialization in many ways. For instance, they can be written down in books and articles. 
Ideas can be turned into action as they are communicated. Ideas that are objectified become public 
knowledge. Subsequently, they can travel across space and time. They move because of human curiosity 
and interest in new things, and they move by the way of the energy produced by each translation 
(Czarniawska, 2008: 92): “Even ideas that have materialized will not move if no one demonstrates an 
interest in them and does not want to translate them to their own need” (Czarniawska, 2008: 92/93). 
Ideas like this can, for instance, be called old books but it is not impossible that one day somebody will 
come to the library or archive and dust them off.
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The entire travel of ideas can be divided in two main phases: disembedding and re-embedding through 
the process of translation. The disembedding of ideas refers to the decontextualization of local ideas. 
Local ideas or innovations are objectified, theorized and given a name by consultants and academics 
as they are explicated into books and articles. These local ideas are translated into global theories, 
which can be applied in many organizations across the world. Once ideas are disembedded they are 
free to travel as a general concept. As the idea arrives at a local organization it is re-embedded into 
local practice. As such, one could argue that disembeddedness refers to a movement from the local 
to the global, whereas re-embeddedness is about a movement from the global to the local. Through 
the process of translation both phases are connected; there is a global-local interaction. Czarniawska 
and Joerges (1996: 21) point to the fact that local and global are not ostensive but performative 
properties: “people make something into local or global, they localize or globalize. And they do it at 
different time intervals, of course”. Global is not a separate entity, but a “hugely extended net work of 
localities” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 22). This implies taking into account both the spatial and 
time dimensions. ‘Globalized time/space’ connects a number of ‘localized time/spaces’, implying that 
globalized institutions are also constantly reproduced locally (Becker and Saxl, 2009). So, globalized 
time/space involves at the same stance a re-embedding of disembedded practices into localized time/
spaces (Becker and Saxl, 2009). This is the reason why Czarniawska and Joerges speak of the global as 
a network of localities: “What we call a ‘global economy’ is a network of many local economies, which 
thus acquire an unprecedented scale and scope of action” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 22). As a 
rough analogy, Becker and Saxl (2009: 6) argue that globalized management accounting practices (like 
the BSC) may be understood as a network of many localized management accounting practices which 
are performed in identical or similar form across many localized time/spaces.
The travel of ideas starts at a local time/space. Local ideas are turned into objects, allowing them to 
travel and cross local barriers. Nowadays, communication and transportation allow ideas to travel 
quickly across the globe (Czarniawska, 2008). As these ideas start to travel they are no longer local. 
They have been theorized, named, and transformed into global concepts which can be applied in 
almost any context; they have become disembedded as they are decontextualized from their local 
roots. Travelling across the world, these so-called translocal ideas land in various places. They are re-
embedded in local settings. This is where the theory differs from the modernist notion of diffusion, 
which assumes that global concepts can be imitated thereby leaving the initial idea untouched as it 
will be similar in every situation. 
  
Czarniawska (2008: 93) illustrates the rationale for the translation of ideas by employing the gardening 
metaphor: “... everyone knows that plants that are to be moved to another place are taken from the 
bed where they were growing, and then, cleaned of most of the soil in which they sat, are put into 
a new bed. An experienced gardener knows how much or rather how little of the old soil should 
remain around the roots of the plant to survive, yet not clash with the soil in the new bed. The plant 
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growing at a new place is never identical to the one that started traveling; it has been transplanted, or 
translated (which literally means put in another place)”. The argument is that, once adopted, an idea 
or innovation may well be interpreted differently by different change agents and other actors in local 
contexts. As a result, the idea may well be constructed and employed differently across organizations 
due to the idiosyncrasies of the local context. The notion of translation of Callon (1986) and Latour 
(1986) is employed as a way to contrast the diffusion model (Zilber, 2008).
“The model of diffusion may be contrasted with another, that of the model of translation. 
According to the latter, the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artefacts 
goods – is in the hand of people; each of these people may act in many different ways, 
letting the token to drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or 
appropriating it” (Latour, 1986: 267).
Every time an idea is translated the translation process is influenced by the organizational context. As 
a result the very same idea is translated differently by different organizations and even by different 
actors within the same organization. The original/traveling idea is likely to be changed as organizations 
will transform them and, if necessary, enrich them in order to make them work (Czarniawska, 2008). 
Eventually, elements of the original idea will be “lost in translation” (Morris and Lancaster, 2006: 210). 
The rise of global ideas
Not every idea travels across the world. For understanding why some ideas become global whereas 
others remain local, the phenomenon of fashion comes into play: “The image we are invoking is as 
follows: guided by fashion, people imitate desires or beliefs that appear as attractive at a given time 
and place. This leads them to translating ideas, objects, and practices, for their own use” (Czarniawska 
and Sevón, 2005: 10). Even though fashion seems to be contradictory to institutions, as the first is 
likely to challenge the latter, a more complex process seems to explain their connectedness and 
complementary relation. Fashions not only challenge institutions, once more and more organizations 
perceive the ideas as a remedy for some perceived organizational problem they can become institutions 
as well (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). “As long as the problem is the focus of attention, all the ideas 
which can be related to it have greater chance of being realized” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 32). 
Still, it is not only the properties of the idea that determine its fashionability. Instead, the attention the 
idea receives is key. Arguably, successful promotion plays an important role in the acceptance of ideas. 
A fashion arises in case of perceptual readiness. For some ideas their time has come. “An idea cannot 
catch on unless it already exists for some time in many people’s minds, as a part of a master-idea in a 
translocal time/space” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 36). Fashion arises as it is followed. Consultants 
often play an important role in spreading ideas as they are the designers, distributors, wholesalers, 
and retailers of the idea (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1999). As more and more organizations start to 
translate the idea, a chain of translations is created and a kind of “field	consciousness” (Homan, 2006: 
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74) arises. This collective translation process produces fashions. Organizations are part of time/space 
collectives, which explains why they have similar practices. Once such a collective has selected an 
idea, the idea can become an institution; it becomes an unquestionable, taken for granted practice. In 
this way fashion produces institutions, and institutions produce fashions. Change on a local level does 
not occur out of the blue. Instead, it is related to the institutional requirements of the environment. 
As Czarniawska and Joerges (1996: 16) note, “organizations introduce the same changes at about 
the same time.” Hence, it becomes apparent that Scandinavian Institutionalism, given its roots in 
New Institutionalism, recognizes the influence of the external environment of the organization for 
understanding change on a micro-level.
Unlike most New Institutionalists, Scandinavian Institutionalism recognizes the active role of agency 
(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008). For ideas to land, change agents 
should adopt them. “Such an adoption is far from unconscious or passive: it activates the intentional 
processes of the creation of meaning” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 47). These change agents, 
so-called translators, make sure that words become deeds, the idea which is an object is turned 
into action. A local translation is made by change agents, thereby creating a new idea and a new 
actor (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Creed et al., 2002). The translation metaphor is adopted by 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996:24) as it is attractive for portraying organizational change given that 
“it comprises what exists and what is created.” The translation process starts with an idea that exists, 
which is subsequently transformed into an object. 
Once we arrive at a local place the journey of the idea approaches completion. “An idea has been 
objectified, has traveled, and has arrived at a new place ready to be translated into action” (Czarniawska 
and Joerges, 1996: 39). In essence, Scandinavian Institutionalism offers a tracking device, as it describes 
where ideas come from and where they go. Once ideas turn into fashion they are likely to land in many 
organizations. Focusing on the intra-organizational change processes, translocal ideas are re-embedded 
in the place they are landed (Czarniawska, 2008). They take root in a local time/space. They become re-
embedded as local organizations materialize them in objects and actions. However, it should be noted 
that some of the local interpretations will alter the idea successfully, hence gives impetus for the idea 
to travel again creating an on-going spiral of fashion, as shown in	figure	2. This figure illustrates how 
local ideas are related to the globalized time space and vice versa. In this way these local experiences 
are re-distributed and eventually may become global ideas as well.  
“We watch ideas become quasi-objects, transgressing the barriers of local time and entering 
translocal paths, becoming ‘disembedded’, in Giddens’ (1990) terms. We watch them again, 
landing in various localities, becoming ‘re-embedded’, materialized in actions, and – when 
judged successful – becoming institutions only to occasion anew the generation of ideas”	
(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 22/23).
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FIGURE 2: THE SPIRAL OF FASHION (CZARNIAWSKA AND JOERGES, 1996: 46).
Scandinavian Institutionalism offers a holistic perspective towards organizational change. Change 
cannot be captured by modernist dichotomies of change. It is not a planned event as suggested 
by studies that adopt a rational perspective, nor an ‘automatic’ result or the result of isomorphic 
pressures in the institutional environment of the organization as suggested by (neo)institutional theory 
and contingency theory. It is “the mixture of intentional and contingent effects that ultimately shapes 
change in any and all organizations” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:47). Czarniawska and Joerges 
recognize the influence of the external environment of organizations, reflecting New Institutionalism. 
Simultaneously, organizational change is seen as an intentional endeavor, far from being passive or 
unconscious as suggested by original insights in New Institutionalism. 
Scandinavian Institutionalism builds on NIS thought, but seeks to go beyond it. A major starting point 
of Scandinavian Institutionalism is a rejection of the NIS notion of ‘diffusion’ as well as of a one-sided 
focus on stability. Drawing on ANT (Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986), Scandinavian 
Institutionalism seeks to replace the ‘diffusion’ concept with the ‘concept of translation’ (Becker-
Ritterspach, 2006; Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996). Scandinavian institutionalist researchers see this 
conceptual change as a cornerstone for achieving a better understanding of (de-) institutionalization 
processes because ‘translations’ imply changes, however minuscule they may be (Becker-Ritterspach, 
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2006:363). Czarniawska and Sevón (1996:5) call for a need for a paradoxical view of organizations: 
“Change	and	 stability	 together	 become	an	organizational	 norm,	 as	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness	 is	
seen	as	complementary	to	the	logic	of	consequentiality” (see also Magnusson and Oskarsson, 2008: 
2). Scandinavian Institutionalism conceives the organizational field as a ‘field of forces’, kept together 
by processes of translation, where all arrangements of people and things are necessarily provisional 
and contingent (Lindberg et	al., 2007:5). Scandinavian Institutionalism explains how ideas travel in 
and across organizational fields, accounting for institutional stability as well as change, and offering a 
solution for the following problem with NIS: “New institutionalists don’t explain the role of actors and 
actions in the creation, diffusion, and stabilization of organizational practices” (Scheuer and Scheuer, 
2008: 159). Czarniawska and Sevón (1996:5) argue that, although planned organizational change never 
succeeds in full, “people	do	manage	to	convince	each	other	–	to	change	their	opinions,	beliefs,	and	
ways	of	acting	–	and	not	only	by	mistake”. This approach to institutional theory is complemented by 
a focus on organizational practice and processes of institutionalization (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard, 
2007; Erlingsdottir and Lindberg, 2005). This action/practice orientation is, for instance, vividly 
described by Czarniawska and Joerges (1996:41): “The	magic	moment	when	words	become	deeds	is	
the	one	that	truly	deserves	to	be	called	materialization...”. Scandinavian Institutionalism focuses on 
what happens in the encounter between an innovative idea and practice in organizations (Scheuer 
and Scheuer, 2008: 117). Scandinavian Institutionalism may be seen as an answer to Lounsbury and 
Ventresca’s (2003) call for new institutionalists to focus on temporal and spatial variation in order to 
analyze how different positions in a field, relational connections, or identities shape the decision of 
organizations to adopt new practices and how they implement them (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008: 
117). Finally, Scandinavian Institutionalism offers a more nuanced view of institutional isomorphism 
as presented by NIS (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The travel of ideas can result in homogeneity as 
well as heterogeneity among organizations and this view opens up for a broader interpretation of the 
spread of management ideas (Karlsson and Torgerson, 2011:14; Erlingsdottir and Lindberg, 2005). 
Heterogeneity may, for instance, result when a use of coercive forces produces counteractions with 
unexpected consequences (Lindberg et	 al., 2007: 6). Mimetic forces become more complex when 
interpreted in terms of fashion (this is both the will to conform and the will to be unique). Fashions 
and processes of attention (‘perceptual readiness’; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:27) are considered 
very important in relation to the translation process. Normative forces exert opposing pressures to 
follow as well as to rebel against traditions (Lindberg et	al., 2007: 6). In sum, this interplay between 
intentional action and taken-for-granted norms makes structuring organizational fields a much more 
complex process than many new institutionalist researchers have suggested (Lindberg et	al., 2007:6).
As mentioned before, Scandinavian Institutionalism uses ANT’s translation model as its point of 
departure (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008:161). According to Scheuer and Scheuer (2008) the term 
translation is connected with a network building activity where actors transform tokens (e.g. 
ideas) into something else by translating or associating them with heterogeneous elements that 
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might be human or non-human. The understanding of translation in Scandinavian Institutionalism 
is related to the definition of Callon and Latour (1981), though it minimizes the violent part which 
took up much space in the article on Leviathan (Robertsen, 2010:23). Scandinavian Institutionalism 
stresses how actors cannot only be forced but also convinced into doing what is needed for the 
idea to be introduced (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996; Scheuer and 
Scheuer, 2008). Instead of remaining loyal to the constructionist, flat ontology of ANT, Scandinavian 
institutionalists integrated ANT’s conceptualization of the concept of translation into their own social 
constructivist idea model (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008:161). Scandinavian Institutionalism constructs 
the translation process as one whereby an idea is translated into an object, then into an action and, 
finally, if the action is repeated and stabilized there is a chance that the transference rises above a 
passing fashion into an enduring institution (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006; Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008). 
Ideas are supposed to be able to travel when they have become objectified (i.e. turned into objects 
that have been disembedded) (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). Disembedded objects may travel in 
time and space until they are translated by a local human actor or translator, whereby the objects 
become re-embedded (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008). As mentioned 
before, fashions and processes of attention (‘perceptual readiness’) are seen as very important in 
the translation process. What is given attention will depend on what the actors know in advance, on 
cultural assumptions, on political structures, and on what institutional entrepreneurs, the market, 
and the general public find important at a given time and place (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008:161). 
Thus, Scandinavian Institutionalism considers humans and objects’ ‘situatedness’ in time and space 
as constitutive for the translation process (Scheuer, 2007:18). According to ANT however, time and 
space are actants as other actants that might influence the translation process (Scheuer, 2007:18). 
Whether it does is viewed as an empirical question. This ontology of ANT is criticized by Scandinavian 
institutionalists for being out of touch with the world we live in (Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008:116). ANT 
is accused of suggesting an ontology that is in accordance with a society where the majority of the 
translation processes take place in cyberspace, or through other means of communication, making it 
possible to ignore the ‘situatedness’ of and distances between the body and objects in time and space 
(Scheuer and Scheuer, 2008:116; Scheuer, 2007:18).
Scandinavian Institutionalism positions translation not as a result of purely flat relations between human 
and other-than-human actors, but as a practice (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard, 2007; Erlingsdottir and 
Lindberg, 2005). A practice is an organized human activity. It is an “organized, open-ended spatial-
temporal manifold of actions” (Schatzki, 2005:471) in which many actors may take part. It is made up 
by understandings, rules and human intentions that organize chains of action or “arrays of activity” 
(Schatzki, 2001:2) and is inherently normative. Different from an ANT-perspective, a Scandinavian 
institutionalist practice perspective acknowledges that certain managerial locations may be a priori 
privileged; that there are managerial intentions that are not network-effects, but that are infused in the 
network. Specific managers may embed the practice in an intentional structure, whilst allowing for the 
agency of many other actors. Therefore, although it is infused with managerial intentions, the practice 
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might have unexpected consequences. Moreover, a Scandinavian institutionalist practice perspective 
is less deconstructive than an ANT-perspective; it takes an interest “in the (temporarily) assemblages 
of which it becomes a part” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007:8). In such a practice perspective, the BSC 
is not treated as a side-effect of all kinds of associations, but is interesting in itself. It is a more or less 
stable institution or structure that results from the translation practice.
  
a conceptual framework
For matters of simplification the disembedding and re-embedding of ideas through the translation 
process can be categorized into a number of analytical stages. The translation framework is shown in 
Figure 3.
Disembedding
The first stage of the framework refers to the disembedding of the idea from a local setting to a 
global setting. Ideas become disembedded once they are theorized and named and thus objectified 
(Qu and Cooper, 2007). Theorization refers to “the self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect” 
(Strang and Meyer, 1993: 492). Naming/	 languaging	 plays an important role in theorizing and 
disembedding an idea because it allows the idea to be communicated to a wider audience and to 
become part of the cognitive map of the field (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). It refers to “the power 
to consecrate linguistic and discursive competencies, i.e. the ability to create categorization submaps” 
(Oakes et	al., 1998: 284). When ideas are objectified then they are ready to travel. Thus, in order 
to make this happen, institutional entrepreneurs interpret and transform the model/idea, linking 
it to a more general and simpler account (Leca et	al., 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Institutional 
entrepreneurs are conceptualized as being able to disembed themselves from existing institutional 
arrangements (Beckert, 1999), in order to change existing institutions or create new ones (Leca and 
Naccache, 2006: 628). This simplified version becomes a translocal idea, i.e. an idea “floating in the 
translocal organizational thought-worlds” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 16), until it is re-embedded 
in another local context (Leca et	al., 2006). That this decontextualization can also have a material 
dimension can, for instance, be illustrated by Callon (1986) who shows how scallops are brought from 
Japan to St. Brieuc as part of a translation project to change Japanese techniques of scallops’ raising 
in France (Leca et	al., 1996).
Re-embedding: five stages
Then, the institutional entrepreneurs must re-embed the idea within the focal setting where they 
want to implement it (Leca et	al. 1996). Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) point to the double dimension 
of this re-embeddedness which includes interpretation – i.e. aligning the new idea with words, values 
and symbols that already exist in the focal context, and materialization – i.e. the enactment of the new 
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idea through discursive and material arrangements (Leca et	al., 1996). The re-embeddednes of ideas, 
which refers to the intra-organizational change processes that unfold once a disembedded idea has 
entered the organization, involves the following five stages: problematization, interessement, idea-
materialization, support of allies, and institutionalization.
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FIGURE 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (BASED ON LECA ET AL., 2006; CZARNIAWSKA AND JOERGES, 
1996; VORONOV ET AL., 2010)
Problematization is about the perceived problem the idea aims to solve. An idea is more likely to 
become accepted when it provides an answer to a perceived problem. ”Often there is an attempt to 
portray the process as functional: this particular idea was spotted and adopted because it served well 
in resolving a specific difficulty”	(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:27). That is, the idea is of relevance to 
the concrete organizational problem (Frenkel, 2005; Mouritsen, 2005). The institutional entrepreneur/
local champion defines the main groups of potential allies that they want to target and elaborates 
the problematization accordingly (Leca, et	al., 2006). This implies the identification of actors whose 
support is likely to help the institutionalization of the project. Sahlin-Andersson (1996) suggests that 
entrepreneurs/champions must set a logic, linking causes to effects to present the idea: “the story” 
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will present the problem and the solution (Leca et	al., 2006). The concepts must be presented in a 
rational way, defining and explaining causal relations (Leca et	al., 2006). From a social constructivist 
perspective, an event such as a BSC innovation is not inherently disruptive (Ezzamel et	al., 2012:284). 
It is theorization which makes it disruptive (Munir, 2005:94; Ezzamel et	al., 2012:284). Voronov et	al. 
(2010) argue that theorization is a phenomenon that has been conceptualized in prior literature as 
operating on both the macro-level and micro-level (see also Svejenova et	al., 2007). According to them 
local	ex-ante	theorization includes local actors’ creation of an initial model, based on the identification 
of problems and formulation of solutions to these problems. This local ex ante theorization also 
informs actors about the existence of new practices and gives motivations why old practices need to 
be replaced (theorization specifies organizational failings!) with these new practices (Voronov et	al.,	
2010; Hinings et	al., 2004; Dacin et	al., 2002; Ezzamel et	al., 2012). Or as Hinings (2011: 3) puts it: “...
theorization points to the necessity of establishing why an emergent culture or practice should be 
adopted...”. Sahlin-Andersson (1996: 71) explains how a problem is constructed locally: “One common 
definition of a problem is the difference between a desired state and the present state. The perception 
of a problem is thus a result of comparison”. Once a problem has been identified locally,	organizations 
are inclined to search in their environments for ‘success stories’, to imitate (Nilsson, 2005).
   
Interessement (Akrich et	al., 2002a,b) refers to convincing the other organizational actors about the 
need for change and the role of the idea. Interessement can be defined as a matter of interesting an 
increasing number of allies around a potential innovation (Pohl et	al., 2009:53). The entrepreneur/
champion must convince the actors of the focal field that the project will benefit them. The idea will be 
edited according to the local context’s institutional arrangements (Leca et	al., 2006; Sahlin-Andersson, 
1996). A good fit with these local institutional arrangements increases the chance of successful 
institutionalization (Leca et	al.,	2006; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). The institutional entrepreneur/
champion must perform translating in the new context and editing aimed at convincing other actors 
to take part in the change (Leca et	al.,	2006; Czarniawska, 1990). A discursive strategy is to formulate 
the concepts in the local settings so that they “tell a good story” (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996:87) – i.e. 
in such a way that they would attract attention (Leca et	al., 2006). In order to legitimize	the	idea, it 
is often presented as rationally and logically appealing, including a clear causality pattern (Nilsson, 
2005; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Change agents that tell a good story are more likely to generate 
support for the idea. In order to create support the idea needs to be legitimized. Some elements 
can be overemphasized and dramatized to convince local actors (Leca et	 al., 2006). By means of 
‘languaging’ a bridge can be build between the present (state) and the future (desired state) of the 
organization. Languaging (Von Krogh et al., 1994; von Krogh and Roos, 1995; Wolpert, 2002) is being 
defined in this study as developing a common terminology by inventing, applying and/or rejecting 
distinctions, by means of interaction/dialogue among actors (Wolpert, 2002; Tsoukas, 2009). The goal 
is to exchange interpretations, get to the bottom of meanings and to develop a common definition 
of the situation and common action context. Distinctions are ideas, images and insights that are put 
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into words in language and are expressed in the form of opposite twin concepts (Wolpert, 2002). 
Through distinctions actors establish a discrepancy between the existing and desired situation. The 
actors try to express their own opinions by using distinctions, in order to accentuate certain aspects 
they consider particularly important during the interactions with other actors (creating contrast). To 
a certain extent the translation effort has the character of a ‘language	game’, in which actors try to 
reach consensus about the meaning of certain key concepts and possible innovations locked in these 
concepts (Wittgenstein, 1953; von Krogh and Roos, 1995: 99). By means of interaction, the actors 
try to mutually develop a common definition of the situation and a common action context. For this, 
a consequent management terminology, interpretation and meaning conferment to the terms and 
concepts that are highlighted in the interaction is necessary. Von Krogh et	al. (1994: 62-63) describe 
the dynamic verb (Chua, 2007) of ‘languaging’ and the role of distinctions therein as follows:
“As organizational members observe events and situations, and as they engage in languaging, 
that is, apply and invent	distinctions, phrases, sentences etc., they participate in developing 
organizational knowledge. Agreement and disagreement are apparent at many levels of the 
organization at all times, and as organizational members strive towards agreement (or settle 
for disagreement) they continue to develop organizational knowledge, enabling finer	 and	
finer	distinctions… Sometimes organizational members invent new	fundamental	distinctions 
pertaining to organization vs. environment, strategic vs. operational, innovation vs. imitation 
etc. In other words, they scale towards the ‘root’ of the distinction tree. This scaling has 
seriously challenged existing organizational knowledge and current distinction making. The 
reaction of other organizational members is often apparent; they do not recognize these 
new distinctions as advancing the knowledge of the organization. Why? Perhaps they do not 
so much because they disagree with the new distinctions, but rather because they do not 
understand the distinctions; i.e. they lack knowledge. … Organizational members frequently 
introduce new ideas, new concepts, and new experiences. The	key	question	is	to	what	extent	
new	distinctions	are	‘languaged’ in the organization, and how long they are sustained. New 
distinctions often vanish simply because they are not understood or further debated”.
So, interessement systems “aim at convincing the actors that they have an interest in cooperating 
to the institutionalization of the new practice” (Leca et	al.,	2006: 7).
Once, the idea has gained legitimacy it is materialized into an object, so-called idea-materialization. 
The process of materialization gives rise to new meaning for ideas (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; 
Czarniawska, 2008). This embodiment of the idea is aimed at making the idea work (“materialize in 
action”) for the organization. In this study we are interested in researching how the BSC is made 
practicable, how it is made to work. For instance, how is someone becoming capable to act as a BSC 
user? 
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It should be noted that “most ideas can be proven to fit most problems, assuming good will, creativity, 
and a tendency to consensus” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:25). The act of translation is creating 
the match between the idea and the perceived problem. Therefore, idea-materialization can be seen 
as an act of customization as the idea is transformed by the adopting organization. 
Often, the solution is embodied in inscription	devices in which the problematization and interessement 
are materialized (Joerges and Czarniawska, 1998). Inscription devices influence the thoughts 
and actions of members of a network (Mouritsen et	al., 2010:312) and constrain and enable local 
control and action at a distance (Robson, 1992; Sundstrøm, 2011) They reduce the range of possible 
conversations (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). These material artifacts will stabilize the problematization 
and the distinctions and diffuse them (Leca et	al., 2006). Inscriptions that start to travel the world will 
“change the world as they go” (Callon and Latour, 1981; Munro, 2009: 133). Inscription devices take 
the form of projects, handbooks, tentative templates, memos, reports and so on. They put down what 
are the issues and the solutions considered (Leca et	al.,	2006). If actors accept the device, they will 
agree to discuss within the limits of this artifact (Leca et	al., 2006). Qu and Cooper (2011) describe 
three features of inscriptions. First, inscription building provides local specificity. Second, inscriptions 
can be a means to control conceptual ambiguity. Third, inscriptions can hold together a network of 
support for management technologies (see Qu and Cooper, 2011 for an elaboration).
Support	of	allies indicates whether the idea is enacted by organizational actors. Is there commitment	
(Benn, 2011)? Is the newly constructed object or system employed by the targeted audience? 
If the champion considers that a sufficient group of actors fail to give their support (e.g. because 
they reject or do not understand the distinctions), he can negotiate with potential allies. He can (re)
negotiate about the problematization or interessement (e.g. Fligstein, 1997, 2001) as well as about the 
inscription devices (Callon, 1986) with potential allies to ensure that the idea is enacted by more and 
more people within the organization (Leca et	al., 1996). 
     
The final stage is institutionalization, which indicates whether the idea/model is institutionalized at 
the level of the specific organization. Local	 ex-post	 theorization is part of this stage. Local ex-post 
theorization includes post-hoc reflections on the collective translation work, whereby the reflecting 
actors search for evidence of the success of the translation, or lack thereof, and rationalize it (Voronov 
et	 al., 2010) Thus, local ex-post theorization evaluates the outcomes of the translation work, and 
whether the local model still necessitates further elaboration (Voronov, et	 al., 2010). If not, and 
the situation is signalled by stability, institutionalization comes into the picture. Over time the idea/
object has become unquestionable and taken-for-granted. The idea/object is turned into action, and 
that action is repeated to the point of forming an action pattern. If this action pattern acquires a 
normative justification, an institution emerges (Czarniawska, 2008: 93). In addition, whether the idea 
has become an institutionalized action is often signalled by spokesmanship on behalf of one of the 
change agents. At this stage the new institution will either tend to become irreversible or fail (Leca et 
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al., 2006). This can be measured by convergence – i.e. “the extent to which the process of translation 
and its circulation of intermediaries leads to agreement” (Callon, 1991:144; Leca et	al., 2006). The 
network begins to be perceived as a ‘macro actor’ (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996: 7), meaning that the 
networks created by associating micro-actors acquire a relative stability.
In some cases the translated idea may go ‘back to the globe’ and become a new model, which, if 
successfully promoted within and outside the organization, may start to travel over the world again 
thereby creating an on-going spiral of fashion, hence explaining the dotted line in figure	3. Voronov et 
al.	(2010: 42) even state that just “by choosing to adopt and develop a particular version of the global 
institution, local actors thereby enter the global field and become participants in the debate about the 
nature of this institution”.
        
It should be noted that the stages of the re-embeddedness phase are not unidirectional. It is more 
likely that they are interacting with each other throughout the translation process, and that several 
of these stages, in some cases, are taken place simultaneously and continuously (Johnson and 
Hagstrøm, 2005). For instance, it may well be that the materialized idea fails to gain the support of 
allies, hence requires additional argumentation why the idea solves the perceived problem, referring 
to the problematization stage. Furthermore, the idea may require additional explanation and 
languaging in order to become legitimate, referring to the interessement stage. Moreover, it could 
be that in order to gain the support of allies the materialized idea requires reconstruction. Finally, 
de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization may probably follow the institutionalization process 
(Johnson and Hagstrøm, 2005).
Summary
In this chapter a theoretical framework based on Scandinavian Institutionalism was sketched. At the 
heart of the framework is the notion of translation, a collective act of re-creation or reconstruction. 
Both those who translate and that which is translated are modified. Although the influence of the 
organizational environment on a local change in performance management is recognized, change is 
essentially viewed as a product of translation and not as a product of diffusion. As a consequence 
of disembedding a translocal idea is shaped, that, through problematization, interessement, idea-
materialization, the support of allies and, ultimately, institutionalization is re-embedded in another 
local context. Processes of translation entail that a translocal idea never becomes a global idea that 
can be diffused across organizations while obtaining its original properties. The ‘global’ is no more 
than a network of localities.

Chapter
4
research methodology
introduction
In this chapter I discuss the concepts methodology, methods and field research. 
Then I will describe the reasons for choosing the field study methodology, 
followed by an explanation of how I decided and acted on the case study sites. 
Then I go on with a description of the processes of data collection and data 
analysis. Finally, I discuss some limitations of the research and end the chapter 
with a summary. 
research methodology, methods and field research
This study adopts a constructivist-interpretive paradigm (Soekijad, 2005). 
This means that it adopts an ontological stance that posits that “realities are 
constructed from multiple, intangible mental constructions that are socially and 
experientially based, local and specific in nature, and dependent on their form 
and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions” 
(Butler, 1998: 294). The epistemology is subjectivist because the researcher 
and the object under investigation are interactively linked (Butler, 1998; Koro-
Ljungberg, 2008; Soekijad, 2005). Together they create the findings as the 
research proceeds (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 33 call this “co-construction” 
by the researcher and the interviewee). The methodology is qualitative (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006). Methodology refers to the general approach to studying 
research topics (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). It “involves theorizing about 
how we find things out; it is about the relationship between the process and 
the product of research” (Mayan, 2009: 31). A method is a specific research 
technique (such as interviews, documentary analysis, and observations). A 
method exists within methodology (Mayan, 2009: 31). Qualitative methodology 
assumes that “social reality is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified 
through human interaction” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Chua, 1986: 615). 
Qualitative field researchers seek to articulate actors’ motivations and dynamics 
in the field, but the field often draws them into its interactions (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006). Ahrens and Chapman (2006: 821) state “qualitative field 
studies collect data in the domain ‘field’ and employ ‘qualitative methodology’”. 
However, conducting qualitative field studies is not only empirical but a 
theoretical activity: the field is not just part of the empirical world but it 
is shaped by the “interpretive repertoire” of the researcher (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011). What is needed is a disciplined 
process of continuously reflecting on the plausibility of the ‘fit’ between the 
data, the research questions, and the theoretical lenses. The field researcher 
is also disciplined by working in a ‘contact	 zone’ (Hastrup, 1997) in the field 
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where, for instance, interviewees challenge him with their own theorizing of their practices (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006). Subsequently, the researcher is confronted with discussants, reviewers, and 
other critical readers of his work (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). 
The researcher and field study methodology
This study is concerned with ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions: why and how do translation processes unfold? 
The aim is to illustrate the fragile and performative character of reality and to outline “interesting” 
and, maybe, “surprising” translation processes (Hansen, 2005: 17; Hansen, 2011; Mouritsen et	al., 
2010). The study investigates actual practices and complex and dynamic phenomena in which the 
context is crucial (Cooper and Morgan, 2008: 160). The focus is on how actors interpret, act upon, and 
experience the changes connected to the BSC as an idea. How do they give meanings to processes in 
“real life” settings? To this end, the researcher has to learn the field by way of experience, by ‘leaning by 
doing’ (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Of course, the researcher cannot share the experience of others 
in any literal manner, but may share a communicative space that enables him, by way of imaginative 
investment, to comprehend at least part of other people’s motives (Hastrup, 1997: 357). Beyond 
the understanding of local knowledge, the field researcher should have the ambition to produce 
theoretical knowledge, that transcends the singular, local instances (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; 
Hastrup, 1995, 1997): “The interest is not so much an uncovering of particular images of the world as 
it is an understanding of their motivational force in the daily life of people” (Hastrup, 1997: 358). To get 
to the theoretical comprehension of motivation and dynamics, the field researcher has to invest in the 
process of understanding the wholeness of the situation. “Living another world” (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006; Hastrup, 1997) implies a merging of action and awareness (Hastrup, 1997: 358). This merging 
of action and awareness is a theoretical point. It is derived from an experiential encounter with the 
reality of other people. Fieldwork literally brings us in touch with another reality (Hastrup, 1997: 359), 
‘another’ in the sense of being viewed from our chosen theoretical suggestions. Acts of construction 
become central and are always guided by theory in some form (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011:35). 
The framework, the researcher, and the (inescapable constructed) social reality form an interrelated 
net of potential insights that can be cultivated by discipline, imagination and reflexivity (Mills, 1959; 
Weick, 1989; Alvesson and Skøldberg, 2009; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 35). Reflexivity points to 
the “struggle” to acquire an awareness of how paradigms, social-political contexts, frameworks and 
vocabularies shape the constructions of the researcher (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 35). Pillow 
(2010: 275) argues that, in order to become reflexive, the researcher should “read widely and deeply” 
(e.g. see the “interpretive repertoire” in chapter 2) and should keep a researcher log, researcher field 
notes, and a researcher journal. For this PhD-project my log included the details such as date, time, 
place of interviews and the details of the documents. The field notes provided a thick description of 
everything that was done during the research events. The material in the logbook and the field notes 
stimulated an iterative process between data collection and data analysis. Also, I regularly made notes 
of my thoughts, questions, frustrations, and reflections in a journal. This process of recording the 
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constructions of the research as best as I could provided a working history of the unfolding process of 
the research (Pillow, 2010: 276).
Case selection: a rhizomatic process
The approach I have followed is rather “rhizomatic” in nature (Nicolini, 2009; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 
2012:66). A rhizome is a form of ‘bulb’ that “extends its roots in different directions, whereby every 
root extension forms a new small plant that, when matured, extends its roots in different directions” 
(Nicolini, 2009: 128). The term was introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and has since caught on 
as a way of describing a form of research process (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012:146). 
Between 1999 and 2004 I was involved in research projects at three organizations: the ING Group, the 
Rabobank group, and another large financial institution in the Netherlands. At the ING Group I studied 
the BSC practice of five organizational units, at the Rabobank I studied the BSC practice (including 
Results Oriented Management) at headquarters (Rabobank group) and the BSC/Results Oriented 
Management practice at the local level in four local banks, and at the other financial institution I 
studied the BSC practice of four organizational units. So, there were times that I found myself handling 
multiple studies at the same time, each at different stages of the research (access, preliminary 
investigation, in-depth investigation), and with different temporalities of the phenomena (Nicolini, 
2009: 133). One consequence of this rhizomatic approach is that, given the many, idiosyncratic, and 
parallel mini-projects, the research project was not as linear as textbooks on qualitative methods 
might suggest. I had to go through multiple cycles of collection, analysis, and reflection (Nicolini, 2009: 
134).
IBN was selected because of its on-going efforts to translate and disseminate the BSC idea, so the case 
was useful for answering the research question(s) (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The ‘opportunity to 
learn’ (Stake, 1995) could be maximized here. Because of the complexity of the organization a lot of 
tension regarding the BSC practice could be expected. Moreover, because of the internship of one of 
the master students (later followed by another internship) a ‘rich’ case study could be expected (free 
access to documentation, inside information, etc.). So, this reflects a purposive sampling technique 
to gather “information- rich cases” (Patton, 1990: 169; Appleton, 2002). Initial contact with IBN was 
established through my supervisor. He had contacts with the BSC coordinator of the ING Group.
In accordance with the metaphor of the rhizome, the studying of the BSC practice started at one place 
with an in-depth study (“zooming in”) of that specific local organization and then spread following 
emerging connections (Nicolini, 2009: 128). These connections were interviewees at the Rabobank 
Group who pointed to a remarkable BSC practice at Rabobank The Hague, which in turn became a 
target of a new round of zooming in (Nicolini, 2009: 128). Thus, the study of BSC practice starts with 
a ‘zooming in’ movement to understand how the activity is accomplished in one site, proceeds with a 
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‘zooming out’ movement which exposes the relationship between practices, and continues with a new 
effort of ‘zooming in’ on the new site (Nicolini, 2009: 128).
After I had become curious when a few interviewees at the Rabobank Group told me that the local 
Rabobank The Hague “had a really very successful BSC implementation”, I established initial contact 
with the Director Private Companies of this local bank. I wondered: do “successful” (whatever this 
may mean) translations of the BSC really exist and what do they look like? Until that time I had never 
come across “really successful” BSC change processes. One of these interviewees even told me that 
Rabobank The Hague had “some kind of dialogical approach”. This in particular caught my attention 
because my experience with the IBN practice so far was that it was rather instrumental. Thus, I 
expected to be able to contrast it with the IBN case and learn a lot from doing so (Stake, 1995).
The variables/constructs on which the selection of the cases was based thus cannot be seen as 
unambiguous objective facts, but as constructions subject to reflection (Maseland, 2006). Some might 
say that they were selected on the basis of minimum variation in independent variables/constructs 
(e.g. similar industries), maximum variation in dependent variables/constructs (e.g. outcomes of the 
translation processes), and relatively unknown variation in intervening constructs (e.g. the impact 
of language). However, the ‘opportunity to learn’ was of primary importance (Stake, 1995: 6). I also 
believe that it is not possible to distinguish between critical, unique, and revealing cases, as suggested 
by Yin (1984). From a constructivist viewpoint the case should be critical, unique and revealing at the 
same time. Or as Hansen (2005: 17) puts it: “Each construction process is by principle unique and by 
revealing the surprising and overshadowed sides of reality, the case study becomes critical”. 
Other case selection criteria include the possibility to have complete access to all relevant interviewees 
and documentation, as well as the possibility to publish results openly afterwards (Soekijad, 2005).
data collection
I use three independent sources of evidence: interview data, documents, and observations. Interviews 
and documents are the key empirical data sources while observation was used only for supplementary 
evidence. 
Interviews 
The project started early 1999 at the Erasmus University Rotterdam with a few brainstorm sessions 
about the BSC. Participating in these sessions were two master students, a colleague from the 
Accounting department (associate professor), my supervisor, and myself. Eventually, we came up 
with a lot of questions that were divided into four groups: adoption, design, implementation, and 
evaluation. This list was partially the result of “common sense”, but it was also informed by TCE 
analysis constrained by institutional theory (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). This list was used in the 
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first round of interviews as an ‘interview guide’ (Patton, 2002) to focus the semi-structured interviews 
(see Appendix	 1; see also Bouwmans, Wagensveld and van Weelden, 2000). The focus in the first 
rounds was on the adoption and design stages and moved to the implementation and evaluation 
stages in the later rounds.
The interviews were conducted in four rounds (and except for two interviews at the end of the field 
study at IBN; see table 1) conducted by two researchers (a master student and the researcher). The 
advantage was increased creativity and inter-researcher comparisons. After each interview the two 
researchers exchanged their ideas and impressions about the interview, which was an input for the 
next (round of) interview(s). Sometimes new questions relevant to the overarching research question 
of the project emerged during the interviews, which were kept as flexible and iterative as possible. 
Because our aim was to thoroughly understand the case, we kept our case design (including the 
questions) rather flexible. This was done throughout the whole research process. Parlett and Hamilton 
(1976) call this progressive	focusing (Stake, 1995: 9; Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2012).
With the exception of two interviews (see table 1 and table 3), all interviews were recorded on tape. 
With regard to the two interviews that were not recorded, the researcher made notes during and 
immediately after the interview was taken. Almost all recorded interviews were transcribed by the 
master students, except for two interviews at the end of the IBN field study that were transcribed 
by the researcher. For all interview transcripts an extensive summary was produced and sent to 
the interviewees for review and feedback or remarks. They often provided us then with valuable 
additional information, but all the interviewees agreed with our interpretations, which is, of course, 
very important for the validity and plausibility of the research findings. The purpose of this member 
checking was to “highlight our ability to communicate with one another” by engaging in a “continual 
dialogue” (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008: 986). The results of the interview rounds were also reflected in the 
master theses of the students, of which I was the supervisor. Of course, all the master theses are 
available on request at the author of this study.
At IBN there were several rounds of interviews:
First round: M. van Weelden (MW); defended in May 1999 (this student also had an internship at ING 
Group).
Second round: S. Hicks (SH); defended in March 2001; adjusted interview guide, still theoretically 
informed by Roberts and Greenwood (1997).
Third round: M. Van Muyden (MM); defended in August 2002; theoretically informed by old 
institutional economics (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Fourth round: K. Verberg (KV); defended in August 2004; theoretically informed by adapted Burns and 
Scapens (2000) model.
There was also the master thesis of J. Hoefsmit (JH), defended in December 2003. She had an internship 
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at IBN and focused mainly on the testing of the causal relations in the BSC’s of IBN.
TABLE 1: INTERVIEWS AT IBN
date position interviewee
master student
Code
duration
(minutes)
1 March 1999 Project leader BSC MW 90
2 April 1999
Head Research and
Advice (Controller department)
MW 90
3 April 1999
Head Policies and
Planning (Controller department)
MW
90
4 June 2000 Project leader BSC SH 110
5 June 2000 Controller SH 90
6 July 2000 Area Director Goes SH 90
7 July 2000
Head Policies and
Planning (Controller department)
SH 90
8 April 2002
Former project leader BSC/ 
Executive staff member
Headquarters branch organization
MM 180
9 April 2002 Human Resource manager MM 90
10 May 2002
Head Research and
Advice (Controller department)
MM 90
11 July 2002 District chairman Midden-NL MM 90
12 April 2003
Former Project leader BSC + former
project team BSC member
KV 90
13 April 2003
Project leader Performance
Management
KV 150
13 May 2003 Former Project leader BSC KV 90
14 May 2003 Group controller KV 90
15 June 2003 Former controller KV 90
16 July 2003
Manager headquarters 
branch organization
KV 100
17 July 2003
Former project leader BSC + former
project team BSC member
JH
60 (not
recorded)
18 October 2003
Staff employee Commerce,
District West- & Midden-Brabant
KV 120
19 November 2003 Former project leader BSC - 90
20 December 2004
CFO business line Intermediary/
Board member auditing professional body
- 90
At the Rabobank we first researched the BSC at Group level (including Results Oriented Management). 
This was very important for the understanding of what happened at the local level. The group level 
research is reflected in the master thesis by M. Hoogendoorn (MH); defended in December 2002. Her 
starting point was the same “interview guide” as used at ING, but she adjusted it somewhat as she 
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was theoretically informed by the Burns and Scapens (2000) model. Then we researched the BSC at 
the local level (Rabobank The Hague). This is reflected in the master thesis by S. Tijssen (ST); defended 
in October 2004. He was also theoretically informed by the Burns and Scapens (2000) model, but in 
addition he was also inspired by the work of Kasurinen (2001).
The interview data at IBN consist of 20 formal, semi-structured in-depth interviews carried out in the 
Netherlands between 1999 and 2004 (see table	1).
In addition to the formal interviews, over the entire field study period the researcher also had many 
informal interviews and conversations, in particular with the Coordinator BSC at Group level. Some 
of these conversations were aimed at the writing of research papers based on the case material. 
Although not recorded, these interviews and conversations were very helpful in understanding the 
case. Also, we conducted more than 40 interviews at the other four researched organizational units 
of the ING Group. The opportunity of comparing sites proved valuable in checking the plausibility of 
our research findings.
The interview data at Rabobank Group (headquarters) consist of 7 formal, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews carried out in the Netherlands in 2001 and 2002 (see table	2). Also there was a written 
interview (filled in questionnaire) with the CEO of the Rabobank Group.
TABLE 2: INTERVIEWS AT RABOBANK GROUP (HEADQUARTERS)
date position interviewee
master
student
code
duration
(minutes)
1 November 2001
Director Control 
Rabobank Group
MH 60
2 November 2001
Controller Control
Rabobank Group
MH 90
3 December 2001
Team leader Control
Rabobank Group
MH 90
4 January 2002
Senior advisor Strategy
Rabobank Group
MH 90
5 January 2002
Program manager
Results Oriented Steering
Rabobank Group
MH 120
6 February 2002
Director Control
Rabobank Group
MH 100
7 March 2002
Director Control
Rabobank Group
MH 75
8 July 2002 CEO Rabobank Group MH
Written 
interview
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The interview data at the local Rabobank The Hague consist of 8 formal, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews carried out in the Netherlands in 2003 and 2004 (see table	3).
TABLE 3: INTERVIEWS AT RABOBANK THE HAGUE
date position interviewee
master
student
code
duration
(minutes)
1 March 2003 Director Private Customers ST 120
2 May 2003 Director Private Customers ST 120
3 July 2003
Project manager BSC + Staff member
Employees and Organization department
ST 150
4 July 2003
Manager Customers Advice + Manager
 Marketing & Communication
ST 150
5 July 2003 Consultant/ University professor ST
90 (not
recorded)
6 August 2003
Manager Business Development
& Control
ST 120
7 January 2004 Consultant ST 90
8 June 2004 Project manager BSC ST 120
In addition to the formal interviews, the researcher also had a few informal conversations, in particular 
with the Director Private Customers and a consultant at the end of, and after, the field study period. 
Some of these conversations were aimed at the writing of research papers based on the case material. 
Although not recorded, these conversations were very helpful in understanding the case. Additionally, 
we conducted more than 30 interviews at three other researched local Rabobanks. The opportunity of 
comparing sites proved valuable in checking the plausibility of our research findings.
It will be clear that the IBN case study is more longitudinal than the ‘Rabobank The Hague’ case study. 
Of course, a longer stay in an organization offers the researcher more translations and articulations to 
choose from, but I agree with Hansen (2005) that it cannot be uphold to a principle that longitudinal 
studies are necessary in order to conduct constructivist research. What matters is that the researcher 
has enough resources to produce an interesting description of the studied processes (Hansen, 2005: 18).
In order to get a holistic picture of the BSC translation processes at the local organizational level 
we (often based on “snowball sampling”) interviewed diverse categories of actors in the case 
organizations (e.g. managers, project leaders, users and controllers). In order to learn more about 
the local / global interconnectedness we also interviewed some interviewees from group level (e.g. 
CEO, group controller, BSC project coordinator at group level) and from ‘outside’ (e.g. consultants, an 
university professor, and a member of the Board of an auditing professional body).
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In terms of Flick (1997; 1999) the early interviews in each case study can be characterized as “episodic 
interviews”. We asked questions like: “What does the BSC mean for you?” When you look back, what 
was your first experience with the BSC? Could you please tell me about that situation?”, and “Have 
your relations with other people changed due to the BSC? Please give me a typical situation”. Potential 
recall problems (Schwenk, 1985) were alleviated by interviewing more than one person of one and 
the same “category”. In some cases we even interviewed the same person several times. In the later 
interviews it was then possible to conduct more “narrative interviews” (Flick, 1997). We then asked 
the question: “Tell us the story of the BSC (again)” and then the interviewee started a monologue 
telling us all relevant events from its beginning to its end.
Documents
Documents in different forms were the second source of data collected. The documents included 
annual reports, strategy documents and department plans, information on the intranet, publications 
in journals, minutes of BSC project team meetings and other internal company documents (See 
appendix	 2 for a listing of the most important field documents). We collected a huge amount of 
material because the interviewees were very willing to provide us with all the documents we needed. 
At IBN it also helped that the two master students that had an internship at IBN could really deliver me 
all the relevant material that was available.
Observations
As stated, observation was only used for supplementary evidence. It included a conference day on the 
BSC held in February 1999 at the ING group. The goal was to exchange the BSC experiences in the Group 
between the participants of the different organizational units. It was organized by the Coordinator 
BSC - ING Group and the master student that had an internship at IBN at that time. I participated in 
this conference, together with my supervisor (who was also a plenary speaker). I produced notes of 
my observations and put them in my log. As another example I mention the extensive clarifications 
that we got from the interviewees during our visits. For instance, we got a detailed explanation of the 
workings of the dynamic intranet BSC site at IBN. Finally, the detailed notes of the two master students 
made during their internship at IBN were very valuable. 
data analysis
Barrett (2009) argues that the analysis of qualitative data is a “last frontier” that still has to be 
demystified. He warns and shows by three examples that qualitative researchers will not get much 
assistance from textbooks on qualitative methods. He proposes a “modest alternative” by making 
a distinction between large A and small a analyses. Large A analysis refers to the analysis of data at 
the higher analytical level of analysis that is addressed to the research project as a whole. The pure 
case, or exemplar of large A-analysis is the conceptual model/theoretical framework. Small a analysis 
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refers to analysis of the data in a project at the minimal “close to the data” level. The pure case, or 
exemplar of small a is the “burst of insight”. The “burst of insight” is like shouting “Eureka” when 
puzzling matters suddenly make sense. As a third feature of qualitative analysis, Barrett points to the 
importance of the writing process (see also Alasuutari, 1995:177). This is not to deny other analysis 
tasks. For instance, comparison with existing studies (see chapter 2 and 6 of this study) can also be 
relevant. However, according to Barrett (2009), three features are of central importance in qualitative 
analysis: the conceptual model/framework, the “burst of insight”, and the writing process (Barrett, 
2009). 
Conceptual model/theoretical framework
The conceptual model/theoretical framework is an elegant, concise, abstract, meaningful snapshot of 
the major themes, steps, arguments, patterns, “constructs”, etc. in a research project. It is a product of 
logic and imagination (Barrett, 2009). Imagination refers to “sociological imagination” (Mills, 1959) or 
“disciplined imagination” (Weick, 1989). It requires a “playful” attitude towards the empirical material 
to be adopted (Moisander and Vallonen, 2006; Alasuutari, 1995: 42). Playful viewpoints permit the 
researcher to see patterns in the data that are not readily apparent. The field (in the broad sense as 
described earlier in this chapter) can provide ideas that will stimulate the imagination. Imagination 
consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another (Moisander and Vallonen, 2006). 
For instance, in this study we shifted our orientation from a TCE-analysis, seeing institutions as 
constraining (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997), to a more old institutional economics theory orientation 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000), followed by a Scandinavian institutionalism orientation in a later stage of 
the research project. In this sense, our conceptual model as described in chapter 3 has evolved in a 
“playful” process of theorization understood as disciplined imagination. In chapter 6 it is used as a 
format to structure the final description of the case findings. Imagination also consists of the capacity 
to combine ideas that no one expects to be combinable (Moisander and Vallonen, 2006). For instance, 
in this study we combined the idea of “languaging of distinctions” with the ideas of Scandinavian 
institutionalism. 
Empirical material creates a relative boundary for imagination: some constructions make more sense 
than others (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 17). So, empirical material not only facilitates theorization 
as a resource for imagination, but also as a resource for discipline. It creates an outer limit for our 
imagination (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 61). In sum, we see theory as a vehicle for disclosure, 
understanding, and communication (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Alasuutari, 1996; Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2011), relevant throughout the whole research process. We want to avoid the naive idea 
of being ‘non-theoretical’ as a means to being open, as suggested by some views of grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 36).  
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The burst of insight
The “burst of insight” is about penetrating into the details of people’s everyday lives. It is a product 
of imagination and perceptiveness (Barrett, 2009) and results in a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973; 
Leitch et	al., 2010:70). We need some “bursts of insight” during our field study in order to theorize 
and create the contours of a meaningful model. We aim to produce “rich accounts”, where emergent, 
maybe surprising empirical insights take our theorizing to new alleys (Vaivio et	al., 2012). My first 
example concerns the IBN case. The earlier interviews had revealed a contradiction/distinction 
between self-steering and hierarchical steering. In an interview in November 2003 a former project 
leader remarked: “...a piece of entrepreneurship has been pulled off the districts...”. It was then that I 
suddenly realized that entrepreneurship and the BSC were the key concepts by which the “languaging” 
of this distinction was done. This focus on the data then stimulated an intensive, iterative back-and-
forth movement between data and theory (von Krogh et	al., 1994; Wolpert, 2002). My second example 
concerns the Rabobank The Hague case. Already in the first interview in March 2003 the Director 
Private Customers explained to us in detail the importance of artifacts (“the cups”) in the Champions 
League and the importance of the inscriptions in the department plans. It was then that I realized 
the importance of this materialization in objects, again stimulating a move between data and theory 
(Latour, 1986; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).
  
In general terms our “palette” for this “zooming in” (Nicolini, 2009) on the details of the BSC practice can 
be described as follows. First, we approached the BSC practice as a knowledgeable accomplishment. 
We turned our attention to issues such as: How are the constant micro changes of the BSC practice 
coped with? How are the different elements realigned? What practical concerns move practitioners? 
Through which discursive devices do practitioners make the BSC work? Zooming in on the BSC practice 
requires thinking about the conflicts and problems practitioners encounter when they try to make the 
BSC work.
Second, we paid attention to the specific interactional order between human (and at times non-
human) participants, turning our attention to issues such as: What sort of interactional order is 
performed by this specific BSC practice? What positions does this specific BSC practice make available? 
How are these positions (re)negotiated or resisted? What kind of collective interests are sustained 
by the specific BSC practice? How is the BSC practice transmitted? This is a way of zooming in on the 
inherently political nature of BSC practices. What are the interests at stake and how do institutional 
entrepreneurs/local champions convince other actors? 
A third focus of attention for zooming in is the horizon of sense, intelligibility, and concern associated 
with a specific BSC practice. While all BSC work is carried out in view of a set of rules, norms, and 
specific local institutional conditions, these aspects are experienced by practitioners in terms of lived 
concerns, expectations, and desires. We focused on questions such as: How do norms and goals with 
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regard to the BSC practice manifest themselves in practice? What local forms of intelligibility are 
available to the practitioners? How do they become normatively binding? It is also necessary to study 
the role of local “languaging” with regard to these issues. 
Finally, we zoomed in on the heterogeneous and material multiple ‘entities’ that will play an active 
part in the accomplishment of the BSC practice. We focused on questions such as: How are artifacts 
and inscriptions used in practice? In which way do they contribute to giving sense to the BSC practice 
itself? What (visible and invisible) intermediation work do artifacts perform? Are the tools and the BSC 
practice aligned, or are there tensions between them?
The palette described above proved useful not only for directing our attention toward solving the 
practical issue of what to observe once in the field (‘small a’- analysis). It is also a toolkit for moving 
towards theorizing (‘large A’- analysis) or as expressed by Nicolini (2009: 127): [it is]“a tool for zooming 
in on details and a device for taking stock, so that patterns, regularities, and provisional ‘phenomena’ 
can come to light”. The palette can be extended by a palette for a horizon-widening ‘zooming out’ 
(Nicolini, 2009). In this study we conceptualised this ‘zooming out’ palette by searching for the global/
local interconnectedness (see chapter 5) and by comparing sites (i.e. comparing the findings of the 
two case studies with the findings in the other organizational units in the ING group and the Rabobank 
group as a further “check” on the plausibility of the emerging description of the BSC translation 
processes).
I would like to make an additional comment. I also experienced some “bursts of insight” at the 
higher, more abstract level, something that is not acknowledged by Barrett (2009). For instance, 
when Tommi Kasurinen gave me a personal copy of his PhD-thesis on BSC change (according to me 
the “best” so far!), it changed my thinking about my project dramatically. Particularly, his idea that 
the ‘BSC rule’ consisted of different ‘features’ (see chapter 2) made me suddenly realize that I had 
to go beyond the Burns and Scapens (2000) model. This burst of insight sowed the seeds into the 
direction of Scandinavian Institutionalism. As a second example I mention the work of Jan Mouritsen. 
I was already influenced by his writings, but when I read the Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) paper 
(see chapter 2; of all the many BSC papers I have read, I personally like this paper most!) I shouted 
“eureka”. Relating this paper to Callon (1986) and Scandinavian Institutionalism (e.g. Czarniawska and 
Joerges, 1996), I suddenly realized that my theorizing should go beyond the ‘problematization’ stage. 
It should encompass other stages (e.g. interessement and materialization) and should even focus on 
interconnecting localized time/spaces by studying both disembedding and re-embedding processes. 
A final remark here is about coding. Many qualitative researchers often have implicit ways of 
sensemaking that block them, especially in their quest for patterns in (“coding”) the data they have 
(Strong, 2012). This can result in coherent reductionist accounts, despite messiness or tensions in the 
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data (Strong, 2012; Law, 2004). I explicitly wanted to avoid “forcing” my data into particular themes. 
Exactly the data that do not fit the theme (the “anomalies” or “breakdowns” in terms of Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2011) provide an opportunity for the researcher to newly “dialogue” with his data (Strong, 
2012: 2). To me, the central goal of coding is to make it easier to return to the original texts/material 
in ways appropriate for building an argument and presenting it to others in as rich a form as possible 
(DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002: 173). I believe that the ‘process of engagement’ (Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2011: 43), in which the theorizing of the researcher is activated, is central rather than the passive 
mirroring of reality (e.g. through coding and processing in a mechanistic way). I certainly did not strive 
for a strict and ambitious codification project, where “the faithful representation of data is the key 
virtue” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011:60). However, given the “playful” attitude described above, I 
did multiple codings. I regularly made copies of the interview transcripts, notes, and documents and, 
based on a re-reading of this material and a re-framing of my position, I started an iterative process of 
coding for themes. Next to inductive codes (emerging from the empirical material), I used deductive 
codes (derived from the evolving theoretical framework (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006)). It was 
very helpful to keep a copy of my research questions, theoretical framework, aims of the study, and 
other major issues on one page in front of me to keep me focused during my coding decisions (Saldana, 
2009: 18). I asked myself during all cycles of coding: “What strikes me?” (Saldana, 2009: 18) in order 
to see something interesting in the data (Moisander and Vallonen, 2006: 120). Gradually (or quickly 
in an “eureka” moment) I began to abstract a number of ideas and words contained in a text (for 
instance words of a particular interviewee as reflected in the transcript) into a single concept, or small 
set of related concepts (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002:173). After assigning it a tentative name, I went 
back to the data to see if it can be applied to, for instance, other interviewees. Then it could become a 
“theme” (for instance “languaging”). Then the analysis proceeded by reviewing, re-reviewing and sub-
coding (e.g. different distinctions that are “languaged”) the empirical material (DeWalt and DeWalt, 
2002:173). After this stage I switched from ‘small a’- analysis to ‘large A’- analysis by the in-depth 
interpretation of these themes through the use of theoretical lenses and by comparing with the 
literature and with other sites (a kind of ‘zooming out’ on the texture of BSC practice; Nicolini, 2009). 
Thus, I bracketed the impulse to control (through measuring, codifying, checking, etc.) and the desire 
to become surprised and challenged took centre stage in my research (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011: 
43). In the ‘process of engagement’ I actively employed theoretical lenses and vocabularies to open 
up ‘sensitive constructions’ and interpretations of the empirical material (Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2011: 37 and 59). My approach could be labelled as “temperate” in terms of Vaivio et	al. (2012): no 
theoretical frames were linked with the empirical observations too hastily and there was a seeking for 
other theoretical frames. Only after several iterative rounds between theory and the field insights, 
it was possible to construct an informed, meaningful but also plausible description of the emerging 
nature and dynamics of the translation processes of the BSC (Vaivio et	al., 2012).
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Writing
To a large extent writing and analysing are the same because a researcher interprets as he writes 
(Barrett, 2009; Moisander and Vallonen, 2006; Richardson, 2000). My experience was that I often had 
to go back to text and “code” during the writing process. But writing enables the discovery of new 
aspects and may potentially change the way to go about the research problem (Ritvala, 2007). Writing 
can facilitate the dialogue between the text and the researcher (Moisander and Vallonen, 2006). I 
experienced that the mere taking of a note could be a prod to start thinking more carefully (Mills, 
1959; Moisander and Vallonen, 2006: 122). Also, writing practices can make the researcher move back-
and-forth in his data. I experienced that when I wrote a draft of the entire detailed, chronological BSC 
translation processes of the two case organizations. This effort to figure out ‘the whole’ (Moisander 
and Vallonen, 2006: 123) made me produce new interpretations, in this way releasing the imagination 
(Mills, 1959). Therefore, throughout the PhD-project I wrote memos and notes, kept logs and journals 
and, from time to time, wrote ‘the whole’. I also wrote articles and papers which were presented at 
different international accounting conferences (e.g. European Accounting Conference Congress and 
Workshop on Performance Management and Management Control) and at the RACC (Research Centre 
for Accounting & Control Change) conferences. As an example I can mention that the most recent 
paper that I presented at the RACC was a previous version of my chapter 2. It discussed the relevant 
literature in the positivistic, interpretive, and critical paradigm, nicely illustrating my ‘interpretive 
repertoire’. However, critical participants insisted that I should “focus” more. The result can be seen in 
the mini-review in the final version of chapter 2. Compared to the earlier version it is now more focused 
on interpretive research. The contribution of my co-authors, colleagues, participants in conferences, 
and a number of conference and journal reviewers in validating and revisiting my empirical material 
and theory is gratefully acknowledged. They helped me in enhancing the clarity and the rigor of my 
research.
limitations
One limitation is that part of the writing-up (interview transcripts, master theses) has been done by 
the master students. However, I have been reading, re-reading, coding, visualising, etc., the interview 
transcripts myself many times during my own analyzing and theorizing (see above). The comparison 
with the interpretations of the master students and the subsequent discussions were very valuable 
(Leitch et	al., 2010:78). The master theses can be seen as an additional writing-up. Contrary to normal 
supervisor procedures, I checked (and discussed with the students) almost every sentence of a 
student’s master thesis. Furthermore, I took notes of the remarks made during the defence of the 
master theses and put them in my log. The remarks of the co-readers and exam committee members 
(often accounting professors, but sometimes management professors) proved very valuable and 
enhanced the quality of the research. 
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Another limitation has to do with the relatively long “throughput time” of this study. Although 
there were rigorous “member checking” procedures and I was lucky to keep in touch with the local 
champions (in both case organizations) for a long time, there was no opportunity for them anymore to 
assess the plausibility of the final writing-up of the ‘storylines’.
Summary
This study adopts a qualitative, constructivist-interpretive approach to research rooted in a relativistic 
ontology (multiple valid and socially constructed realities) and a subjectivist epistemology (researcher 
and interviewee co-create understanding). The chapter starts with explaining that this qualitative field 
study collects data (using methods like semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis) in the 
domain ‘field’ and employs ‘qualitative methodology’. It also explains why a qualitative field research 
methodology was chosen. After a description of the selection of the case organizations as a rhizomatic 
process it explains, in detail, how the research process developed by elaborating on the data collection 
and data analysis processes. The chapter ends with a concise description of the limitations of the 
methodology.
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The travel and translation of a Balanced 
Scorecard: disembedding and re-embedding 
an administrative innovation
“Greater	 than	 the	 tread	 of	mighty	 armies	 is	 an	 idea	whose	 time	 has	
come”
(Victor Hugo, quoted in Kingdon, 1984: 1 and Czarniawska and Joerges, 
1996: 44)
“The	 idea	of	a	multiple	performance	measurement	system	has	existed	
for	a	long	time.	Its	modern	incarnation	as	a	scorecard	which	combined	
financial	and	non	financial	measures	emerged	in	a	specific	situation	at	
Analog	Decices	(ADI)	in	the	late	1980s”
(Qu et	al., 2010: 1)
introduction
In this chapter the origins and further development of performance 
management through a balanced scorecard (BSC) will be outlined. First, Kaplan’s 
rather serendipitous encounter with the scorecard will be described, followed 
by a description and depiction of the innovation action research cycle through 
which Kaplan seeks to advance the performance management system that 
incorporates the balanced scorecard. Next, the main stages in the development 
of the system through the innovation action research cycle are analysed, 
followed by an interpretation of the development in terms of our theoretical 
model. Our model also constructs a basis for the study of the translation of the 
balanced scorecard system at the micro-level in the next chapter.
a first encounter with the balanced scorecard
In retrospect, Kaplan’s serendipitous encounter with the scorecard of Analog 
Devices Inc: (a semiconductor company based in the Boston area; further ADI) 
gave impetus to the emergence of the BSC (Schneiderman, 2006; Kleiner, 2002). 
Kaplan’s encounter with ADI was initially meant to support the launch of an 
activity-based costing program. During his visits Kaplan learned that ADI had 
constructed a scorecard:
“...opportunity arose from a request from Art Schneiderman, the vice 
president of quality and productivity, at Analog Devices, to deliver a 
talk on activity-based costing. As I responded to this request, I began to 
realize that I had more to learn from Art than he did from me. I agreed 
to deliver the ABC talk, but part of the deal was for me to visit Art at an 
Analog plant. This visit led me to the case Analog Devices: The Half-Life 
Method, which documented the metric for continuous improvement 
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that Schneiderman had developed for Analog. The half-life metric provided short-term 
feedback to employees about their rate of progress in achieving long-term goals requiring 
orders-of-magnitude improvement in production processes.
The visit and case-writing process, however, also documented a Corporate Scorecard that 
senior executives at Analog were using to evaluate the company’s overall performance. The 
Corporate Scorecard included, in addition to several traditional financial measures, some 
metrics on customer performance (principally related to lead times and on-time delivery), 
internal processes (yield, quality, and cost), and new product development (innovation). 
Many of these measures were subjected to aggressive improvement targets derived from 
Schneiderman’s continuous improvement half-life metric. The significance of Analog’s 
Corporate Scorecard, however, did not become apparent until another project emerged.
In late 1989, the Nolan, Norton Company, an information technology consulting firm, formed 
a multi-client research project on performance measurement. I was invited to serve as a 
consultant to this effort. The project attracted about a dozen clients who met on a bimonthly 
basis throughout 1990. At the first meeting, I presented my newest cases – Texas Eastman 
and Analog Devices. Analog’s Corporate Scorecard captured the interest of the participants 
who, throughout the year, experimented with the scorecard in their organization. The concept 
proved successful in many of the pilot sites and became the prime output from the year-
long research project. David Norton, who had served as the project leader and facilitator, 
collaborated with me in writing up these experiences for a Harvard Business Review article” 
(Kaplan, 1994b: 179-181).
Analog’s scorecard was a response to problems caused by a personal struggle between a financial-
oriented Chief Operating Officer and a quality committed Chief Executive Officer (Qu and Cooper, 
2007). It complemented financial measures with non-financial measures. It offered a comprehensive 
insight into ADI’s performance elements on a single page and it was used to evaluate the company’s 
overall performance. 
innovation action research 
As it stands today, the performance management system incorporating a balanced scorecard is a 
product of innovation action research, a particular form of action research (Kaplan, 1998). Innovation 
action research differs substantially from traditional field research in management. Traditional field 
research in management is generally associated with cross-sectional research, time-series research 
and case study research that describes existing phenomena or tests existing theories (Kaplan, 1998). 
Instead, the innovation action researcher operates as a change agent creating things that previously 
did not exist. It is an alternative approach through which the researcher is actively engaged in helping 
organizations to successfully implement a new idea. Such research starts with the observation that 
there is gap between actual practice and desired practice. Both new theory and practice are required 
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then (Kaplan, 1998). The scholar builds on an idea in order to close the gap, and subsequently aims 
to improve the idea. Given the active engagement the scholar is not only in the position to improve 
the idea, but also learns how it can be successfully implemented. Innovation action research is 
experimental. It is a result of in	 vivo experiments (Callon, 2009). The researcher acts as a change 
agent in organizations to test and improve the emerging idea or theory that has been proposed to 
enhance performance. New theory is employed to modify elements of the organization in order to 
assess whether it actually accounts for the limitation of extant theory. By means of experience gained 
in the field encounters and through publication, teaching and discussions, the scholar is able to modify 
and extent the theory during its journey (Kaplan, 1998). 
Labro and Tuomela (2003) argue that a potential problem with innovation action research is that 
an immense research programme with access to a variety of leading-edge companies is needed 
– a challenge that most researchers are not able to meet. They also argue that Kaplan’s belief in 
the development of ‘objective’ constructs with universal applicability that can be diffused all over 
the world, is rather naive. Moreover, this more positivistic and instrumental view contrasts with 
the philosophical foundation of the “constructive research approach” in management accounting 
(Kasanen et al., 1993), which is more related to pragmatism (Labro and Tuomela, 2003). In this 
constructive approach, new constructs for specific organizational settings are produced in	 vitro, 
that is they are skillfully designed by scientists in their ‘laboratories’. This is different from Kaplan’s 
approach, which starts with a ‘withdrawal’ of a new construct from practice. In order to produce 
successful innovation dynamics, a cross-fertilization should be achieved between the in vitro world of 
the constructive research approach (more in-depth reflection on certain mechanisms) and the in vivo 
world of innovation action research (Callon, 2009; Akrich et al., 2002a). 
The innovation action research program encompasses a number of steps (see Figure	4).
A first step in such research implies the search for solutions for closing the gap between actual 
practice and best practice. This is a search for mere solutions to specific local problems. Once these 
local solutions are found, there has to be additional refinement in order to make them applicable to 
other organizations. “It may not be generalizable and applicable to many other organizations without 
additional refinement” (Kaplan, 1998: 100).       
  
Kaplan, being a professor of Harvard Business School, introduced the ADI’s scorecard in M.B.A. 
courses and executive training programs. This can be considered the second step in the innovation 
action research cycle which involves teaching and speaking about the innovative idea. By introducing 
the idea to an experienced audience its validity and generalizability is tested (Kaplan, 1998). The 
class discussions offered valuable feedback with respect to the need for such an innovative idea 
by practitioners. In addition, teaching classrooms of M.B.A.s and executives offers access to the 
experiences of a wide range and number of organizations. The experiences of ADI’s scorecard as well 
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as the experiences discussed in the classroom gave rise to an emerging conceptual framework that 
was employed for informing both academics and practitioners. 
The writing of articles and books is the third stage in the innovation action research cycle (Kaplan, 1998).
“Our explicit goal in writing these articles was to generate some excitement, enthusiasm 
and debate about the new ideas among a broad management audience. At this point, each 
concept has evolved far enough that it could be named and illustrated with experiences from 
the initial innovating companies” (Kaplan, 1998:101). 
The implementation of the concept by a new set of organizations is the fourth and final step of the 
innovation action research cycle:
“Such new implementations are the most innovative, critical and controversial aspects of the 
innovation action research cycle” (Kaplan, 1998: 102).
“Our explicit goal in writing these articles was to generate some excitement, enthusiasm 
and debate about the new ideas among a broad management audience. At this point, each 
concept has evolved far enough that it could be named and illustrated with experiences from 
the initial innovating companies” (Kaplan, 1998:101). 
The implementation of the concept by a new set of organizations is the fourth and final step of the 
innovation action research cycle:
“Such new implementations are the most innovative, critical and controversial aspects of the 
innovation action research cycle” (Kaplan, 1998, 102).
FIGURE 4: INNOVATION ACTION RESEARCH CYCLE (KAPLAN, 1998: 98)
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The development of the BSC performance management system: an innovation action 
research perspective
In 1990 KPMG sponsored a research project aimed to develop a performance measurement framework 
for “organizations of the future” (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). The participating organizations, which 
were all leading, successful, and innovative North-American organizations, served as pilot sites 
for experimenting with the Analog’s scorecard. Kaplan and Norton served as consultants in the 
research project (Kaplan, 1998). Based on the experiences in the pilot sites the scorecard concept 
was expanded. The original scorecard at ADI served to make operational improvements. In the pilot 
it became apparent that the scorecard had been transformed into a more strategic performance 
measurement system. By testing and experimenting with Analog’s scorecard in other organizations 
it shifted from a local solution to a local problem to a more generic innovative idea. Eventually, the 
project enabled Kaplan and Norton to translate ADI’s scorecard into a template with four generic 
perspectives: a financial perspective, a customer perspective, an internal business process perspective 
and a learning and growth perspective (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a; Kaplan, 1998).
The vagueness of the notion “organizations of the future” enabled Kaplan and Norton to link the 
balanced scorecard to continuously changing problems, for instance the problem of how to measure 
performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), the problem of how to implement new strategies (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996), the problem of how to manage new economy firms with a preponderance of 
intangible assets (Kaplan and Norton, 2004), the problem of how to align all the organizational 
resources (executive teams, business units, support groups, information technology, and employee 
recruiting and training) to focus intensively on implementing strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2006) 
and the problem of how to establish strong linkages from strategy to operations so that employees’ 
everyday operational activities will support strategic objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 2008). The 
influential spokesmen Kaplan and Norton even managed to link each of their successive books to one 
(or two) of the five principles of the framework described in their second book The	Strategy-Focused	
Organization	(Kaplan and Norton, 2001). These principles are:
Mobilize change through executive leadership
Translate strategy into operational terms
Align the organization to the strategy
Motivate to make strategy everyone’s job
Govern to make strategy a continual process
For instance, their third book (Kaplan and Norton, 2004), Strategy	Maps, expanded on Principle 2 by 
introducing a general framework for translating a strategy into objectives that are linked in cause-and-
effect relationships, across the four balanced scorecard perspectives (Kaplan and Norton, 2008). Their 
fourth book (Kaplan and Norton, 2006), Alignment, expanded on Principle 3 and showed how to use 
strategy maps and scorecards to align organizational units, both line business units and corporate staff 
ones, to a comprehensive corporate strategy. 
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FIGURE 5: THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONS (KAPLAN AND NORTON, 
2008:8)
The last chapter in Alignment described the application of Principle 4, communicating the strategy 
and aligning individuals’ goals and incentives to business unit and corporate objectives (Kaplan and 
Norton, 2008, preface). Their fifth book (Kaplan and Norton, 2008), The	Executive	Premium, described 
all the key processes required to implement Principle 5, ‘Make strategy a continual process’. In this 
book, Kaplan and Norton describe how companies can establish strong linkages from strategy to 
operations so that employees’ everyday operational activities will support strategic objectives. They 
introduce a new framework for management review meetings that clearly separates the operational 
review meetings, which solve short-term problems and monitor the improvement of key operational 
processes, from the meetings that review and improve strategy execution (Kaplan and Norton, 2008, 
preface). Kaplan and Norton (2008, preface p. ix) reflect on this process:
“While we set out, in writing this book, to document the best practices for SFO Principle 5, we 
ended up with a self-contained and comprehensive management system that links strategy 
and operations”.
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According to Kaplan and Norton, this system (see Figure	5) integrates the contributions from their 
four earlier books and those of many other recent management innovations (including activity-
based costing). They conclude (Kaplan and Norton, 2008, preface p. ix):
“The closed-loop management system described in this book represents the “end-state” that 
enterprises can aspire to reach for connecting excellence in operational execution to strategic 
priorities and vision”.
So, the balanced scorecard developed into a very broad performance measurement/ management 
system, moulded and marketed around ever changing problems.
developing the performance management system: a process of disembedding and 
re-embedding
The development of the BSC performance management system can be understood as a series 
of translations that take place through processes of disembedding and re-embedding (Giddens, 
1990,1991; Qu et al., 2009).
Disembedding
ADI’s scorecard has been translated into a generic solution by disembodying it from its local idiosyncratic 
setting (Qu and Cooper, 2007). In terms of Scandinavian Institutionalism, the scorecard has become 
disembedded by means of decontextualization (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). ADI’s scorecard is 
disembodied into a translocal or global idea; an idea that is ready to travel. The disembedding of the 
scorecard is characterized by theorizing (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Greenwood et	al., 2002) and naming 
(Qu and Cooper, 2007; Oakes et al., 1998; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006).
By theorization Strang and Meyer (1993:492) mean “the self-conscious development and specification 
of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and 
effect”. It should be noted that ADI’s scorecard was not very theorized as it did not encompass generic 
features. Kaplan and Norton theorized the scorecard by detaching it from the details of the local 
setting by means of defining generic features that could apply to all organizations (Qu and Cooper, 
2007; Hughes et	 al., 2002:235). For instance, the Nolan-Norton study specified four categories of 
performance: financial perspective, customer satisfaction, internal processes and organizational 
learning (Qu and Cooper, 2007). Specification of abstract categories rather than specific measures 
is key to the success of promoting the BSC idea (Qu and Cooper, 2007). The BSC is further theorized 
by introducing the concept in M.B.A. courses and executive training programs, as well as by writing 
articles and books. In this way, the BSC transformed into a global theory that provided the solution 
for the drawbacks of pervasive financial performance measures in traditional control systems (Kaplan, 
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1998). A generic template consisting of four perspectives was created. These perspectives were 
very broad, hence enabled application by a wide audience. In addition, these dimensions provided 
substantial degrees of freedom for including company specific measures and goals thereby facilitating 
customization (Qu, 2004; Qu and Cooper, 2007).  
 
ADI’s scorecard gave emergence to a multidimensional scorecard which was renamed as the balanced 
scorecard. Naming refers to “the power to consecrate linguistic and discursive competencies, i.e. 
the ability to create categorization submaps” (Oakes et	 al., 1998: 284). Naming is more than just 
sensemaking because it directs actions toward the object or experience that is named (Lissack and 
Roos, 1997). Or as argued by Srivasta and Barrett (1988), naming implies anticipations, expectations, 
and evaluations toward the named. Naming plays an important role in theorizing and disembedding 
the BSC from a local practice to a global concept as it allows the concept to be communicated to a 
wider audience and to become part of the cognitive map of the field (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
The name “balanced scorecard” created a ‘solution’ in terms of measuring non-financial performance, 
and provided hope and space for managers to improve performance (Qu and Cooper, 2007; Sturdy, 
1997). This idea with an identified name was later experimented on by the participant companies in 
the research project in their own organizations and ‘this initial set of adopters thrived and prospered 
by using the balanced scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Qu and Cooper, 2007). The balanced 
scorecard provides a language for many different people from many different social worlds (Qu et 
al., 2009; Star and Griesemer, 1989). Such a language not only allows them to share concerns about 
management control, performance measurement and strategy, but also to impose a specific way of 
understanding the world (e.g. rationalistic top down control, performativity, entrepreneurship), or 
what Bourdieu (1991) refers to as symbolic	violence (Qu and Cooper, 2007; Oakes et	al., 1998). The 
‘languaging’ of Kaplan and Norton was not only based on the distinction financial – non-financial, 
but also on the distinctions short-term – long-term, internal – external and cause – effect. This is 
reflected in the fourfold notion of ‘balance’ (note that ADI’s scorecard was more or less silent on the 
notion of ‘balance’!) in the balanced scorecard: there should be a balance between financial and non-
financial measures, between short-term and long-term performance, between internal and external 
perspectives and between driver and outcome measures. 
The main findings of the KPMG sponsored research project were, in terms of Czarniawska and Joerges 
(1996) objectified in the 1992 article “The	Balanced	Scorecard	–	Measures	That	Drive	Performance” 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). In this way, the innovative, translocal idea was spread to a wider audience 
or as Qu and Cooper (2007: 12) put it:
“As management ideas travel as models of alleged ‘success’, they become disconnected from 
any specific contexts and take on objectified forms, which are conveyed in texts, presentations 
or other media and are easily transferred to new settings”.
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The travel of the Balanced Scorecard (= re-embedding on a global level)
The communication of the BSC by means of articles and books enabled the researchers to reach an 
audience that has no direct experience with the innovative idea. According to Kaplan, this step is vital 
as it allows the scholars to become advocates of the new idea. In this way valuable feedback and 
comments could be obtained from both practitioners and academics (Kaplan, 1998). If communicated 
successfully the scholars are likely to be invited to implement the idea in a new set of organizations.
         
Problematization
The communication step turned out to be successful. The BSC has become a fast-moving recipe 
for success that has gained global appeal. According to Qu et al. (2009) this is partly the result of 
the attention to ‘success stories’ and partly due to the complexity that the BSC introduces. The BSC 
proposes ever-changing	problems to be attended to, from multiple performance measurement, to 
strategic management, to mapping and aligning strategy. According to Scandinavian Institutionalism 
ideas are more likely to catch on when they are a solution to a perceived widespread, global problem 
(e.g. the inadequacy of managing by financial numbers alone and the difficulty of implementing 
strategy). In the latter case, there is perceptual readiness, as the audience is waiting for the solution to 
arise. For such ideas, their time/space has come (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; see the first quote 
at the beginning of this chapter). Arguably, by means of a research article in the prestigious Harvard	
Business	Review this idea was presented at the right time (Nørreklit, 2003; Qu, 2004). Right from 
the start, the BSC has gained enormous attention and has attracted considerable interest among 
academia and practitioners. The scorecard convincingly explains how it provides an answer for the 
perceived problems associated with traditional performance measurement systems. A “stubborn 
fact” was the catalyst for searching for new knowledge, knowledge that could not be found in the 
textbooks or teaching cases (Lindsay, 2004). Most managers were obviously frustrated with traditional 
accounting-based performance measurement practices. Therefore, they were receptive to this 
new concept. Kleiner (2002) describes the 10-year ‘feud’ between Kaplan (drive your business with 
numerical targets and performance measures) and Johnson (management through measurement is 
fundamentally dangerous). He argues that Kaplan is the more successful of the two feuders because at 
that time measurement and rankings seem like the natural way to drive people to improve: 
“Most managers intuitively believe that they can get better results only by setting goals and 
targets, especially the sophisticated ‘process drivers’ of the Balanced scorecard and similar 
methods”(Kleiner, 2002: 20). 
Moreover, the simplicity of the BSC is certainly appealing, as a BSC provides management with a 
concise summary of the key success factors to monitor and improve performance (Mooraj et al., 1999).
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Interessement 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) note that the popularity of ideas is not only related to the properties 
of the idea. The rise of the BSC from a local practice and its future as a global theory was dependent 
on others having an interest in applying this idea to their own environment (Qu et al., 2009). The 
process of capturing the interest of others required the attention of other managers who might have 
similar problems (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Qu et	al., 2009). Here is where translation takes 
place through ‘languaging’ of distinctions where varied concerns and interests commingle through 
the expression of a shared common understanding (Qu et al., 2009; von Krogh et	al., 1994) in order 
to move from an existing to a perceived	desirable situation, for instance more non-financial steering 
and more attention for the long-term and for drivers (‘causes’) of success. The BSC certainly generated 
attention among practitioners, and even academics. The successful promotion and its subsequent 
rapid and easy acceptance can be attributed to the vast number of credible sources associated with 
the BSC (Nørreklit, 2003; Qu and Cooper, 2007).
First, the participants in the original research project were some of the most prestigious North-
American organizations, like Shell Canada, Apple Computers, General Electric Company (GE) and 
Hewlett-Packard (HP). Their success stories of the BSC illustrated the general applicability of the 
concept. As such, these initial success stories paved the way for the rapid adoption of the BSC by 
organizations all over the world. This initial network not only provided legitimacy for the BSC, but also 
supported the simultaneous creation of BSC experts (Qu et	al., 2009). Those involved in the research 
project became pioneering firms, and those who were in charge, authorities on the BSC. A series of 
professional service firms (for example the BSCCol, later the Palladium Group) arose, often created 
and staffed by these pioneers and experts. Qu et al. (2009) extensively describe how the BSCCol uses 
several strategies to enroll and control networks of actors, such as forming partnerships, introducing a 
BSC certification program to involve leading software providers, and awarding BSC Hall of Fame status 
to exemplar adopting organizations.
Second, there was widespread confidence of the academic and business audience in the Harvard 
Business School, its professor Kaplan, as well as the business consultant Norton. The reputational 
effect encouraged the audience’s faith in the concept. Consulting firms soon embraced the BSC. As 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) note, consultants often play an important role in spreading ideas as 
they are designers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers of the idea. As expressed by Kaplan (1998: 
109) himself:
“I believe the reason for the more rapid [than ABC, KW] advance of knowledge was the 
leverage from Norton’s consulting company, for which the balanced scorecard represented a 
major deliverable (and differentiator). Therefore, we had the advantage of a dedicated cadre 
of trained, skilled and highly motivated consultants working and innovating with companies in 
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North America and Europe. And we could directly access these experiences for presentations, 
articles, cases and a book”. 
The global presence of consultants has led to a rapid spread of the BSC in organizations as the 
decontextualized idea turned out to be a generic concept capable of coping with similar local problems 
that were perceived by organizations across the globe. The BSC has become best practice in the field 
of performance management. 
Idea-materialization
In the academic world the scorecard has gained popularity as well, as is signalled by the growing body 
of literature devoted to the BSC in academic journals (Qu, 2004). The BSC idea has been objectified 
through the emergence of books, research articles and (software) reports and soon became a hot 
topic among management accounting academia. The BSC is not a pre-existing empirical, observable 
entity. Rather, it relies on specific knowledge production and inscribing practices which objectify it 
as things-like and thereby render it usable, manipulable and reportable (Qu, 2006; Bloomfield and 
Vurdubakis, 1994). Paperwork such as articles, diagrams, graphs, and (flip)charts are also argued to 
possess many rhetorical advantages (Qu, 2006). For example, the success of the BSC is due in part 
to the extensive use of graphical representations to illustrate its key ideas (Qu et al., 2009; Nørreklit, 
2003). An example of a key idea of the BSC is the notion of cause- and-effect relationships between 
measures and strategic goals. Graphics are powerful in showing patterns and introducing causal 
relationships and contribute to the generalization of claims (Qu et al., 2009). The “elimination of 
gratuitous details is part of the move from the particularity of one observation to the generality of a 
scientific claim” (Myers, 1988: 239; Qu et al. 2009). Removing local categories (for example those in 
the ADI scorecard!), and replacing them with abstract categories (for example the four perspectives!) 
is very persuasive when this is achieved through colorful figures (Qu et	al., 2009). ’Strategy maps’ 
are proposed as a visualization of the cause-and-effect links between specific improvements and 
desired outcomes (Kaplan and Norton, 2000; Qu et	al., 2009). The ‘strategy map’ is a “dynamic visual 
tool to describe and communicate strategy through a visual display of an organization’s perspectives, 
objectives, measures, and the causal linkages between them” (Qu et al., 2009; Kaplan and Norton, 
2004: 54). Qu et al. (2009: 42) conclude that the strategy maps “are inevitably subjective and based on 
the imagination of its authors, but their fixity hides the possibility of resistance and that the underlying 
objectives and strategies can be contested”.
Support of allies
Kaplan and Norton continuously checked whether enough actors gave their support to the BSC. 
As argued, they regularly renegotiated the problematization: from performance measurement 
(1992) to linking strategy to operations (2008) with many in-betweens. Kaplan (2009) gives another 
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example. Although the subtitle of the first Kaplan and Norton article (1992) was ‘Measures that Drive 
Performance’, the authors soon found out that they should not focus on the measures in the first 
place, but on the strategic objectives: 
“It turned out that the selection of measures was much simpler after company executives 
described their strategies through the multiple strategic objectives in the four BSC perspectives” 
(Kaplan, 2009: 1262). 
And from this problematization it soon “became natural” to describe the cause-and-effect relationships 
between strategic objectives (Kaplan, 2009) and so on. 
Kaplan and Norton also renegotiated the interessement from time to time. The emphasis on non-
financial measures allowed the BSC to be allied to a range of practices associated with non-financial 
measurement, for instance in human resource management (Qu et al. 2009; Townley, 1995). For 
many years, the weakest link in the BSC was the learning and growth perspective (Kaplan, 2009). 
While companies had some generic measures for employees (such as employee satisfaction and 
absenteeism), none had metrics that linked their employees’ capabilities to the strategy (Kaplan, 
2009). The discourse around this “black hole of the balanced scorecard” (Kaplan, 2009) linked HR 
professionals to the BSC network. The following quotation elaborates on this issue. It also illustrates 
that the renegotiations regarding interessement and problematization (and even materialization: 
article and book) are intertwined:
“Dave Norton led a research project in 2002 and 2003 with senior HR professionals to explore 
how to better link the measurement of human resources to strategic objectives. From this 
work came the concepts of strategic human capital readiness and strategic job families and, 
by extension, the linkages to information capital and organizational capital. These important 
extensions to embed the capabilities of a company’s most important intangible assets were 
described in a Harvard Business Review article and a book (Kaplan and Norton, 2004a,b)” 
(Kaplan, 2009: 1262).
Another example concerns the extension of the BSC to Non-profit and Public Sector Enterprises 
(NPSE’s), as described in Kaplan (2009). Managers of NPSE’s were linked to the BSC network as they 
started to realize that focusing only on financial measures, such as budgets, donations and funds 
appropriated, is not enough. The success of NPSE’s has to be measured by their effectiveness in 
providing benefits to constituents (Kaplan, 2009). The Kaplan and Norton literature convincingly shows 
how the BSC helps NPSE’s select a coherent use of non financial measures to assess their performance 
with constituents. A final example concerns the development of the BSCCol (later Palladium) Hall of 
Fame award system. This system shows how local BSC initiatives, not only get reproduced as global 
successes, but enable the BSCCol to stay at the centre and to constantly change and enhance the 
idea of the BSC (Qu et al., 2009). The Hall of Fame award honors organizations that have achieved 
an “execution premium” (extraordinary performance results) through the use of the BSC (Palladium, 
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2010). Founded in 2000, the Palladium BSC Hall of Fame program today has 133 honorees that span 
the private and public sectors in more than 20 countries. Winners are selected based on the quality 
of their BSC implementation and the results they demonstrate over a period of at least two years 
(Palladium, 2010). Each year, new members are accepted in the Hall of Fame at a well-publicized 
conference, profiled in the bimonthly “Balanced Scorecard Report” (see later on). They are often used 
as examples in later publications of the institutional entrepreneurs Kaplan and Norton (Qu et al. 2009). 
They may also be used in training material of the BSCCol (later Palladium). This adds allies to the BSC 
network and provides exposure that organizations believe enhances their reputation (Qu et al., 2009). 
See, for instance, the “success stories” in the document entitled “Sample Testimonials from BSC Hall 
of Fame Winners 2000-2006”, available on the Palladium website.
Finally, Kaplan and Norton renegotiated the inscription	 devices several times. Kaplan and Norton 
understood very well, that one way to make sense of complex ideas like the BSC is to turn them into 
concrete images, templates and pictures, or give them physical properties as objects (Qu et al., 2009). 
For instance, they introduced the ‘strategy map’ and made use of many graphical representations in 
their successive books and articles. Another important example is the bimonthly Balanced	Scorecard	
Report (BSR). This is a 16-page newsletter published by the BSCCol. since September 1999. It claims 
to provide “insight, experience, and ideas” for executing strategy (at first) and for strategy-focused 
organizations (later on) through exclusive field reports, case studies, example templates and figures, 
and analysis that show how to ‘improve performance’. (BSR’s; Qu et al., 2009). As the official publication 
of Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard Collaborative, the BSR offers “exclusive real-time delivery 
of the latest insights and ideas by Kaplan and Norton, as well as new research, emerging trends, and 
practical lessons drawn from on-going Balanced Scorecard implementations worldwide” (Qu et al, 
2009: 59). These help objectify local experiences offering success stories and best practices which can 
make the claims of the BSC convincing. As Qu et al., (2009: 59) put it: 
“Success stories produce a self reinforcing dynamic among adopters of management ideas 
(Sturdy et al., 2006) and are a key element for an idea to gain management recognition and 
adoption. Best practices profile ‘top-performing’ organizations by interviewing their senior 
executives about their achievement with the BSC implementation.”
Institutionalization 
During the past 20 years the BSC has been kept alive as Kaplan and Norton translated the experiences 
of organizations that embraced the BSC. Although the BSC changed continuously (e.g. Larsson, 2010, 
describes seven ‘versions’ in the evolution of the BSC), it became a source of common identity. The 
alliances around the BSCCol. (now Palladium) and Kaplan and Norton provide a sense of a ‘global 
expert support community’ (Qu et al., 2009: 48). Of course, the BSC was conceptualized and promoted 
by powerful, global experts/spokespersons like Kaplan and Norton, but it was local managers and 
management consultants who made the ‘allegedly great idea’ work (or not) in organizations (Qu et al., 
2009). These local actors became local experts/spokespersons (e.g. they train and provide advice to 
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others), who use the original BSC concept in innovative ways. As such, these local interpretations have 
altered the idea, hence gave impetus for the BSC idea to travel again creating an on-going spiral of 
fashion (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). Kaplan and Norton (1996, Kaplan, 1998, 2009) re-distributed 
these practices which subsequently became global ideas as well. 
Summary
In this chapter the origins and further development of performance management through a BSC is 
outlined. Kaplan’s serendipitous encounter with the scorecard is described, followed by a description 
and depiction of the innovation action research cycle through which Kaplan seeks to advance the 
performance management system that incorporates the BSC. It is shown that Kaplan believes in the 
development of objective constructs with more or less universal applicability – a view that is close 
to positivistic science ideals. Kaplan believes that academics pick up ideas from practice that can be 
diffused all over the world. 
This chapter also demonstrated a translocal perspective on the development of the idea of the 
balanced scorecard. It took a ‘Scandinavian Institutionalism’- perspective on the instrumental inno-
vation action approach as proclaimed by Kaplan and Norton. The idea and concept of a balanced 
scorecard is processed and institutionalized through networks of localities. It proves to be the local 
managers and consultants who make the idea work in organizations and who advise it to others. 
During the traveling process an on-going spiral of fashion is kept active. Authors such as Kaplan and 
Norton further contributed to the ‘globalization’ of the idea. The analysis further revealed that the 
success of an idea is not only depending on the properties of the idea, but also on the extent to which 
it copes with perceived problems and the extent to which it attracts the interest of actors.
In the next chapter, we will study two local re-embedding processes.

Chapter
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local translations of the Balanced Scorecard
“In	the	global	world,	ideas	travel	around	the	planet,	but	are	then	locally	
translated.	The	result	may	be	that	the	same	idea	differs	every	place	it	
lands;	 that	different	 ideas	may	 lead	 to	 similar	practices;	and	 that	 the	
final	combination	of	global	ideas	and	local	practices	is	almost	inevitable	
difficult	to	foresee,	but	fascinating	to	study”
(Czarniawska, 2012: 27)
In this chapter, the translation of a balanced scorecard as practiced in two 
banks (Rabobank The Hague and IBN) is described. For each bank, the process 
of re-embedding the balanced scorecard is presented by focusing on both 
interpretations through which the idea of the balanced scorecard is aligned 
with words, values and symbols that already exist in the organization, and 
through the social-material enactment of the new idea. There is an interplay 
between taken-for-granted norms and intentional action. The translations are 
described by drawing on the five analytical stages that were distinguished in the 
conceptual framework (chapter 3) and that are in accordance with Scandinavian 
Institutionalism: problematization, interessement, idea-materialization, support 
of allies and institutionalization. A special focus is on (ex ante and ex post) 
theorization. 
Case study rabobank The hague 
introduction
Rabobank The Hague is one of the local Rabobanks of the Rabobank Group. 
Rabobank The Hague consists of two different (key) segments: ‘Private 
Customers’ and ‘Companies’. There are 18 departments that together make up 
the two segments and a number of staff departments. 
The executive team consists of a Director Companies, a Director Private 
Customers (the initiator and ‘champion’ of the BSC program of change) and a 
General Director. In Appendix	3 a chart of the organization is attached.
The mission of the Rabobank The Hague, as formulated in 1996: 
“Rabobank	 The	 Hague	 aims	 at	 gaining	 a	 sustainable	 and	 prominent	
position	 in	 the	 hearts	 and	minds	 of	 people	 in	 its	 operating	 area	 as	 a	
broad,	 cooperative	 financial	 services	 provider	 by	 demonstrating	 its	
ties	 with	 the	 local	 community	 and	 stimulating	 the	 related	 economic	
activities” (Medium term plan 2003-2005, p.5).
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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More specifically, the Rabobank Group aims at value creation for customers by:
“offering	the	best	possible	financial	services	that	are	of	relevance	to	the	customer;
ensuring	the	continuity	of	the	services	in	line	with	the	customer’s	long-term	interests;
fulfilling	the	bank’s	commitment	to	the	customer	(and	the	community),	 in	order	to	help	the	
customer	realize	his	or	her	ambition” (Medium term plan 2003-2005).
Thus, the key objective of the Rabobank Group is the creation and increase of customer value, the 
value conferred to the offered services by the customer. The customer value is defined as “the best 
possible products and services at the best possible price”. 
Moreover, generating value for the employees is seen as a critical success factor. Precondition to 
the value creation to both customers and employees is financial stability. The bank aims at a steady 
development of three financial ratios: the tier 1 ratio, the ROA and the net profit growth.
 
The primary strategic ambition of Rabobank The Hague concerns the bank’s financial performance: 
substantially	improving	the	profitability. The reason why Rabobank The Hague focuses on the financial 
objectives is that its financial ratios structurally lag behind both the profitability requirements by 
Rabobank Netherlands and the ratios of other large city banks. The improvement of the profitability 
is a necessary precondition for reaching a sustainable and leading position in its operating area (as 
stated in the mission statement). In March 2003, the Director Private Customers states:
“Customer	value	means	nothing	 to	me.	The	only	 thing	 that	does	mean	 something	 is	 that	 I	
want	to	increase	the	profitability	of	my	current	portfolio.	We	are	particularly	investing	in	the	
‘wealthy’	segment	because	this	is	where	you	can	get	something”. 
 
In addition to an improvement of its profitability, Rabobank The Hague aims at a profitable growth 
of market penetration in specific markets – those markets that will lead the bank towards substantial 
improvement of its profitability in both the short and the long term. 
In order to reach its key objective the bank cooperates with Rabobank Netherlands and other local 
banks. 
For the 2003-2005 period, the most important objectives of Rabobank The Hague are specified as 
follows (source: Medium term plan 2003-2005 “Profitable growth”):
. Direct improvement of the results;
. Focused growth in selected markets;
. Cross-selling and deep-selling in the current portfolio;
. Professionalizing sales management and further building a sales organization;
. Focus on efficiency by controlling direct and indirect costs; 
. Professionalizing management control. 
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In sum: the bank seeks for ‘profitable growth’.
In 2002, the Cohen Brown cultural change program was initiated. Due to the disappointing revenues 
and profits there was a felt need to develop a methodology to increase the sales of the company in a 
structured way. The so-called ‘big	five’ was a part of this methodology. This concerns five focal areas 
(main objectives) in a particular period; a particular week, month or year. The logic behind this is that 
one cannot focus on more than a few things at a time. Therefore, it was considered adequate to make 
explicit the five most important focal areas. 
In August 2003, the Manager Business Management and Control was commenting on the prevailing 
business culture: 
“It	seems	quite	contractual	to	me,	quite	open.	A	company	where	it	used	to	be	difficult	to	join	
in	with	each	other	and	to	make	it	clear	that	one	works	for	the	same	customer.	I	really	think	
that	our	work	is	[primary]	about	customers,	everybody	understands	this	but	we	designed	the	
company	in	such	a	way	that	one	risks	losing	this	ultimate	objective	out	of	the	view.	You	see	it	
getting	much	better	now,	so	that	you	say:	there’s	more	focus	now”…	“by	‘contractual’	I	mean	
that	if	we	agree	to	sell	this	week,	say	five	All-in-One	insurance	packages,	then	everyone	goes	
for	it	and	nobody	should	find	excuses	for	having	sold	just	four	because…	an	agreement	is	an	
agreement	and	this	is	well	understood	now”. 
The Medium term plan 2003-2005 (‘Profitable growth’) states the following regarding the 
(development of) the culture (p. 19/20): “The culture of the bank develops from a reactive (Rabo) 
culture towards a proactive customer and sales oriented culture. This is exemplified not just by the 
developments related to Cohen Brown/Champions League in 2002, but also by the development of the 
Customer Contact Center and by growing cooperation among the segments. In this planning period, 
the trajectory initiated in 2002 will be strongly pushed forward. The desires for winning together, for 
excelling in the own profession, for giving others a chance and for having good sales managers are the 
essentials of this culture”.
Translating the BSC in rabobank The hague
In accordance with Scandinavian Institutionalism, there clearly was no diffusion of a ‘State of the art’ 
balanced scorecard, but translation. Some features (elements) of the general BSC idea got ‘lost in 
translation’, some elements were slightly changed, and some features were added (‘enrichments’). 
This translation process was bolstered by willing political agents, but it was also “shaped by contingent 
events and little controlled processes such as fashion” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 44).
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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Problematization
Before 1986, the ‘The Hague’- market was explored by two competing cooperative banks: the 
Boerenleenbank and the Raiffeisenbank. The two banks were operating from the periphery of the city 
with little or no (policy driven) interest in the city as a whole, nor in the specific market opportunities 
in the city. In 1986, the two banks finally merged. The period before 1995 was characterized by 
‘cleaning-off’ the offices of fellow Rabobanks, bringing the offices’ network into shape and preparing 
the merger with the Scheveningen and Rijswijk Rabobanks. This merger completed January 1, 1995. In 
1996, a thorough change trajectory was initiated, focusing on building a professional Rabobank in the 
city and aiming at substantial relevant and healthy market shares that could guarantee a sustainable 
development of the bank. With this purpose, large investments in people and resources were made. 
The efforts resulted in market growth and a considerable improvement of the image of the bank in its 
operating area. The Director Private Customers recalls March 2003:
“In	a	killing	speed	the	bank	released	100	people	then	and	grew	to	380	people.	In	a	short	period,	
hundreds	of	people	came	in.	In	a	very	short	time,	the	company	went	through	a	number	of	life-
phases,	much	too	fast,	with	too	much	pressure.	At	a	certain	moment	we	became	one	of	the	
big	city	banks,	one	of	the	biggest	banks	in	the	country.	Financially	spoken	we	were	a	poorly	to	
moderately	performing	bank,	this	is	also	due	to	our	position	in	a	big	city.”
When, in 2001, the Director Private Customers had taken office with Rabobank The Hague, the bank 
was rather messy. Every department pursued its own results and only the Directors took care of the 
whole; there was hardly any mutual cooperation. The Director Private Customers reflects on the ex-
ante	 theorization	 indicating the failings of the old practices (March, 2003) and relating them to a 
‘solution’ of the balanced scorecard: 
“I	work	here	for	two	years	now.	When	I	arrived	it	was	a	messy	bank.	The	top	was	very	noisy,	a	
lot	of	money.	Each	department	focused	on	its	own	results	and	only	the	directors	on	the	whole	
[bank].	However,	there	was	no	mutual	co-operation.	And	then	one	needs	a	driver	for	change	
and	that	driver	has	been	found	in	the	Balanced	Scorecard	(BSC)”.
The ex-ante theorization was not limited to a lack of mutual co-operation. It also concerned a 
performance	gap.	For many years, Rabobank Netherlands was disappointed by the financial results of 
Rabobank The Hague. To change this, the executive board of Rabobank The Hague decided to adopt 
the idea of a Balanced Scorecard. Both the Director Companies and the Director Private Customers 
were already familiar with the BSC. The Director Companies himself had developed a scorecard for 
the ABN AMRO bank in his former job. Apparently, there was perceptual readiness (Czarniawska and 
Joerges, 1996) for the balanced scorecard. The Balanced Scorecard was given attention to because 
the BSC was ‘fashionable’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:45) at that time and because of this prior 
experience of the directors. 
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Our interviews revealed that the most important argument in favor of the Balanced Scorecard was 
the opportunity to focus on (just) four perspectives. It was theorized that in order to increase the 
profitability, the most significant ‘profitability generators’ had to be controlled. Thus, the scorecard 
was reasoned to be a solution not just for a lack of co-operation, but also for a lack of focus. 
   
An alternative to the BSC was the Rabobank Steering Model (Results Oriented Management), also 
called Compass Model, developed by the Rabobank Group. The Compass model was mandatory for the 
external reporting to Rabobank headquarters. For the governance, management and control of their 
own organizations, the local banks were formally free to use this model or any other model. However, in 
practice executive management had to explain a deviation of the Compass model for internal purposes 
to headquarters. Moreover, the controller in Rabobank The Hague opposed to the adoption of two 
distinct ‘models’. Therefore, the (potential) use of a balanced scorecard was not without problems. 
Yet, according to the Director Private Customers, when it came to management purposes, the 
Compass Model had a number of deficiencies. For example, the local bank must deliver the results 
for evaluation purposes to headquarters on a monthly basis, and for (own) management purposes 
this was considered to be too long a period. At headquarters, the results were then benchmarked 
against those of other local banks, operating in different situations. However, a large city bank such 
as Rabobank The Hague differs considerably from the ‘average’ local bank. Therefore, this led to 
misleading interpretations. In addition, there was the ‘customer value’ aspect. Although this was an 
important factor in the Compass Model, it was not measured because headquarters considered return 
on assets and solvency to be much more important. 
The Project manager reflects on the ex-ante	theorization and explains the reasons behind the adoption 
of the BSC:
“A	cry	for	help,	as	we	wanted	to	know	where	we	are	and	how	we	can	measure	this.	To	get	
an	 idea	whether	 you	are	 in	 control,	 you	obviously	 need	management	 information	and	 you	
should	know	where	you	aim	at.	This	should	be	stated	clearly,	because	this	bank	was	aiming	
at	everything	(and,	thus,	at	nothing).	There	was	too	little	structured	vision	behind	this	all	and	
this	was	the	main	reason,	I	think,	why	we	have	employed	the	BSC,	because	this	was	a	means	
to	structure	our	vision	and	to	held	each	other	accountable	for	it.	There	was	simply	no	structure	
prior to it”.
The Project Manager confirms that the Director “Private Customers” was the initiator of the scorecard. 
He was the institutional entrepreneur/change agent of the BSC project. The General Director always 
externally promoted the (importance of) the BSC and the related cultural change program (employees’ 
newsletters, the presentation of the Champions League cups, etc.), but according to the Director 
Private Customers, he “never	really	embraced	[the	BSC],	but	rather	tolerated	it”. 
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
83
Ch
ap
te
r
6
The following quote of the Project manager illustrates the logic set by the change agent, linking the 
main local problems to the BSC idea: 
“Simply	for	being	able	to	structure	the	management	information	and	to	focus.	Focus	is	a	key	
word	here.	There	was	a	focus	deficit	so	far,	what	do	we	want? The	BSC	pushes	you	to	think	in	
a	structured	way	and	to	measure	accordingly”.
 
Asked about the reason behind control based on non-financials, the Project manager states the following: 
“We	realize	how	important	the	role	of	other	categories	for	our	profits	is.	For	instance,	looking	
at	HRM,	you	see	learning	and	growing	people,	the	people	that	determine	the	success.	This	is	
the	motivator	behind	the	learning	and	growth	perspective.	This	leads	to	financials	in	the	end”.
 
Interessement
After the end of the Cohen Brown trainings, the BSC trajectory was initiated (February– March 2002). 
The report ‘Profitable growth’ was identified as the basis for plans in the planning period 2003-2005. 
In a bottom-up process, the management team and the heads of the departments consequently 
formulated plans for meeting the objectives stated in the report.
First, two “strategy maps” were developed; one for Private Customers and one for Companies (see 
Appendix	 4). For the development of the strategy maps external consultants were engaged. The 
consultants introduced the BSC theory by giving presentations to the directors and the management 
team. There also was a two days meeting of about 30 people (most of them were company managers). 
The nature of the conversations during that meeting was one of “debate” (Yankelovich, 1999), in 
which the Director Private Customers made it very clear that he demanded full commitment of all 
managers to the BSC change trajectory. A number of managers left their positions shortly afterwards. 
The Director Private Customers comments on this:
“...those	people	found	it	unacceptable.	It	was	particularly	due	to	the	higher	transparency	the	
new	system	would	bring”.
The Project manager comments on the later developments: 
“We	started	by	stating	clearly	to	both,	companies	and	private	customers,	what	our	strategic	
objectives	were	 from	all	 four	 perspectives.	 This	was	 the	 focus	 of	 our	 discussions	with	 that	
external	consultancy.	What	did	not	go	well	was	that	the	discussions	were	held	only	with	a	part	
of	management,	just	managers	of	six	line	departments,	but	we	now	have	eighteen	departments	
in	total.	The	other	twelve	followed	at	a	distance.	To	determine	the	critical	success	factors	we	
simply	had	meetings	together:	real	discussions	like,	well,	what	is	financially	important	to	us,	
and	so	on...”
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Finally, the two strategy maps were developed based on a background story (the documents ‘The story 
behind	the	Strategy	Map	of Rabobank The Hague, Private Customers respectively Companies’). The 
philosophy of the dominant scorecard thinking was expressed through these texts. New features like 
the ‘Confrontation matrix’, “Overview Damage Risks’ and “Strategic Contribution of the Department’ 
were emerging from the discussions between directors and consultants. Subsequently, for each 
department a strategic map (18 “department scorecards”) and a department	plan	(see for an example 
Appendix	5) were developed. According to the Project manager, the strategy maps and the background 
stories were only sent to the management of the departments. The other employees were marginally 
involved in the process: “I	don’t	think	this	is	good	either,	but	the	process	was	going	too	fast	for	it”. 
A consultant involved in the project:
“We	firstly	communicated	the	strategy	card	and	subsequently	made	changes	according	to	the	
suggestions	received.	Then	sitting	on	the	Large	Companies:	well,	on	that	chart	(strategy	map	
Companies)	what	are	the	disruptors?	What	can	you	do	about	it?	How	could	we	[the	directors]	
help	on	this?	Then	we	descend	from	Companies’	objectives	to	Large	Companies’	objectives.	
What’s	it	called	then?,	etc...”.
Similar formulations were used by the Manager Marketing & Communication: 
“At	a	certain	moment	we	got	some	homework.	Now	try	to	fill	in	on	that	strategy	map	what	are	the	
CSF’s	[critical	success	factors]	and	what	is	your	contribution	to	this”. 
During the process of producing department plans, the important issues were focus, cooperation and 
delivering strategic contributions. This can be traced also in the following statement by the Private 
Customers Director:
“…P&O	[Employees	and	Organization	department]	for	instance	was	very	disappointed	about	
the	demands	by	the	managers	for	services	with	regard	to	the	development	of	employees.	Then	
they	wanted	to	develop	themselves	their	own	P&O	plan.	No,	no,	you	go	and	talk	as	long	as	
needed	to	those	managers	so	that	one	of	these	objectives	in	the	learning	&	growth	perspective	
ends	in	the	big	five.	And	if	someone	has	zero	[employees]	turnover	rate,	zero	sick	leave	and	
everybody	 has	 a	 training	 plan,	 then	 you	 have	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 one	 cannot	 do	 better,	
nothing	to	improve.	For	the	staff	people	this	is	incredibly	difficult	to	realize,	because	in	banks	
you	see	the	staff	people	feeling	extremely	important	so	that	the	‘commercials’	have	to	adapt	
themselves”.
On April 3, 2003, a policy day was organized on the topic ‘From BSC-project to continuous process’. 
During this day in Noordwijk, a manager of a certain department presented the scorecard of another 
department. In the afternoon an ‘information market’ was organized (also called ‘reflection market’). 
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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The participants examined certain issues from multiple points of view, without pushing forward their 
own opinion. The aim was to reach a consensus. Armed with stickers printed with question marks, 
exclamation marks and flash signs, the departments went shopping at other departments. Each 
department had its own ‘market	stall’ containing the strategy maps and the objectives, hanging as 
posters. A consultant recalls:
“Everybody	 had	 received	 all	 the	 information	 from	 the	 others	 beforehand.	 Subsequently,	
you	 could	go	 shopping	 to	 your	 internal	 clients	and	 suppliers.	 If	 one	wants	 to	meet	 its	 own	
objectives,	 than	one	needs	an	 internal	 supplier.	However,	 does	 your	 internal	 supplier	 know	
what	your	objectives	are?	Could	I	help	you	on	this?...	Due	to	this	focus	on	coordination	many	
suggestions	for	improvement	have	been	formulated”. 
In a positive atmosphere, during the course of this day the colleague-departments’ plans and strategy 
maps became better and more focused. All 18 departments were involved in these conversations. 
However, there was one exception. The Marketing & Communication Manager comments that the 
Planning and Control department had been skeptical about the BSC for a long period of time: 
“It	has	to	do	with	the	fact	that	this	model	diverges	considerably	from	the	models	employed	at	
Rabobank	Netherlands.	So	how	can	one	find	a	connection	with	it?	Some	information	has	to	be	
delivered	monthly	according	to	the	Compass	Model”.
The language represents a big problem here! In a letter addressed to the directors and the management 
team (May 20, 2003), the Head Planning & Control asked whether the project manager of the BSC 
“[could]	translate	the	set	of	concepts	of	the	Compasses	to	 ‘Balanced	Scorecard’	concepts	and	sales	
objectives”. 
Eventually, the bank succeeded in meeting the information requests by Rabobank Netherlands 
(external reporting), while at the same time continuing the balanced scorecard project for internal 
purposes, along with the related cultural change program.
The Director Private Customers and his Project Manager used a discursive editing strategy with the 
aim of ‘telling a good story’. In accordance with Scandinavian Institutionalism, they had to put a lot 
of effort in convincing ‘interessement’) other organizational actors into doing what is needed for 
the idea-materialization. In so doing, they gained legitimacy for the BSC idea. Through language	of	
distinctions it proved to be possible to distinguish ‘what-is’ situations from ‘what-is-not’ situations 
(and, respectively, ‘what-still-has to-be-done’ situations). According to Von Krogh et al. (1994), the key 
question is how and why new distinctions are introduced, and to what extent they are entrenched and 
are conferred meaning to. Von Krogh et al. (1994) suggest that sometimes the break line separating 
the present from the past is so strong that it results in a “rescaling of the knowledge tree of the 
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organization”. This, indeed, proved to be the case at Rabobank The Hague. The desired fundamental 
change as portrayed above showed through several (key) concepts as utterances of the distinctions. 
These distinctions gain a central place in the management terminology and form the basis for decisions 
and concrete actions (the action context; Wolpert, 2002).
In the Rabobank The Hague, the following distinctions and corresponding (key) concepts played a role 
in the change processes (see Table	4).
TABLE 4: DISTINCTIONS AND CORRESPONDING (KEY) CONCEPTS
   distinctions     (key) concepts
 (1) financial ↔ non-financial
     effect↔ cause
Balanced Scorecard
strategy map
‘The story behind the Strategy Map’
 (2)‘going for everything’ ↔ 
       focusing           
‘big five’
confrontation matrix
 (3) ‘free – merry’ culture ↔
       ‘accountability’ culture
sales-meeting
briefing/debriefing
week reports
 (4) ‘everyone for himself’ ↔
         cooperation
overview ‘damage risks’
‘market stall’
plan of presentations by colleagues
 (5) ‘simply	do your work’ (incl.
       own hobby’s)        ↔
       delivering strategic
       contributions,	willing to
       become the	best
strategic contribution by the department
(= orange in strategy map)
Champions League (cups, bank hall meetings, etc.)
 
Idea-materialization
Concepts and ideas corresponding to four of the five distinctions ((1), (2), (4) and (5)) were materialized 
in the departments’ plans (for the coming three years). The strategy	maps/Balanced	Scorecards (both 
Private Customers and Companies) state the departments’ overall objectives (their intended ‘strategic 
contribution’). These overall objectives are colored in orange and indicate the departments’ key 
concerns in the implementation of the local bank. In the ‘Departments’ Objectives Overview’, the five 
most important objectives (‘big	five’) are indicated at the top. Subsequently,the ‘Key Performance 
Indicators’ (KPI’s) are presented. For each departments’ objective, one or more KPI’s are described. 
Then, ‘initiatives’ for meeting the objectives are described in a confrontation	matrix, relating them to 
the departments’ objectives. Finally, departments’ dependence upon other parties is traced in the 
‘Overview Damage Risks”.	This overview presents in the strategy map some objectives on which the 
department has no direct influence, but that are nevertheless important for the performance of the 
department. As an example, a part of the departments’ plan of the Large Companies department 
(Wholesale) is attached as Appendix	5.  
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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The idea of ‘competition’ as it is reflected in distinction 5 is materialized through the artifact 
‘trophy’ (‘cup’). In accordance with the Cohen Brown philosophy, in June 2002 Rabobank The Hague 
implemented a ‘Champions	League. Based on the scores on the BSC performance indicators, every 
second Monday of the month the Champions League awards the best performing departments. In the 
evening, the entire local bank gathers in the bank hall (the so called ‘bank	hall	meetings’) to witness 
how the General Director awards the trophies. In 2004 there were three competitions, one for the six 
line departments and three product departments, one ‘staff cup’ for the nine staff departments, and 
one for the banks’ offices.
For example, as utterances of distinction the concepts corresponding with the third distinction are 
materialized in the inscription ‘week	reports’. These reports are directly related to the Cohen Brown 
philosophy. The weekly briefing	and	debriefing is an important part of this philosophy and illustrates 
the instant materialization	in	action. Every Monday morning a ‘Directors meeting’ takes place. There, 
among other things, the week reports are discussed. All the heads of departments have to send their 
reports, accompanied by brief policy texts, to the Project Manager before 10.30 1. He condenses the 
reports to two A4 pages. Each department has its own color, and the most important results are 
marked with red and green. Targets and the actual results are presented for comparison, and the 
Directors assess the reports. An example is given in Appendix	6. 
Moreover, on Monday each sales department starts with a sales	meeting. At this meeting, the focus 
is on sales targets for the coming week. On Friday afternoon an evaluation meeting is organized. The 
objective is to evaluate the achievements against the targets. This is seen as a beginning of a culture 
of factually addressing the problems and making people responsible.
The Director Private Customers comments (Heuvelmans, 2003):
“The	sales	department	was	divided	into	small	units	with	considerable	social	control.	The	sales	
people	evaluate	themselves	on	a	weekly	basis	and	then	tell	me	how	it	went.	At	the	end	of	every	
week,	they	send	me	a	report	with	details	about	what	they	have	sold	and	why	they	think	it	is	
good	or	bad.	By	measuring	achievements	over	very	small	periods,	not	only	does	management	
realize	 in	time	whether	 things	are	going	well	or	not	but	 this	also	applies	 to	 the	employees	
themselves.	If	there	is	a	crisis,	then	employees	see	much	earlier	that	a	crisis	exists	and	they	are	
more	motivated	to	help	solving	it.”
A consultant adds to this, and clarifies the ‘agency’ of the inscription ‘week report’ (Heuvelmans, 2003):
“It	starts	with	raising	awareness,	people	on	the	work	floor	signaling	that	things	are	not	going	
well.	As	 they	write	 it	down	 themselves,	 something	happens	 to	 them	mentally.	 They	will	 be	
more	motivated	because	they	have	an	obligation	with	regard	to	what	they	have	written.”
1 Starting 2004 this function has been assigned to somebody from the Marketing & Communication department.
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From the local to the global
As a consequence of a local translation some features of the general idea and concept of the BSC 
may get “lost in translation”, some features may (slightly or more fundamentally) change and some 
features may be added (“enrichments”). A number of features of the global ‘State of the Art’ BSC can 
be defined (based on Speckbacher et al., 2003; Kasurinen, 2001). The balanced scorecard:
(i) Contains financial and non-financial strategic measures/objectives
(ii) That are grouped into perspectives
(iii) Employs cause-and-effect chains
(iv) Contains action plans/targets
(v) That are linked to incentives
(vi) Involves strategic discussion intended to help ‘refine the vision and strategy’.
Clearly, the first two features are present in the local Balanced Scorecard (=Strategy Map2). 
The employment of cause-and-effect chains (feature (iii)) is clearly recognizable in the translation of 
the Balanced Scorecard, but is apparently lost in translation. The project manager:
“…	when	 reporting,	we	did	not	 implement	 it	 [employing	 cause-and-effect	 chains]	 yet.	But	 I	
think	both	the	management	and	the	directors	have	the	issue	on	their	minds	I	think.	You	can	see	
it	back	in	the	strategy	map,	because	those	lines	have	been	traced.	If	you	read	the	background	
story	[he	means	the	enrichment	in	the	form	of	the	document	’The	story	behind	the	Strategy	
Map’	KW]	than	you	also	see	it	is	there.”
Feature iv (action plans and targets) can be traced in the initiatives overview. The initiatives are even 
related to the departments’ objectives in a confrontation matrix, which can be seen as an enrichment of 
the BSC as developed by Kaplan and Norton. The departments’ managers also define targets themselves, 
which are only marginally assessed by the directors. The Customers Advice Manager states:
 “The	best	part	of	it	is	that	if	you’re	allowed	to	define	the	target	than	you	often	set	e	it	higher	
that	the	directors	would	have	done”.
The managers also have to make a week report detailing whether they did or did not meet the targets.
Feature v (linking plans and targets to incentives), was lost in translation. However, in the interview 
(June 2004) the project manager states that there are plans to start using the variable ‘incentives’ 
shortly.
2 The strategy maps have also been called ‘Balanced Scorecards’ at Rabobank The Hague. In the ‘State of the art’ 
BSC the feature ‘grouped into perspectives’ is particularly emphasized in the Balanced Scorecard and the feature 
‘employs cause-and-effect chains’ in the strategy map. At Rabobank The Hague, both features are emphasized in 
the strategy map (= Balanced Scorecard). 
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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“…we	will	trace	it	from	the	objectives	stated	in	the	Balanced	Scorecard	to	the	employees’	level”.
The following statement by the project manager (June 2004) indicates that the strategic discussion/
dialogue (feature (vi)) did not work out very well so far: 
“This	talking	to	each	other	happens	particularly	within	the	Management	Team,	plus	the	week	
reports	to	the	directors	containing	the	most	important	indicators.	Of	course	we	talk	to	each	
other,	but	at	this	point	still	[particularly]	on	policy	issues,	just	under	the	strategic	level.	Hence,	
we	talk	too	much	on	department’s	level	and	too	little	on	bank	wide	level”.
He also indicates that this is a consequence of a lack of a strategic scorecard for the bank as a whole:
“…you	have	a	card	for	companies,	one	for	private	customers	and	a	story	on	the	top	from	the	
strategy	map,	this	is	where	one	should	pick	up	10-15	most	important	indicators	from,	at	the	
moment	they	are	fragmented.	We	do	have	them	[indicators],	but	we	get	them	fragmentally”.
Another possible explanation is that the General Director frustrates a real strategic dialogue based on 
a BSC. As argued earlier, the General Director promoted the BSC to the outside world, but never really 
pro-actively embraced it nor insisted on an internal strategic dialogue based on the BSC.
The following “enrichments” (additions to the ‘State of the Art’ BSC) may be identified. They went 
“back to the globe” through other client firms of the consultants firm:
. ‘The Story behind the Strategy Map’;
. The ‘Confrontation Matrix’;
. ‘Overview Damage Risks’;
. Strategic Contribution of the Department.
The introduction of internal competition by relating a Champions League (cups) to the BSC may also be 
seen as enrichment. This would then be the only enrichment that played a crucial role in the change 
process. It appears from the interviews that the other enrichments were not responsible for the 
‘rescaling’ that took place at Rabobank The Hague.
Support of allies
In the summer of 2003, the policy planning for 2004 started. It departed from “the	learning	moments	
we had on the policy day in April” (internal memo ‘Policy Planning 2004’, August 13, 2003). For 
example, in July 2003 the project manager states the following:
“Now	we	talk	at	the	team-leaders’	level	about	the	objectives.	Hence,	the	lower	levels	are	also	
involved	now.	Everyone	has	the	opportunity,	if	one	has	the	ambition,	to	say	something	about	it”.
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Specific evenings were organized for the employees with the purpose of communicating to the work 
floor. For example, the Marketing & Communication department organized a special	evening for the 
department ‘Customers Advice’. A movie was presented at the gathering and Mr. Cohen (from America) 
was a distinguished guest. The ‘Customers Advice Manager’ presented the BSC to his department. 
Communicating openly to people was seen as very important. The manager also produced a present 
for every department employee: a ‘puzzle’ of the strategy map for Private Customers. On the issue of 
communication, the Project manager state: 
“We	communicate,	so	to	speak,	 ‘on	the	minute’	about	the	status	of	the	policy	planning.	So,	
within	the	segments	the	objectives	are	now	discussed	collectively.	It	is	much	more	bottom	up	
at	the	moment.	During	the	‘bank	hall	meetings’they	tell	a	monthly	story.	There	are	200	people	
there,	and	they	are	being	told	at	what	point	we	are,	where	the	things	are	balanced,	and	where	
they	are	not.	Furthermore,	relevant	information	is	published	in	the	employees’	newsletter…	I	
think	that	the	largest	communication	efforts	should	be	focused	on	the	daily	work	floor	and	this	
is the case now”. 
The search for support of allies is a continuous process, as is reflected in a statement by the Director 
Private Customers:
“…the	whole	strategy	map	exercise	is	a	continuous	process…continuously	we	discuss	scorecards	
and KPI’s with people”.
 
He also points to the importance of passion in getting support and commitment of allies (Heuvelmans, 
2003):
“In	 the	 Private	 Customers	 segment,	 everything	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 various	 strategic	
discussions	 filtered	 down	 to	 the	 lower	 levels	 and	was	 re-examined	with	much	 enthusiasm.	
At	 a	 given	moment,	 I	 came	 into	 contact	with	 a	 customer	who	 complimented	 the	 company	
on	 its	no-nonsense	attitude.	 This	was	exactly	what	we	had	discussed	 in	 the	 sessions	a	 few	
months	before.	It	is	great	if	you	see	that	a	particular	strategic	decision	is	spot	on	and	due	to	the	
enthusiasm	and	commitment	of	staff	filters	down	to	all	employees.	In	the	Companies	segment,	
there	was	no	filtering	down	to	the	lower	levels	and	therefore	no	lasting	power.	In	this	segment,	
managers	were	so	honored	that	they	were	allowed	to	participate	in	the	discussions	and	felt	
therefore	so	exclusive	that	they	did	not	want	to	share	information	with	the	lower	orders.”
 
In December 2003, another policy day was organized. The conclusions were summarized in a policy 
magazine (February 2004). Here is a fragment from that policy magazine:
“The	morning	was	dominated	by	presentations.	Each	manager	was	asked	to	present	a	plan	for	
another	department.	In	this	way,	the	‘tone’	for	the	day	was	set:	it	is	important	to	look	beyond	
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
91
Ch
ap
te
r
6
the	borders	of	your	own	department.	 In	the	afternoon,	there	was	room	for	discussions.	The	
discussions	were	organized	in	four	groups.	In	each	group	the	plans	of	the	managers	involved	
were	discussed	one	by	one.	A	good	preparation	for	the	day	was	essential.	During	the	group	
discussions	 the	 plans	 were	 assessed	 against	 consistency	 (vertically	 and	 horizontally),	 the	
relation	to	bank	wide	objectives.	The	positive	and	negative	points	of	the	plans	were	discussed.	
After	 the	 group	 discussions,	 a	 plenary	 session	 was	 organized	 for	 presenting	 the	 gathered	
inputs.	Prof.	Dr.	Cees	van	Halem	was	invited	to	chair	the	plenary	meeting.	The	final	objective	
was	to	gather	all	the	critical	notes	and	to	work	them	out	in	the	various	departments’	plans”.
Executive management had the formal power to enforce fundamental BSC change. In a dialectic 
conversation at the beginning of the change trajectory, they made this clear to the managers. The 
Director Private Customers comments (Heuvelmans, 2003):
“In	order	to	create	a	shock	effect,	I	opted	for	the	Balanced	Scorecard.	Some	people	could	not	
accept	 this	 change	 and	 left	 the	 company.	Others	were	 pleased	 that	 finally	 something	was	
going	to	be	changed.	In	this	way,	I	lost	a	third	of	my	managers	and	yet	I	know	there	was	no	
other	way	forward”. 
However, in the subsequent trajectory, executive management was eager to facilitate participation 
and promote dialogue (Franco, 2006; Yankelovich, 1999). The dialogue proved to be a suitable 
conversation form to get the support of allies. It was characterized by the readiness of the human 
actors to examine certain issues from multiple points of view, without pushing forward one’s own 
opinion. The goal of the dialogue was to make the points of view in the group more explicit and to 
bring about a shared perception of reality (‘communicatively acting’). That is, the goal was to objectify 
through social interaction.
This seems to be an explanation for the relatively fast entrenchment of the Balanced Scorecard in 
this organization. It is not a “Herrschaftsfreier Dialog” (Habermas, 1981) or an idealized, fully open 
thoughts exchange (Senge, 1995). Rather, it is an example of business political ‘stage direction’, when 
the directors launch certain key concepts (e.g. balanced scorecard, big five and champions league) as 
‘beacons’. Given these ‘beacons’ the further processing could take place. Definitional boundaries were 
traced around the meaning of the concepts. However, the directors made sure that there was enough 
discretionary space (or room for agency) within the boundaries of these definitions. 
Despite this room for agency, however, the Director Private Customers continuously needed to (re)
negotiate. The (re)negotiations concerned the problematization (for instance with the controller), 
the distinctions (for instance with the non-sales departments about distinction 3 (the issue of 
accountability), and the inscription devices (for instance the different cups and regarding the contents 
(texts, etc.) in the departmental plans).   
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In June 2004, two strategy days were organized for the staff and the management team. The project 
manager recalls:
“We	organized	 two	 strategy	 days	 and	 I	 took	 part	 in	 both	 of	 them.	We	discussed	 in	 a	 very	
conscientious	way	about	the	relevant	variables	[in	the	strategy	map].	Almost	all	of	them	are	
relevant,	 but	we	 better	 framed	 and	 focused	 them.	 I	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	 focusing,	
because	you	can	see	a	year	later	that	you	slightly	miss	the	focus	you	expected.	And	also	the	
process,	 it	becomes	 increasingly	 focused…	we	also	 talked	one	more	time	about	 the	 level	at	
which	the	targets	are	raised... ”.
 
In the summer of 2004 the work on the policy plan 2005 started. The learning points from the previous 
policy planning were taken into consideration in order to achieve a more focused process.
Institutionalization
At the end of 2004, in the interaction among actors (mainly managers) a number of distinctions were 
recognized and gained greater significance. They even surpassed the ‘official doctrine’ (‘rescaling’). 
The changed organizational principles concern the following aspects: more attention to the generators 
of profitability, more focus and the shared desire to excel (being ‘the	best’). From the interviews, it can 
be concluded that the other two intended changes of the organizational principles were not realized 
yet. Creating a culture of accountability	succeeded for the sales departments, but is still a difficult 
process for many other departments. The coordination of the objectives and the cooperation	among 
departments also are still in need of improvement. The ongoing discussion on the exact definition of 
‘lead’, is an illustrative example of this3. 
Reflecting ex-post on the entrenchment of the new BSC control system, the Director Private Customers 
states (May, 2003):
“The	entire	company	talks	about	this,	is	busy	with	it,	has	an	opinion	about	it”.  
Even the departure of the initiator and champion of the BSC (Director Private Customers) in October 
2003 did not decrease the focus on the balanced scorecard. The project manager reflecting on this 
(June 2004):
“It	 seems	now	 that	 the	persons	he	gathered	around	him	 [the	management	 team,	KW]	are	
strong	enough	to	preserve	it.	You	can	see	that	as	the	time	passes	it	has	broadened	continuously,	
so	people	will	not	simply	throw	it	away”. 
 
3 However, the fact that this discussion started anyway, is seen as a great benefit of the Balanced Scorecard by the 
project manager.
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On the other hand, during the first years of the BSC change trajectory there were enough financial 
resources available. For example, it was not a problem to make extensive use of external consultants. 
However, due to initiated cost cutting efforts and probably also due to the departure of the Director 
Private Customers in October 2003, there were no additional resources available for adapting the BSC 
related IT infrastructure. In June 2004, the project leader states the following:
“I	would	like	to	expand	it	[the	IT	infrastructure	KW]	at	the	level	above	the	departments,	bank	
wide,	because	now	the	system	is	rather	fragmented.	There	is	already	a	proposal	for	doing	this,	
the	so	called	‘plateau	planning”.	But	due	to	cost-cutting	it’s	currently	on-stop”. 
With regard to the effects of the new control system’s working the Manager Marketing & 
Communication theorizes the following: 
“As	 I	 see	 that	we	 earn	monthly	more	 than	previous	 year,	 I	 don’t	 know	whether	 this	 is	 the	
reason,	because	I	see	it	as	a	combination	of	Cohen	Brown,	Scorecard,	and	the	company.	If	I	take	
a	look	how	much	an	individual	earns,	then	we	even	earn	more	than	we	budgeted	altogether.	
My	feeling	is	that	this	was	a	good	investment”.
The Project manager also thinks that the cost-benefit analysis of the BSC-application turns out 
positively: 
“I	am	convinced	that	it	pays	back.	It	does	already.	And	those	several	hundred	thousand	that	
were	paid	to	external	consultants	have	been	earned	back	easily.”
In an internal presentation (July, 2003), the effects of the BSC trajectory and the related cultural 
change program were summarized as follows:
“-	Durable	results	above	target
		-	More	than	30%	decrease	in	sick	leave
		-	High	employees’	satisfaction
		-	Insight	into	the	costs	and	readiness	to	manage	costs	
		-	More	effective	and	efficienty	cooperation	between	segments	and	departments	
		-	Collective	objectives”.
 
From the very beginning of the adoption of the idea of a BSC, the first two distinctions (on cause and 
effect relationships between non-financials and financials and on focus, see table 4) seem to have played 
a substantial role. It was about bringing about more structure and focus to the organization. From the 
beginning, a competition element (see the fifth distinction) had been introduced (Champions League). 
The competition element was strengthened continuously (less cups and hence a higher prestige, more 
transparency, etc.). We conclude from the interviews that particularly these three distinctions and the 
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corresponding key concepts (Balanced Scorecard (balanced structure), big five (focus) and Champions 
League (competition element)) are responsible for the ‘rescaling’ that took place at Rabobank The 
Hague. The anchoring of these three concepts in the organization is very strong. Even today (2012), at 
Rabobank The Hague everyone still talks about the BSC, the cup awards and the big five. Referring to 
this last point, the Director Private Customers states already in May 2003:
 “We	initiated	a	management	language	spoken	from	high	to	low.	Everybody	has	a	big	five”. 
The third and fourth distinctions, focusing on creating a culture of ‘accountability’ and on cooperation, 
were also important in the translation process, but were of a different order. They were not responsible 
for the ‘hard break line’ with the past. The concepts corresponding with these two distinctions 
(sales-meetings, an overview of the ‘damage risks’) were not institutionalized. The same counts for 
the ‘Confrontation Matrix’ (distinction 2) and the text on the intended strategic contributions of the 
departments (distinction 5). In July 2003, the project manager formulates it as follows: 
“the	confrontation	matrix	is	important...	but	well,	it	was	somehow	pale	in	the	process,	but	this	
is	because	of	the	speed	we	pushed	the	things…”
The Director Private Customers (and to a lesser extent the project manager) may be seen as a 
spokesman	of the BSC, speaking on behalf of the other actors related to the actor-network of the BSC. 
In collaboration with scholars from Belgian universities (e.g. Heuvelmans, 2003) the Director Private 
Customers was “selling” his particular translation of the BSC through journal articles, book chapters, 
and so on. In this way the translated idea went ‘back to the globe’ and travels over the world . Other 
evidence for this “spiral of fashion” is in the dispersing of many features (especially the enrichments) 
of the Rabobank The Hague BSC to other client firms by the consulting firm.
Case study ing Bank nederland
introduction
ING Bank Nederland (IBN) is a Dutch bank with a network of about 380 offices divided into districts 
and areas. The company offers a full package of financial services to business (financing, transfers and 
insurances) and private customers (mortgages, loans, savings, payments, insurances and transfers). 
Besides services to private customers provided by the account managers in local offices, in the last 
years the bank employs other distribution methods as well, such as direct marketing, and the Internet.
The bank provides its services to a saturated market. Increasing the market share is a difficult task, 
achievable only at the cost of competitors and vice versa. Until recently, the market was divided 
among five major players. In the last years though, new, mainly international, banks have entered 
the Dutch market. In order to preserve the market share IBN has decided to focus on the wishes of 
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the individual private as well as business client (segments). By doing so, the bank confers value to the 
(long-term) relationship with the client rather than to the closing of lucrative deals. The bank went 
through a large reorganization and restructuring (Segmentation Project) that started in 1996, and that 
was formally completed in the second part of 1997. Client groups were added to the existing product 
groups, which resulted in a matrix organization. The segments are steered by managers with market 
responsibility. The most obvious change in Headquarters (HQ) is the division in five dimensions, being 
market management (the segments), product management, channel management, operations and 
staff services. The major change for the sales organization is the geographic division of regions into 
24 districts. There are districts, areas and branches. In addition to district offices, there are about 150 
area offices and about 200 branch offices. The hierarchical line is as follows.
HQ Branch Organization
            ↓ 
District office
            ↓
Area office
            ↓
Branch office
            ↓
Sales teams
 
Each segment is served by a sales team linked up with a particular type of office. The segments Private	
Banking	and Companies	&	 Institutions are served by the district offices, the segments Private and 
Medium-Sized	&	Small	Companies (MSC) by the area offices as well as the branch offices. Furthermore, 
each district office has a team of specialists on Paying Abroad, Paying in the Netherlands, Assurances, 
Stocks and Mortgages and a department of Risk Management. HQ serves the fifth segment, Corporate 
Clients, since these are the big corporations that will not step into a bank office to do business. They 
require special attention. The sixth segment Paying is represented at every office.
In the new relatively complex organization, communication between segments, product groups and 
the sales organization is of particular importance. See Appendix	7 for an organizational chart of the 
new structure.
In order to increase, or at least maintain, the current market share, IBN has implemented value based 
management. Its management is strongly convinced that IBN can only be successful if it is able to 
create value for her most important stakeholders: the shareholders (economic value), the customers 
(customer value) and the employees (employee value). The main logic is that satisfied employees will 
lead to satisfied customers, and therefore to satisfied shareholders.
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Shareholders
For the shareholders, value creation implies guaranteeing the long-term profitability of the bank. For 
IBN this means that she has to meet the following objectives:
. maintaining leadership in the integrated financial service industry;
. a focus on Europe;
. increasing the quality of the organization;
. increasing profit growth with 12% annually.
 
Customers
With respect to the customers, value creation depends on the degree to which IBN is able to delight 
the customer rather than to satisfy the customer. Essentially, IBN has chosen a customer	 intimacy 
approach (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993), supported by a strong brand and by good products. This 
means that she will strive to be a solution	provider for her customers. She wants to offer her customers 
‘total solutions’, while making use of all the knowledge, products and services that are available within 
the whole ING Group. Still, for a part of the mass market she has developed a strategy of operational	
excellence (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993) so that low priced services can be offered.
IBN positions itself as the entrepreneurial bank for entrepreneurial people, to emphasize that she is 
dynamic, innovative, ambitious, and an initiator (see also the mission statement of IBN in Appendix	8). 
Important elements of the customer intimacy approach are: personal advice, tailor made (standard) 
service, maintaining a continuous relationship with the client, (concentrated on the life-time-value-
concept), and direct marketing as a facilitating function. In short, the bank wants to be a problem 
solver for the customer.
Employees
With respect to the employees, the development towards a customer intimacy approach requires a 
shift from reactive to proactive behaviour. IBN realizes that it can no longer take a reactive approach. 
In the early days, the bank did not have to worry about customers, since they simply came to the bank. 
Nowadays, it is necessary to actively approach the customer and offer services according to his/her 
specifications.
The employees who are in contact with the customers will get more responsibilities and freedom. The 
working methods have changed from procedure-oriented towards business-oriented: the customer 
and the creation of value have become central focus points. Mutual work relations are directed 
towards continuous innovation, are focused on self-discipline (self-managing and self-control), on 
mutual support (coaching), on mutual trust (relying on each other’s judgement and commitment), 
and on ambitious goals.
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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Translating the BSC in iBn
In accordance with Scandinavian Institutionalism, there was no ‘diffusion’ of a ‘State of the art’ 
scorecard, but there was translation. The initial translations of IBN’s BSC were shaped by a network 
of possibilities influenced by external factors such as technological developments, calls for increased 
professional standards and transparency for customers. Within IBN, desires for more entrepreneurship 
and self-steering, and for an improved performance management system based on non-financials, 
also shaped translations of the BSC.
Problematization
Up to the mid-1970s, the Dutch banking environment was characterized by stability and certainty 
(Dijksterhuis et	al., 2003). Bankers were powerful in the sense that they decided who to serve and 
what to offer. For example, ABN and AMRO, traditionally aiming for the higher end of the wholesale 
market, were reluctant to provide financial services to retailers. The financial services revolution that 
started in the 1970 made bank managers realize that they needed to alter their conceptualization of 
the business and adjust strategies and structures accordingly. Dutch banks started to enter each other’s 
core domains, which led to an upswing in competitiveness. Awareness of the importance of a strong 
client focus grew and triggered restructurings. In the late 1980’s, the Project ‘Organization Branches’ 
had been implemented within IBN’s predecessor NMB, to improve customer focus in the branch 
network. In addition to general environmental development, a downswing in performance as well as 
the announcement by a leading strategy consultancy firm that the future winners in financial services 
would be the firms without a branch network, triggered strategic change. Within NMB discussions 
emerged about customer loyalty and cross-selling. Technological developments were transforming the 
way business was done in banking, offering new delivery mechanisms and increasing transparency for 
customers (Dijksterhuis et	al., 2003:112). The branch network, for a long time a bank’s most precious 
asset, suddenly seemed a heavy burden (Dijksterhuis et	al., 2003:112). The allocation of revenues and 
costs to clients and products (what was earned on different clients and products?) became important 
issues. How complicated these issues were, and how radical the departure from existing practices 
and ways of thinking was, is demonstrated by a recollection of one of the project managers of the 
Segmentation project (Dijksterhuis et	al., 2003: 113; The project Segmentation at IBN has its roots in 
the Project Organization Branches at NMB):
“This	is	a	terrible	process,	a	terrible	process.	To	find	out	how	much	is	earned	with	particular	
products	and	why.	Because	we	were	doing	things	that	made	us	no	money	at	all	and	we	were	
doing	other	things	which	made	us	a	lot	of	money…We	had	a	branch	which	delivered	a	bag	of	
money.	We	did	not	know	the	various	parts,	we	did	not	know	the	costs	related	to	a	cash	transfer.	
The	process	is	very	complicated.	All	kinds	of	discussions	about	accountability	emerged…”
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The reorganization in 1996 and the new way of working and thinking within the bank (market and 
product oriented activity) entailed new information requirements (segmentation information). The 
previous information facilities (product oriented) could not satisfy this need. The IBN Board decided 
to implement the balanced scorecard in order to satisfy the new information needs. The comments of 
the project manager in March 1999: 
“The	 Balanced	 Scorecard	 has	 two	 bases	 it	 has	 been	 built	 upon.	 The	 first	 one:	 when	 the	
reorganization	started	we	thought	that	diverse	clients	should	be	approached	through	diverse	
mechanisms,	 eventually	 diverse	 products,	 etc.	 Therefore,	 diverse	 clients,	 diverse	 ways	 of	
approaching,	and	if	you	do	this	you	have	to	shape	your	organization	in	accordingly,	and	if	you	
change	the	organization	you	have	to	reshape	the	information	provision	channels.	The	second,	
more	referring	to	the	‘balance’	in	the	balanced	scorecard,	was	that	we	asked	ourselves	if	we	
want	to	be	a	solution	provider,	a	clients’	partner	that	focuses	on	the	relationship	and	not	the	
one	 single	deal,	 than	how	 should	we	manage	 this	 and	how	 should	we	build	 the	 reciprocal	
communication?	We	see	the	balanced	scorecard	mainly	as	a	communication	tool,	as	a	self-
steering	tool;	it	is	not	that	the	boss	should	punish	the	employee	but	the	employee	should	bring	
his	department	on	a	higher	level,	this	is	the	philosophy	that	guides	us	when	implementing	and	
shaping	the	balanced	scorecard.	Therefore,	if	one	focuses	on	the	relationship	with	the	client,	
you	look	beyond	the	one	single	deal.	The	question	is	how	can	you	manage	this?	There	are	not	
so	many	solutions	available,	actually	just	one:	the	balanced	scorecard.	It	looks	not	just	at	the	
individual	deals	that	you	completed	or	not,	but	it	looks	at	the	whole	picture,	how	one	treats	the	
employees,	how	one	treats	the	clients,	how	one	shapes	the	processes	and	what	is	the	added	
value	of	all	this.	Those	are	the	two	backgrounds,	the	segmentation	and	the	reshaping	of	the	
information	provision	channels,	combined	with,	translating	the	strategy	into	steering.”
The interpretation by the project manager that there were no available alternatives points to the 
fact that the balanced scorecard had momentum. Apparently, the time for the innovative idea had 
come. The BSC was ‘in the spotlight’, it was fashionable, and got a lot of attention in the ‘market for 
management control tools’. In sum, there was perceptual readiness (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).
That there were also some ‘coercive isomorphism’ forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) such as pressure 
from the Board of ING Group, can be traced in the following statement of the Head Research & Advice 
within the Controller department in April 1999: 
“In	the	Strategy	Department	one	looked	at	the	scorecard	some	five	years	ago.	The	first	time	
when	 the	 Head	 of	 the	 Strategy	 department	 made	 a	 presentation	 for	 the	 executives	 (IBN	
Board)	about	the	balanced	scorecard,	their	reaction	was	that	‘all	that	theoretical	stuff	is	really	
unnecessary’.	At	a	certain	point	however,	the	executives	understood	that	this	was	important.	
Because	the	Executive	Board	of	the	ING	Group	paid	attention	to	the	scorecard,	the	processes	
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went	 a	 bit	 faster.	 The	 Segmentation	 project	 was	 the	 final	 drive	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 balanced	
scorecard.	 The	 organization	 is	 reorganized	 but	 the	 information	 provision	 failed	 to	 change.	
Then	a	steering	committee	was	involved	to	decide	about	the	needed	management	information	
for	successfully	implementing	the	segmentation.	One	talked	a	lot	about	the	‘what’-question,	
what	kind	of	information	do	we	need?	This	was	the	context	the	balanced	scorecard	made	its	
way	through.	Then	one	has	to	raise	the	‘how’-question,	how	are	we	going	to	do	this?	Because	
we	 failed	 to	arrive	 to	a	conclusion	–	we	were	ending	up	with	political	 issues	–	we	 involved	
Nolan	Norton	to	help	us	with	the	trajectory.	They	worked	for	a	half	year	with	us	and	wrote	a	
report.	Then	we	called	in	an	interim	manager	as	project	leader	till	1st	of	January	1999.	Since	
then	we	have	a	new	project	manager.” 
 
The idea for a balanced scorecard also caught on because the balanced scorecard already played a 
role as part of a master idea in another organizational unit of the ING Group (RVS). This explains the 
interest the Executive Board of the ING Group had in the balanced scorecard. It becomes apparent 
that the balanced scorecard is travelling inside the ING Group as it is spreading from company unit to 
company unit within the Group. Somewhat later the Executive Board of the ING group issued a letter 
to all organizational units in which they “advised” the units to adopt the BSC. Some units (including 
IBN) felt some coercion here, others (e.g. Postbank) did not. Thus, the coercion of the Executive Board 
produced different counteractions by different organizational units with unexpected consequences 
(Lindberg et	al., 2007).
Asked about his involvement in the adoption of the balanced scorecard, the Head Controller/ Policies 
and Planning stated the following back in April 1999: 
“I	was	an	initiator	on	the	background.	There	was	a	group	led	by	the	Head	of	Strategy,	Mister	X,	
and	I	was	a	part	of	it.	That	group	said	that	it	was	the	time	to	introduce	the	balanced	scorecard.	
Mister	 X	 announced	 the	 executives	 about	 it.	 So	 I	 cannot	 say	 I	was	 the	 initiator,	 the	 group	
was	the	initiator	and	I	was	part	of	it.	Concerning	the	decision	making	process,	the	executives	
asked	the	advice	of	one	and	another,	and	finally	decided	to	call	in	Nolan	Norton	to	start	up	the	
trajectory.	Just	thereafter,	they	decided	that	there	is	something	to	do	about	it.	Implement!”
The Head of Strategy is the institutional entrepreneur/local champion of the balanced scorecard 
project. Later on in the process his role was increasingly taken over by the project group and project 
team members.
The two most important local problems to be solved are being summarized in the internal document 
‘BSC Development’ (‘Ontwikkeling BSC (Masterplan)’) dating back to 28 July 2000. This document 
describes the ex-ante	theorization, and illustrates the logic set by the champion, linking the problem 
to the balanced scorecard idea:
Chapter 6
100
“There	were	two	primary	reasons	to	implement	the	BSC.	One	was	the	necessity	of	management	
information,	 especially	 the	 operational	 and	 tactical	 information	 about	 the	 non-financial	
performance.	Secondly,	working	with	a	BSC	is	a	way	to	translate	strategy	into	action	and	to	
help	the	employee	in	self-steering	[of	his	activities]	instead	of	using	hierarchical	steering.	It	is	
important	that	the	employees	behave	entrepreneurially,	because	otherwise	we	cannot	serve	
the	client	accordingly	and	cannot	go	for	‘customer	intimacy’’.
 
Later on in the (reform) trajectory, a third goal emerged, creating a more results oriented and less 
‘libertarian’ culture in line with the project “Performance Management”. Specific ‘results agreements’ 
(‘resultaatafspraken’) should have been made within IBN, based on both financial and non-financial 
scores. This finally led to the goal of integrating the various balanced scorecards into the MTP cycle. 
The scorecard changed from a ‘self-management instrument’ into an ‘accountability instrument’.
Interessement
In 1997 the Strategy Department stressed the importance of a well-functioning management 
information system and consequently started the project Bestuurlijke Informatie Voorziening (BIV; 
Management Information Supply). Several project groups were created in the name of BIV, amongst 
these was the Management Besturings Systeem (MBS; Management Steering System). The project 
group MBS started working on the new steering model and the related needs in terms of managerial 
information. The Balanced scorecard served as a reference model. The steering model represents 
the basis for re-evaluating the existing managerial information at various local management levels 
in the organization. A segment-driven approach was chosen because every market-segment had its 
own market plan containing its strategic objectives and policies. The project group was composed of 
employees of the IT/BIV, Marketing Facilities, Controller and Strategy departments, and the employees 
of the respective market segments. The group started with the Private Banking market segment due 
to the high motivation and engagement of the Head Planning and Control of this segment. For one 
and a half months, the project group met weekly. Prior to the first meeting, a brainstorm session was 
organized aimed at constructing a concept of the four perspectives in the Balanced Scorecard. This 
resulted in a number of relatively ‘unrelated’ performance indicators. The segment’s employees in 
the group started categorizing the objectives and the critical success factors stated in the market plan 
according to the four perspectives in the Balanced Scorecard, and relating the performance indicators 
to them. This document served as a reference for the first meeting. During the first meeting all the 
perspectives were discussed and tested by all the disciplines that were present. Private Banking 
was representing the segment at large, Controlling focused on the financial perspective, Marketing 
Facilities on the client perspective, IT/BIV took care of detailing the definitions and configuring the 
system and Strategy looked at the strategic basis, and facilitated the process. The group chose not 
to select indicators based on the availability of the data, the main concern being the realization of 
strategic objectives.    
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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In 1998, the Executive Board decided to outsource the management of the BIV project to an external 
consultant (Nolan & Norton). After conducting some interviews, the consultant re-affirmed the 
decision to take the segment-driven approach and to choose the Balanced Scorecard as the ‘theoretical 
framework’. Besides the consultants of Nolan & Norton (temporarily), the new project group ‘Bestuurlijke 
Sturingsinformatie’ (Management Steering Information) contains people from Marketing Facilities, 
Controller and Strategy departments’ employees and market managers of Private Banking, Companies 
& Institutions and MSC. In addition, a steering committee composed of representatives of the first and 
second echelons was created. In order to avoid redundant discussions and obtain fast results, the entire 
project and the project organization were positioned right under the executive IBN Board.
The group started with communicating with the market managers of all the segments involved in 
order to motivate them to formulate strategic objectives and critical success factors. Each market 
segment had a market plan that stated their vision and strategy, and that was used as a starting point. 
Subsequently, in co-operation with market managers, the group started categorizing the objectives 
and critical success factors in the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. Based on this, adequate 
indicators were selected. The Strategy Department created Balanced Scorecards on the basis of the 
market plans that served as a reference framework for the project group discussions.
In order to ‘interesse’ the subsequent organization levels, the objectives and success factors were 
translated and then used for interviews/meetings with the district directors. It was remarkable that 
not all the directors were aware of the market managements’ strategies. They were asked about 
the relevant management information, partially related to their claimed objectives. The relevant 
information was translated into performance indicators and these were categorized in the Balanced 
Scorecard perspectives. The account managers were asked the same question, which also resulted 
in translating the outcomes into indicators. After each of the involved market segments had set up a 
‘general’ Balanced Scorecard, the group could pursue to the next phase. In order to reach a suitable set 
of generic indicators the group compared all the existing Balanced Scorecards. During a project group 
meeting, after long deliberations, a generic Balanced Scorecard was developed for all the levels and 
segments, which could eventually be enriched with specific segment dependent indicators. The idea 
was to have some 80% generic and 20% segment dependent indicators. 
There is an important point to make regarding the (change in) hopes, aspirations and attitudes of some 
of the important human actors. The project	group saw the BSC as a means for bottom-up searching 
for patterns in the relationship between operational processes, customer needs and ‘financials’. They 
wanted to “play” with the indicators in order to be able to create predictive ability in the long run. In 
the long run, the project group hoped to enable what is expressed in the following quote: 
“You	are	located	in	this	district	with	these	characteristics	(local	conditions)	and	that	is	why	your	
targets are like this”.
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In 2000, this ambition was not reached yet, as is demonstrated by the following quote from a member 
of the project group:
“At	this	moment	still	too	many	things	are	connected	that	have	not	yet	been	captured	in	causal	
relationships”. 
For the time being, the project group wanted to explain why and in which way certain indicators are 
connected. The project group saw the BSC as a performance management system in support of the local 
managers and did not want to settle scores with managers on the basis of the BSC. Staff	Department	
Controller however, approached the BSC top down. Controller was searching for a logic to deploy 
targets in the perspectives downwards. Controller did not want to explain, but wanted to predict.	
While considering the business plans of the segments, in a top-down way Staff Department Controller 
wanted to determine differentiated goals. Each district/branch office should receive different goals 
and targets, based on local circumstances and performance compared with the average. After the 
goals were differentiated, they would have to be integrated at the level of the organizational unit. It 
was hoped that the Balanced Scorecard would create this integration of financial and non-financial 
targets. This integration means that all goals and targets are linked to each other, so that the BSC 
provides a sense of wholeness and unity (Edinius and Hasselbladh, 2002). Each target has to be part of 
a chain of cause-and-effect relationships. In this way the policy of IBN is a coherent whole instead of a 
set of isolated or even contradictory goals. This integration would underline the strategy of customer	
partnership: providing total solutions to the customers.
In the beginning, the majority of the market	managers were extremely suspicious about the BIV 
project. They wanted more management information, but because of the fear of losing their autonomy 
they were not really co-operative. However, after talks with the members of the project group, they 
became more motivated to co-operate. The more they got involved with the project, the better they 
saw the positive aspects of it.
The dominant atmosphere among the market managers could be labeled as strongly competitive, not 
just among the managers themselves, but also between the managers and the Strategy Department. 
Therefore, there was a danger that each segment would aim at its own objectives, this resulting 
in suboptimal outcomes. The project group tried to solve this interaction problem by including a 
specific indicator in the generic Balanced Scorecard: the number of references made to other market 
segments. The group believed that this would stimulate co-operation.
In the discussions, the district directors clearly indicated the need for more management information. 
Generally, their cooperativeness was quite high. The district directors were particularly interested 
in the functioning of the account teams. During the meetings, the problem was raised of different 
systems used by the offices to monitor the performance of account managers. Those systems were 
often designed ‘of the cuff’ by the directors and were not administrated centrally. The district directors 
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realized that there was a great danger of inconsistency and manipulation, but following the logic of 
‘better something than nothing’, they were nevertheless making use of them. From the discussions 
it appeared that the district directors were often not aware of the market segment strategy. This 
is problematic, because if at the lower levels the strategy is not known, there is the chance that, 
for example, the account managers spend too much time on unprofitable clients, or that they focus 
just upon the revenues of particular products for particular customers without investing in good 
relationship management. Therefore, in the discussions the group concluded that much priority had 
to be given to translating the strategy at the lower levels.
In the discussions, it turned out that the account	managers also were in need of more information 
and supporting systems. They were particularly interested in databases that would store the client 
data. Due to the high turnover of account management staff, much uncodified information was lost. 
Furthermore, the account mangers expressed dissatisfaction concerning the support from head office. 
According to them the internal communication could be substantially improved. In the beginning, 
the account managers reacted rather suspiciously to the non-financial perspectives in the Balanced 
Scorecard and the performance indicators they contained. So far they had been completely free in 
their actions, but they also had no insights in the clients’ behavior, or into their own performance. 
Later on, when the idea of non-financial steering was materialized in the dynamic scorecard (with its 
extensive database function) they became more satisfied.              
In sum, the BSC promised to be many things: from a top down logic to deploy targets downwards 
(Staff Department Controller) to becoming a learning organization (human resource department and 
strategy department). Project group members saw the BSC as a means for bottom-up searching for 
causal patterns from processes to customer needs to financials and district directors associated the 
BSC with more management information regarding the functioning of the account teams. However, 
account managers associated the BSC with more management information regarding the client. In 
short, rather than being one thing to all, the BSC proved to have the potential to be many things to 
many different actors (see also Sandhu et	al., 2008).
Then the preliminary results of the project group were discussed with a reference group consisting of 
seven Private Banking account managers. In the beginning of the meeting, some of them were rather 
skeptical. In the discussions account managers repeatedly insisted that the data was to be used for 
steering and not checking. It appeared that the account managers wanted to have their say in defining 
the focus; they wanted to get convinced that the right direction was taken. They claimed that they 
were knowledgeable of the client and thus that they had much insight regarding the necessary focus. 
They explicitly argued against a top-down set focus they did not back.
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According to the account managers, in order to avoid internal competition within an account team, 
the account team, rather than the individual account manager was to be the lowest level in the ‘BSC-
game’. They thought that it should be avoided that within a team disputes would arise over issues like 
who should pick up the phone and who could write provisions. The account managers furthermore 
agreed that all the teams should get the same targets/norms. They advocated that the account teams 
should define their own targets/norms. According to the account managers, the targets/norms had to 
be realistic, representing a challenge for the given team.
In the discussion between the project group and the reference group it was concluded that the 
intention was not to decide everything in a top-down way, but that account managers were to be 
involved in defining the focus and the setting of the targets/norms.
Subsequently, the indicators developed for the generic Balanced Scorecard were discussed. Thereafter, 
the account managers were asked to set up a list of indicators they would find adequate. It transpired 
that account managers had a particular problem with one of the indicators in the generic BSC: the ratio 
‘offers generation’ (the number of offers divided by the number of visits). The reason behind this is 
that within the Private Banking segment one does not pay visits solely for selling products. Particularly 
in this segment it is important to build a trusting relationship with the client. The account managers 
perceived a danger that the indicator might be wrongly used, which might imply that one would only 
pay visits that had a high probability to result in selling a product. Increasing the customer loyalty and 
improving the trusting relationship might suffer from this. Because of these counterarguments, it was 
decided to eliminate this indicator from all the levels of the Private Banking segment.
    
It transpired that the more the account managers (also from the other segments!) were getting used to 
the BSC, the more their enthusiasm rose. They came to perceive the BSC as an information-generating 
tool, a tool that allowed them to operate in self-steering teams.
  
A project leader, reflecting on the outcomes of all these conversations (June, 2000), states that the 
‘product’ of these conversations, the generic Balanced Scorecard, in itself has to be considered as 
language:
“In	 the	 middle	 of	 1998	 the	 generic	 Balanced	 Scorecard	 has	 been	 developed	 consisting	 of	
performance	 indicators.	Those	were	 just	terms,	 just	very	global	descriptions.	There	were	22	
terms	made	up	by	 those	 in	 charge	of	 the	 segments	and	 channels,	 the	branch	organization	
and	their	directors,	 the	controllers	 in	addition.	And	we	thought	 that	 it	 could	be	something.	
Subsequently,	that	message	has	been	communicated	country-wide	and	one	had	to	simply	build	
it	up.	Loose	terms	say	nothing.	You	need	a	concrete,	well	fitting	definition	and	you	have	to	
link	it	to	the	systems	and	also	develop	the	reporting	forms.	It	started	at	the	end	of	1998	and	
we	firstly	reported	about	it	in	May	1999.	Partially	the	process	indicators,	a	number	of	client	
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indicators,	those	were	the	first	to	be	opened	up.	You	could	say	that	we	went	into	hiding	for	
some	four,	five	months	to	work	hard	for	making	the	definitions	and	harmonize	them	with	the	
rest:	is	this	what	we	mean	by	the	terms?	So,	the	whole	definition-phase	took	some	half	a	year	
altogether,	prior	to	the	beginning	of	reporting”.
In sum, the conversations during the first two years of the BSC project mainly focused on ‘chewing 
out the reorganization’, exploring the information needs, a feasibility study of the project (by an 
external consultant), and on setting up the generic Balanced Scorecard. This was followed by a period 
of contemplation, of about half a year. This period of contemplation was necessary for making the 
definitions in the generic Balanced Scorecard more specific. It was also necessary because during the 
year 1999 a number of steering decisions had to be made. In 1999, the Steering Committee BSC asked 
for more clarity on the IBN steering procedures based on the BSC methodology. These questions were 
put on the table particularly because of the fact that the technical architecture and infrastructure “has 
to	facilitate	the	suspension	of	other	distribution	channels	[than	the	offices	network]” (minutes of the 
Steering Committee BSC meeting, 27 May 1999). Among other things, the following steering questions 
influenced the further translation of the BSC (memo ‘Steering philosophy and the Balanced Scorecard, 
12 August, 1999):
Strategic	objectives	and	CSF’s
What are the (segment specific) strategic objectives stated by IBN?
Which (segment specific) Critical Success Factors can be formulated organization-wide based on the 
strategic objectives?
What (segment specific) Value Drivers can be identified?
Which cause-and-effect relationships can be formulated organization-wide, given the determined 
CSF’s?
Which (department-specific) indicators can be formulated given the determined CSF’s? 
Managing	the	sales	channels	(Multi-channeling)
How should the various direct channels be managed [for example call center and internet], as a cost 
center or profit center? 
Managing	the	employees	(stimulating	and	‘rewarding’)
How can the employees be motivated to make optimal use of the chosen segment groupings, sales 
channels and the knowledge and skills of other departments?
How does the employee get an insight in the added value of his or her efforts? 
The project group used a discursive editing strategy with the aim of ‘telling a good story’. In accordance 
with Scandinavian Institutionalism, the project group had to put a lot of effort in convincing 
(‘interessement’) other organizational actors into doing what is needed for the idea-materialization. 
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In so doing, they gained legitimacy for the BSC. With the help of distinctions it is possible to distinguish 
“what-is” situations and “what-is-not” situations (hence “what-still-has-to-be-done” situations). 
According to Von Krogh et al. (1994) the key question is to what extent new distinctions are “languaged” 
in the organization, and how long they are sustained. Or are they rejected? New distinctions often 
vanish simply because they are not understood or further discussed. In the IBN case the following 
distinctions and belonging (key) concepts played a role in the change processes (see Table	5).
TABLE 5: DISTINCTIONS AND RELATED (KEY) CONCEPTS
Distinctions (Key) concepts /utterances of distinctions
checking ↔ steering Management Information Supply (BIV)
hierarchical steering ↔ self-steering
Entrepreneurship
self-steering teams
generic BSC
financial ↔ non-financial
generic BSC
strategy communicating scorecard
timetable
effect ↔ cause
strategy differentiating scorecard
Strategy map
dynamic BSC (‘top-sheet and time-sheet’)
fixed rewarding ↔ variable rewarding
Performance Management
results agreements
operational ↔ strategic strategic scorecard
self-steering ↔ hierarchical steering ‘Salesforce” (instead of entrepreneurship)
In the conversations between the human actors three BSC concepts, as utterances of distinctions, were 
used in order to move from the existing to the desired situation in the future. Through distinctions, one 
consciously tried to establish a discrepancy between the existing and desired organizational situation. 
In conversations, through distinctions opportunities for initiating organizational renewal were created. 
From the memo “BSC Development (Masterplan)” the following distinctions can be drawn:
 
“- Strategy defining (strategic scorecard): this card is especially of a qualitative nature, it states what 
the future direction is the unit moves to and what are the strategic choices and programs, that are 
going to be emphasized in the organization. [distinction: operational ↔ strategic] 
Strategy communicating (balanced scorecard): this card tries to translate the strategic choices into 
actions, qualifying the quantitative. The translation into actions will be evaluated systematically; the 
action related norms will be evaluated in particular. [distinction: financial ↔ non-financial]
- Strategy differentiating (scorecard): this card is mainly of a quantitative nature, the actions are 
translated to subsequent lower levels. The actions indicate what is there that requires particular 
attention and how various efforts relate to each other: cause-and-effect relationships. The strategy 
translation can be found in the ‘individual targets’ setting”. [ distinction: effect ↔ cause]
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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Back in April 2002, a project leader states the following:
“So	there	are	several	levels	and	sorts	[of	cards],	which	we	defined	as	a	strategic	card,	a	balanced	
scorecard	and	finally	a	scorecard	of	an	individual	employee.	I	simply	call	it	a	HEMA	[popular	
Dutch	retailer]	exercise	book.	It	[exercise	book]	contains	your	own	objectives	or	performance	
agreements.	We	tried	to	strip	off	those	concepts	but	I	notice	that	not	everybody	gets	it	yet.	But	
this	is	going	to	happen	soon	because	the	variable	rewarding	and	the	performance	agreements	
are	recently	introduced	(in	conformity	with	the	CAO	[collective	labor	agreements]).”
Furthermore, the memo describes that in the future situation three management levels should be 
distinguished. Each level has its own type of scorecard (‘BSC Development (Masterplan)’, 28 July 2000):
-  At the executives’ level the Strategy Defining Scorecard (strategic scorecard) will be applicable. 
The executive managers mainly cope with strategic portfolio management. The strategic scorecard 
should state the strategic choices and related programs in a structured way. This card should also 
play a role in reciprocal harmonization of various cards. 
-  At the market management/segment level, the Strategy Communicating Scorecard (balanced 
scorecard) is useful for translating the strategic direction into actions for meeting the objectives 
of the segment. Because the segments are steered from the executives’ level, various balanced 
scorecards will be complementary to each other (also Channel and Product management and 
Support).
-  Within a segment column (or channel/product/support column) the balanced scorecard (Strategy 
Differentiating Scorecard) will be connected to units and departments that will work towards 
meeting the objectives. The BSC will be important to these departments, not as much as a tool 
for translating strategic choices (the choice will not often change), but more as a steering tool. A 
steering tool clearly describes the relation between the activities and the ways of harmonizing 
them in the best way in order to achieve the desired results. The cause-and-effect relationships 
are of key importance here and those have to be quantitatively supported. This card will also be 
introduced at the lowest possible level so that it can be used as a framework for “Performance 
Management” (that is, as a basis for variable rewarding and performance agreements on an 
individual level). 
Idea-materialization
In May 1999, the (static) publication of the first scorecards for a part of the offices started. Those BSC’s 
were composed of a set of 19 indicators. The cards for the various segments were almost identical. The 
consequence was that all the subsequent discussions based on the BSC were performed within the 
limits of the standardized, generic, static tool. The users at various levels of the offices-organization 
were able to look at the indicators from two dimension-perspectives, segmented and hierarchical 
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(country-wide, district, area, office and sales team levels). Appendix	 9 exemplifies the static	 site. 
The project team was responsible for gathering the information. Partially, the information had to be 
obtained (per fax) from the local offices. Partially it was obtained from departments and systems at the 
head office. The project team filled in the information manually and the scorecards were published on 
the Intranet. At the time the first data were published, not all of the 19 indicators were fully processed. 
The publication was intentionally issued before all the cards could have been filled in completely and 
before cards were available for all the offices. A member of the project team clarifies:
“The	data	was	 ready	 in	proportion	of	70%-80%,	 some	 indicators	were	not	filled	 in	 yet.	We	
wanted	 to	 publish	 it	 at	 an	 early	 stage,	 in	 order	 to	 show:	 this	 is	 what	 we	 have,	 it’s	 being	
published	monthly,	delivered	monthly,	so	that	you	get	used	to	it,	you	look	over	it	for	yourself”.
About one year after the first publication, the implementation of the scorecard in the local offices 
(branch organization) was almost concluded. At that time just two or three indicators were not 
publically accessible. 
IBN adjusted and changed both the methodology and the presentation style of its BSC data several 
times. An important example of an improvement in this inscription device (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; 
Latour, 1987) is that in the first quarter of 2001 the dynamic	website (BSC-tool) was introduced. From 
then on, the figures published on the website were obtained directly from various source-systems and 
the site was more interactive. An important source was the decentralized management information 
system used by the offices to record their commercial data (e.g. customer visits, hit-ratios, cross-selling). 
The dynamic website provides the possibility to see, for instance, the scores for the variables making 
up the indicators on the scorecard (top-sheet). Specific documentation on the balanced scorecard (e.g. 
procedures, templates, definitions) was also published on the website (see appendix	10).
The Goes area director clarifies how the inscription device ‘charts’ enables the BSC to be customized 
(Qu, 2006) during the discussions in working meetings (July, 2000):
“We	also	 tried	 to	 visualize	 the	 balanced	 scorecard	 during	 our	working	meetings.	We	 have	
a	number	of	objectives,	part	of	our	market	plan	as	well,	 that	we	translated	 into	charts,	 for	
the	MSC’s’	and	the	Individuals’	markets,	that	we	keep	up	to	date.	Hence,	a	somehow	semi-
balanced	scorecard,	but	you	can	visualize	your	scores.	Such	a	system	is	in	your	PC	as	well,	but	
in	this	case	you	have	to	look	at	it,	extract	it	and	print	it	each	time,	this	is	how	it	works.	If	you	
transpose	it	autonomously	into	your	working	meetings,	commercial	meetings,	it	has	a	more	
intensive	life”. 
Almost all (21) HQ departments, assisted by the project team, developed a strategy	map in 2001 
(Kaplan and Norton, 2001). A member of the project team, illustrating how the inscription device 
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
109
Ch
ap
te
r
6
‘flipchart’ (Qu, 2006) is used to ‘capture’ key information from participants, states:
“...and	those	MT	sessions,	you	would	stay	there	for	the	whole	morning	and	talk	about	how	
it	goes.	…you	would	write	down	that	‘according	to	me	cross-selling	is	important	in	your	unit	
but,	 this	and	 that…’	We	had	a	big	flipchart	 divided	 in	 four	and	one	would	place	 things	on	
it.	One	would	of	course	think	prior	 to	 this	where	one	was	moving	to.	And	one	could	say	at	
a	certain	moment	that	 ‘ok,	but	you	have	a	big	hole	 in	here’.	 ‘Yes,	actually	we	do...	but	 this	
is	not	 important,	 I	 think	this	 is	 important!’	Then	we	would	come	to	a	consensus	and	would	
say	‘this	is	what	you	define	as	important.	This	is	what	you	have	to	manage.	What	then	is	the	
content?	What	people	from	the	departments	you	think	can	contribute	best	in	putting	this	into	
operation?’	And	this	works	of	course	only	if	you	are	covered	by	an	executive	member.	Surely	
in	the	type	of	organization	like	IBN.	And	even	then	it	is	difficult	[to	realize]	because	this	is	a	
very	entrepreneurial	organization,	especially	when	elaborating	one’s	own	 ideas.	 Something	
like	‘yeah,	I	think	it	is	this	way	or	that	way’.” 
The design of these maps resulted in valuable discussions. A BSC project leader states: “This	(designing	
the	strategic	maps)	led	to	discussions	between	certain	clubs,	among	product	departments	or	product	
departments	and	 channels	 (segments),	 like	 ‘hey,	 how	 is	 that,	 (…)	what	 is	 your	 focus’.	 There	was	a	
source	for	asking	questions	to	each	other	and	people	made	an	intensive	use	of	it”4. 
Another remarkable inscription (based on the distinction financial ßà non-financial) used for moving 
from the actual to the desired situation was the ‘spoorboekje’ (a kind of timetable). This ‘spoorboekje’ 
reveals the development of the change-process and was set up according to the four perspectives 
of the Balanced Scorecard. The ‘timetable’ revealed that in the change-process, four elements were 
particularly emphasized. In 2000 it was ‘the learning organization’ and ‘the human’, in 2001 ‘the 
processes’, in 2002 ‘the client’ and in 2003 ‘the results’. The Goes area director:
“We	surveyed	the	employees’	satisfaction.	So	you	start	from	the	bottom	side.	First	the	people	
satisfied,	then	concluding	clear	agreements.	When	I	came	to	the	office	this	was	not	optimally	
organized.	Now,	I	dare	say	this	 ís	the	case.	 It	means	that	we	made	good	agreements,	good	
career	agreements	with	people.	Therefore,	we	worked	hard	to	reach	this,	reach	employees’	
satisfaction.	We	are	now	in	the	next	phase,	now	we	have	to	follow	the	commercial	processes	
4 Finally one third of these cards have been fully put into operation (quarterly reports on the dynamic website). In 
the second part of 2001 the cards used by the local offices and the ones from the HQ departments have been for the 
first time integrated in the planning and control cycle. The MTP plans for 2002 were written in BSC-format (financial 
and non-financial indicators divided in 4 perspectives) and ninety percent of the yearly plans were elaborated 
according to the strategic maps (planning). However, there was no further supervision over the realization of those 
plans (control) based on the scorecard. By 31 December 2001 the project organization was dismissed and the 
ownership of the balanced scorecard was moved to the standing  organization. The CPP department maintained 
the responsibility over the BSC-tool and the project leader and a few members of the project team remained partly 
available for scorecard support. In 2002, about two thirds of district chairmen and area directors were actively 
using the scorecard. The (active) use has not augmented ever since.
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according	to	agreements,	this	is	the	second	phase	and	it	should	lead	to	a	satisfied	client	and	
finally	 to	 results.	 I	 myself	 work	 very	 explicitly	 with	 those	 swinging	moves	 in	 the	 balanced	
scorecard;	as	you	progress	 through	 the	phases,	 the	 things	will	 surely	overlap	and	mix	with	
each	other,	because	you	have	to	cope	with	all	the	fields	at	a	time”.
However, a project leader states (2002):
“In	 fact	 the	 change-process	 is	 set	 up	 a	 little	 bit	 too	 instrumentally,	 but	 it	 does	 facilitate	
communication;	 you	 have	 the	 year	 of	 culture	 and	 humans,	 you	 have	 the	 year	 of	 process,	
the	year	of	client	 in	order	to	finally	become	a	business	partner,	because	this	 is	the	financial	
objective	of	one’s	results’	fields.	This	is	how	he	[Mister	X,	former	Head	of	Strategy,	currently	
head	of	Controller	and	inventor	of	the	‘timetable’]	sold	it	and	this	is	how	he	still	does	it,	ok,	we	
get	a	clearer	picture	about	it.	But	what	happens	if	you	get	behind	schedule...	and	you	have	to	
go	back	from	time	to	time	to	the	year	of	the	process	if	you	want	to	set	up	certain	things	with	
the	client.	The	basis	should	be	of	such	nature	that	some	flexibility	is	built-in,	actually	this	also	
sounds	instrumentally.	If	you	look	at	how	things	work	in	practice,	then	this	is	hard	indeed.	It	
needs	more	time	than	one	assumed,	surely	because	of	the	fact	that	you	have	to	go	into	the	
smallest	details”.
From the local to the global
The following features	of the ‘State of the Art” BSC can be defined (based on Speckbacher et al., 2003 
and Kasurinen, 2001). The balanced scorecard:
(i) Contains financial and non-financial strategic measures/objectives
(ii) that are grouped into perspectives
(iii) Employs cause-and-effect chains
(iv) Contains action plans/targets
(v) That are linked to incentives
(vi) Involves strategic discussion intended to help ‘refine the vision and strategy’.
The features (i), (ii), and (iv) are materialized in the BSC’s as designed and in use. However, the 
notion of balance between short term and long term into a single scorecard is translated in three 
different management level scorecards. Not all BSC’s contain cause-and-effect chains (feature iii). 
With regard to the fifth feature IBN employed a “wait while we learn” approach (Speckbacher et 
al., 2003) where no incentives are emplyed until the company understands BSC better. At the time 
that variable rewarding and “Performance Management” (enforced by the Group) became a serious 
matter, IBN was disbanded. The BSC’s at IBN were never meant to be strategic management systems: 
reformulating the strategy, for instance, was never the goal (feature vi).
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
111
Ch
ap
te
r
6
In the context of a Branch Organization, the creation of the dynamic site (‘top-sheet and ‘time-sheet’) 
may be seen as enrichment to the BSC as defined by Kaplan and Norton. These ideas went “back to the 
globe” through presentations during conferences by the institutional entrepreneurs.
Support of allies
Preceding the introduction and during the implementation of the scorecard, the project group spent 
much time on informing and training the employees that had to work with the card. In this way one 
wanted to create a (legitimate) basis for the balanced scorecard. A project leader states:
“If	you	ask	me	which	aspect	we	emphasize	the	most,	I’d	tell	you	this	is	playing	on	the	organization	
in	 order	 to	 assure	 the	 project	 performs	 as	 it	 has	 to	 perform.	 This	 implies	 deliberations,	
‘massage’,	prepare	explanatory	notes	and	advertising,	bringing	the	message	to	everybody.”
As an example of the efforts of gaining commitment, it can be mentioned that the project team visited 
all the district chairmen to elucidate the new instrument at an early stage (1998). A communication 
plan had been set up for the implementation. It stated what instruments should be used at what stage. 
The spreading, recognition and acceptation of the scorecard was achieved (besides the circulating 
memos) through internal newsletters, intranet and particularly various meetings. The project group 
started with the local executive teams, subsequently the various sales teams and other employees. 
The meetings with the local executives were organized by the project team. Those for the sales teams 
and the local employees were organized by the executives themselves, assisted by members of the 
central project team. At these meetings much attention was paid to the ways of using the BSC. The 
organizers used the existing generic indicators for providing an insight in their composition and the 
ways to use them. Moreover, the further enlargement of the BSC and the interconnection of the 
indicators were discussed. Because these meetings paid much attention to the logic behind the BSC 
and its use, as well as to the employees’ objections to the card, the opposition to the BSC has softened 
somehow. The objections targeted the ‘checking’ function, the accountability according to results, 
the ‘big brother’ phenomenon and the comparison of the results. Much time was also spent on a 
clarification of the definitions of the indicators.
From the interviews it can be concluded that the local champions (most of the time project group/ 
project team members) continuously needed to (re)negotiate the problematization (for example when 
the focus of the project shifted into the direction of ‘Performance Management’), the distinctions (for 
example regarding the role and function of different scorecards materializing different distinctions) 
and the inscription devices (for example regarding the (dis)advantages of the dynamic site versus the 
static site).
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Institutionalization
For example, in June 20005, one of the project leaders was ex-post	reflecting on the static scorecards:
“It	is	enormously	appreciated.	One	sees	that	this	is	nice	and	that	this	is	a	good	way	to	discuss	
the	business	as	it	is.	Are	all	the	indicators	right,	are	they	per	segment…,	this	is	being	changing	
and	 the	 indicators	 are	 being	 slightly	 modified,	 or	 one	 more	 is	 added.	 You	 cannot	 do	 this	
too	 fast,	you	need	some	time	to	build	up	some	history,	but	 this	 is	going	to	change	and	the	
related	discussions	get	increasingly	better	as	more	people	get	involved	into	it	and	they	see	the	
scorecard	as	a	helpful	 instrument	for	deliberating	on	business.	 It	 is	almost	done	now	as	the	
critical	mass	is	being	achieved	and	it	means	you’ll	get	even	more	input.	Than	you	dare	to	use	
the	scorecard	as	a	key	instrument,	because	you	also	need	a	commercial	system	underneath	it	
comprising	your	clients,	that	states	what	you	did	with	your	clients…	on	our	process	side	there	
are	a	number	of	percentages,	but	you	need	 in	 fact	 the	absolutes	 [figures],	especially	 if	you	
want	to	check	if	certain	things	go	wrong.	However,	it	is	also	important	for	accepting	it	from	the	
very	beginning,	because	this	is	what	you	fear	about.	The	links	have	not	been	proved	yet	as	we	
were	assuming.	If	I	see	that	an	activity	is	going	very	well	and	my	financials	do	not	change,	than	
it	might	be	that	I	focus	on	the	wrong	clients.	You	need	data	on	this	which	can	help	you	to	work	
out	your	commercial	steering.	You	need	a	commercial	steering	system	underneath	the	process	
side	of	your	balanced	scorecard.	This	whole	philosophy	is	now	much	clearer.	This	is	the	nice	
part	of	commercial	steering	and	managerial	steering,	that	they	interlock	here.” 
At the same time, and as another example, the Goes area director was reflecting on the situation in 
his area (July 2000):
“The	 situation	 is	 now	 that	 we	 are	 very	 disciplined	 at	 counting	 in	 fives.	 People	 see	 the	
need	 of	 the	 balanced	 scorecard,	 so	 this	 is	 explicitly	 not	 a	 checking	 instrument	 [for	 us].	
This	 is	 the	 way	 we	 presented	 it.	 It	 [the	 scorecard]	 is	 for	 themselves,	 for	 measuring	 their	
own	 effectiveness,	 assessing	 how	 good	 one	 is	 as	 part	 of	 a	 team	 or	 compared	 to	 other	
teams.	 We	 explicitly	 stated	 this,	 and	 here	 in	 Zeeland	 we	 do	 it	 explicitly,	 that	 we	 look	
at	 the	 teams	 that	 do	 it	 well	 and	 we	 contact	 them	 to	 find	 out	 how	 do	 they	 manage	 to?
5 In the middle of 2000, the status-quo regarding the BSC has been mapped in a memo at the headquarters. In that 
memo, “BSC Development (Masterplan)”, dating to 28th of July, 2000, the situation is presented in bullet points as 
following:
“The BSC is for the sales organization and provides the data according to segments
There is no card yet for the market managers.
There is no card yet for the executives (IBN Board).
The indicators on the scorecard are similar for all the segments.
Besides the segments, a number of other headquarters’ departments are in process of defining a BSC.
The four perspectives represent a template for writing the central MTP plans by the departments (has not lived 
up to its promise).
The BSC instrument is the end-point of the decentralized planning and budgeting.”
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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Actually,	 in	 order	 to	 complete	 the	 implementation	 we	 are	 trying	 to	 build	 a	 discipline	 of	
refreshing	 [the	BSC]	on	a	monthly	basis.	 In	 the	beginning	this	discipline	was	not	 really	well	
entrenched	in	the	organization”.
The BSC coordinator ING Group acted as a spokesman for the BSC. He gave lectures and presentations 
at universities (for instance the Erasmus University Rotterdam) and conferences (for instance the 
popular conference series “Op kop met de Balanced Scorecard” organized by Alex van Groningen) 
about the IBN scorecard. He also published an article (together with a student and the author of this 
thesis) in a Dutch professional journal (Tijdschrift	Financieel	Management,	July/August, 2000) about 
the BSC experiences of some organizational units within the ING Group (including IBN). This article 
was even re-published in a series called “Checklisten Financieel Management” (Kluwer, 2001) often 
used by practitioners/ potential adopters of the BSC. Therefore, elements of the IBN scorecard went 
“back to the globe”.
A potential important event for the future institutionalization of the BSC happened in 2001: the new 
CFO ordered the design of balanced scorecards also for the HQ departments. These cards subsequently 
had to be integrated in the planning and control cycle (MTP) of IBN. The new CFO was willing to 
‘embrace Performance Management on the basis of a balanced scorecard’. The motivation for this 
decision was also due to a steering issue the organization had to deal with (after having restructured 
the segments, the creation of the business lines Wholesale, Retail and Intermediary). An executive 
staff member comments in 2002: 
“As	we	 talked	 to	 the	 directors	 of	 the	 offices-channel,	 then	we	would	 ask	 them	what	 their	
position	as	channel	is.	That	much	you	should	sell,	and	in	a	highly	efficient	way.	And	how	do	you	
monitor	this,	and	what	do	you	do	about	it	then?	That	type	of	bitter	discussions	still	prevails	and	
they	emanate	from	the	past,	as	they	say	‘I	have	24	district	chairmen	and	it’s	their	affair.	They	
get	a	financial	budget	and	they’re	free	to	go’.	This	is	until	the	point	when	many	people	say	‘hey,	
this	is	not	the	way	to	do	it.’	Definitely	now,	when	the	business	lines	argue	they	have	different	
channels:	telephone	channel,	internet	channel,	and	offices	channel.	
And	the	offices	channel	is	still	the	most	expensive	one	and	one	must	know	what	to	do	with	it.	So	
you	see	that	the	talks	become	more	straightforward	and	clear,	we	ask	ourselves	what	we	need	
from	each	other.	Myself,	in	my	naivety,	I	realize	we	did	it	for	ten	years	on,	but	apparently	not	so	
tight.	Now	one	talks	explicitly	about	this...	you	can	say	this	is	the	today’s	spirit,	it	can	be	the	bad	
weather	or	the	way	we	want	to	go	about	with	each	other	now.	It	is	a	bit	of	everything.	Formerly	
one	had	much	independence	[at	the	offices],	there	was	a	bank	director	and	you	wouldn’t	dare	
to	ask	him	how	he	did	the	business.”
In the middle of 2002, the executives of IBN, assisted by the former BSC project leader, designed a 
strategic scorecard for the first time. The rising attentiveness to Performance Management at Group 
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level has definitely played a role in the adoption of the strategic card. However, a few months later 
it became obvious that IBN would be disbanded, due to the Group’s reorganization. The strategic 
card was not further produced. Meanwhile, due to worsening economic results, the pressure on the 
sales within IBN increased significantly. A recently appointed executive member got a well-defined 
mission from the Group: ‘sales, sales, sales’. The commercial steering became increasingly important 
within the organization (see also ‘Sales	Force’: het Jaarplan 2004 van de Verkooporganisatie Kantoren 
Centraal (the 2004 year plan of the Sales Organization Central Offices). In November 2003 a former 
project leader states:
“You	can	say	that	a	piece	of	entrepreneurship	has	been	pulled	off	the	districts	by	simply	saying	
that	‘you	have	the	people,	you’re	not	a	district	chairman	anymore	but	a	super	sales	leader	in	
the	field,	so	you	are	responsible	for	your	people	to	act	accordingly	and	this	is	how	we	are	going	
to	asses	you,	based	on	this	we	are	going	to	steer	you’…	 in	 fact	we	became	with	the	whole	
balanced	scorecard	story	less	balanced	but	tighter,	more	directive”.
In conclusion, the ‘languaging’ in the beginning of the BSC trajectory (distinction: from hierarchical 
steering to self-steering) with corresponding concepts of entrepreneurship and a (generic) BSC 
completely turned the other way around at the end of the BSC trajectory (distinction: from self-steering 
to hierarchical steering), as “sales force” becomes the key word. The legitimate basis for the BSC is then 
almost gone. With regard to the other distinctions, we can conclude from the interviews that:
- There is a strong awareness in the organization that steering is more important than checking;
- There is an awareness that steering should take place based on both financials and non-financials;
- There is awareness that the cause (the performance driver) also has to be integrated in the 
steering process. However, the awareness was apparently not strong enough to resist the “sales 
force” power.
- The shift to more results orientation (Performance Management/ results agreements) only 
happened after the business lines reorganization (2003 and later);
- The shift from more operational control to strategic control did not occur. The strategic scorecard 
was designed, but not brought into production any further because of the business lines 
reorganization.
In 2003, there is no longer budget allocated for keeping the balanced scorecard indicators up to 
date. More and more issues that are not directly related to the balanced scorecard (top-sheet) are 
published on the BSC website (the feedback from sales promotions, peer-groups benchmarks, sales 
numbers analyses). The ‘hot’ items are not included in the scorecard (top-sheet) any longer. Separate 
(commercial) lists emerge on the website. The decentralized (local) MIS acquires a more important 
role in the overall steering. The balanced scorecard is no longer in the minds of the managers. The 
sales organization is being steered based on a combination of financial and commercial information. In 
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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the middle of 2003 the BSC-website turned into a handy ‘portal’ used at both central and local levels. 
A former member of the project team says: 
“The	districts	still	use	it,	they	get	some	things	out	of	it.	It	is	still	a	nice	MIS”.
This end of the ‘storyline’ (increasing focus on ‘sales’ and the BSC ending up with an information-
processing function with little impact on management control) is almost identical to the end of the 
‘storyline’ described in the case study of Wickramasinghe, Gooneratne and Jayakody (2008; see 
chapter 2).
rabobank and iBn: a comparison and reflection
The following table summarizes the main differences in local theorization:
TABLE 6: COMPARISON BETWEEN RABOBANK AND IBN
Institutional entrepreneur Ex ante theorization Ex post theorization
Rabobank Director Private Customers ·	 Lack of mutual cooperation
·	 Lack of focus
·	 Performance gap perceived 
by Headquarters
·	 BSC became a relatively stable 
actor-network
·	 More focus (big five), but not 
more co-operation
·	 More ‘playing’ (competition)
·	 Strong ‘anchoring’ of the BSC
IBN Head of Strategy, 
(embedded in a group), 
later coordinator BSC ING 
Group and project group/ 
project team members
·	 Call for management 
information
·	 Call for entrepreneurship 
and self-steering instead of 
hierarchical steering
·	 Call for a more results-
oriented culture (later)
·	 The translation has led to a greater 
awareness of the importance of 
future oriented management
·	 The translation has brought more 
discipline
·	 BSC did not survive because of 
the strengthening of hierarchy (as 
opposed to entrepreneurship). It 
just collapsed
Compared to the Rabobank The Hague, the translation at IBN proved to be more of a controlled 
affair. The project team put a lot of design effort into the construction of the balanced scorecard. 
At Rabobank The Hague, however, the translation of the BSC was more connected to intra-action, 
to action nets consisting of humans and non-humans. In a way, the controlled and comparatively 
instrumental character of the translation of the BSC at IBN is consistent with the observation that 
the balanced scorecard meant different things for different actors. Still, the BSC might have multiple 
identities within an organization but still be collectively recognized as a BSC. Yet, at IBN the focus is on 
the individual rather than the relational. The interviews indicated that there was a tendency for actors 
to put greater emphasis on BSC measures that were closely related to their functional responsibilities. 
For example, controllers mainly focused on the financial perspective of the BSC. Compared to 
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Rabobank The Hague, at IBN it was therefore less the construction of a relatively stable actor-network 
and more the construction of instruments in the hands of individuals. The balanced scorecard at IBN 
easily collapsed when ‘entrepreneurship’ turned into hierarchy. However, at Rabobank The Hague the 
balanced scorecard is still waiting for future resolution. Human actors within Rabobank The Hague 
were enthusiastic about translating the BSC because its ‘messiness’ enabled actors to connect with 
each other (Law and Singleton, 2005). This messiness provided the ‘glue’ connecting this network of 
human and non-human actors, mobilizing and keeping alive the idea of a BSC within Rabobank The 
Hague (Sandhu et	al., 2008). 
Particularly (but not exclusively) at Rabobank The Hague, the translation of the idea of the balanced 
scorecard at these local settings proves to be a social-material practice in which the social and the 
material are strongly intermingled. In the practice of objectifying and institutionalizing the balanced 
scorecard, human and non-human actors co-produced an actor-network of the balanced scorecard. 
Both human actors and non-human actors (inscriptions) proved to have agency. Non-human	actors 
provided more than a contextual backdrop to the translation process; they had a capacity to shape the 
BSC’s possibilities and serving to enable and constrain a range of human actors (sales managers, HR 
manager, marketing manager, customers advice manager, controller, project manager, etc.) involved 
in initiating and further translating the BSC (Sandhu et	al., 2008). At Rabobank, the human	actors 
found their agency embedded in some definitional boundaries and (at the start) experienced some 
domination and institutional pressure exercised by top management that thus embedded the practice 
in a ‘structure of intentionality’ (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). In accordance with Scandinavian 
Institutionalism, there was no ‘diffusion’ but ‘translation’ of the BSC. The translation by no means 
was a straightforward implementation of a ‘State of the Art’ scorecard available in a global space. 
Moreover, top management did not a priori design a balanced scorecard that was then top-down 
enrolled in the local bank through a process in which resistance to the balanced scorecard was to 
be fought. This does not imply, however, that there was no power or domination involved at all; 
particularly at the beginning of the translation process top management made it clear that it expected 
commitment from the managers. Thus, there was agency and contingency. In a similar vein, the more 
top-down character of the translation of the balanced scorecard at IBN does not mean that there was 
no agency. There was, but it was less connected to an interactive (or intra-active) affair. In a way, it was 
the agency of Homo Economicus.
At Rabobank The Hague, the balanced scorecard proves to be a relatively stable institution resulting 
from the translation practice. However, the definite form was not found yet; the resolution is in 
the future. The balanced scorecard may be impacted by all kinds of actors, both human and non-
human, some of who are already known and others have yet to emerge in the future. Translation is a 
continuously ambiguous and uncertain process.
Local	translations	of	the	Balanced Scorecard
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Both cases revealed that the stages distinguished in our model (chapter 3) are only of descriptive 
importance. They offered a format to the researcher to structure the presentation of the findings in 
the study. In accordance with Scandinavian Institutionalism, the change agents had to put a lot of 
effort in convincing other actors into doing what is needed for the materialization in object and action. 
Particularly (but not exclusively) the translation in Rabobank The Hague gave evidence that in the 
practice of translation the discursive is truly intermingled with the material. Convincing other actors 
of the adequacy of the balanced scorecard and interactively objectifying the balanced scorecard 
occurred through an entanglement of the discursive and the material; through an entanglement of 
discussions, a champions league ‘cup’, week reports, a confrontation matrix, etc.
Both cases also revealed that the practice of translation involved theorization by the practitioners. The 
theory was not an input to the practice, but was a part of it. The theorization was a network thing that 
helped in institutionalizing the Rabobank scorecard. 
Finally, consistent with Scandinavian Institutionalism, the translations at both Rabobank The Hague 
and IBN resulted in a travel-movement from the local to the global.

Chapter
7
Conclusions
research overview
This study sought to provide insights into the theoretical implications of context-
specific and time-specific dynamics in the shaping of a BSC performance 
management system. It therefore sought to investigate why and how the 
translation processes of the BSC in the two case organizations unfold. This 
research question requires consideration of the interconnectedness between 
the global and the local. This study therefore also sought to investigate why and 
how the micro translation processes of the BSC can be connected to forces on 
the organizational field level in order to draw inferences for theory building on 
performance management systems at an organizational overarching level.
To answer these questions, this study adopted a qualitative methodological 
approach. The researcher of this study conducted case studies at two Dutch 
banks that incorporated (some) observations, extensive documentary analyses 
and 35 semi-structured interviews. In order to get a holistic picture of the 
BSC translation processes at the local organizational level we interviewed 
diverse categories of actors in the case organizations (e.g. managers, project 
leaders, users, and controllers). In order to learn more about the local / global 
interconnectedness we also interviewed some interviewees from group level 
(e.g. CEO, group controller, BSC project coordinator at group level) and from 
‘outside’ (e.g. consultants, an university professor, and a member of the Board 
of an auditing professional body). The case material was interpreted through 
a ‘Scandinavian institutionalist’ lens, in order to ‘illustrate’ the fragile and 
performative character of reality and to ‘illuminate’ the emergence of interesting 
BSC translation processes.
Thus, we particularly aimed to theorize at the local level, but we also touched 
upon a possible movement from the local to the global. That is, we aimed to 
theorize ‘dialectical transformation’ (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). We aimed to 
theorize how both the translator and that which is translated in the local setting 
(e.g. the BSC as an idea and as an inscription, the content and the form) undergo 
change. From a local stance, we sought to produce knowledge on why and 
how performance management with a BSC emerges and changes, and on the 
organizational consequences of such change. Moreover, we studied if and how 
the translated BSC may be decontextualized again and go ‘back to the globe’, 
and how it becomes a modified idea or concept, that, if successfully promoted, 
may start to travel across the world again, thereby creating an on-going spiral 
of fashion. We perceived the global to be a ‘hugely extended network of 
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localities’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 22) and not as a separate centre that governs the local 
settings in a controlled way. Our perception of the global implies taking into account both spatial and 
time dimensions. ‘Globalized time/space’ connects a number of ‘localized time/spaces’, implying that 
globalized institutions are also constantly reproduced locally (Becker and Saxl, 2009). So, globalized 
time/space involves at the same stance a re-embedding of disembedded practices into localized time/
spaces (Becker and Saxl, 2009). In sum, globalized management accounting practices (such as the 
BSC) may be understood as a network of many localized management accounting practices which are 
performed in a similar form across many localized time/spaces.
Theoretical contributions
The BSC is a product of innovation action research. Innovation action research (Kaplan, 1998) aims at 
testing and extending the emerging concepts of performance management within specific organizational 
contexts and at learning about their limitations and barriers. Moreover, it aims at gaining knowledge 
about organizational conditions that lead to either successful or unsuccessful implementation of the 
concepts. It requires active cooperation between practitioners, consultants and scholars (Kaplan, 1998: 
115). Essentially, the innovation action research program suggests that by successive reflecting on the 
design characteristics, conditions and consequences of performance management, and measurement 
tools in specific individual organizations, a more or less general organizations-overarching theory on 
innovative performance management systems is generated. The theory assumes that performance 
as a phenomenon, as an achievement, can be separated from the performance management system. 
The performance management system is viewed as a means in a means-end relationship, the end 
being a desired level of performance. The design characteristics of the performance management 
system are assumed to be contingent upon factors in the organizational context. Therefore, the 
theory delivers conditional-normative guidelines that should enable specific local settings to perform 
better. The consultancy products and the products of the innovation action research program should 
lead to a body of knowledge, concerned with what performance measurement (and management) 
should	be. This knowledge not only draws on ‘best practices’, but also on notions of rational decision 
making and control. To an individual organization, the adoption and implementation of performance 
measurement (and management) innovations is an attempt to “improve accounting in the name of 
what it should be, rather than what it is” (Hopwood, 1987:210). Performance management then is 
“seen as being able to be mobilized and changed in the name of an abstract image of its real potential” 
(Hopwood, 1987: 210). The innovation research program implicitly assumes that organizations are 
more or less automatically mobilized to adopt a performance measurement (and management) 
system by the perception of a gap between the characteristics of its present system and its potential 
as it is proclaimed in external discourses. It furthermore assumes that there is an invariant relationship 
between the conditional-normative guidelines resulting from innovation action research and the 
program of intervention in a particular organization. The role of agency is under-emphasized. Although 
the knowledge is generated by reflecting on the implementation of performance management in real 
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life local settings (or, in terms of Callon, by reflecting on the results of in	vivo experiments (Callon, 
2009)), the theoretical domain is in itself considered to be a global space, separated from local 
settings. In this global theoretical domain the idea of a BSC is developed, and from this domain the 
developed idea is diffused across local settings. Innovation action research is thus consistent with a 
diffusion-model of change. Apparently, the diffusion of the BSC started with some ‘initial energy’ (the 
discovery of Analog’s scorecard) followed by a ‘global’ development of the idea into a concept that 
can be implemented by specific organizations. In the process of implementation, resistance is seen as 
a threat. Resistance to change implies friction that threatens the knowledge and concepts resulting 
from the innovation action research.
In this study, we take a different perspective. As Ahrens and Chapman note, the tales that “appeal 
to readily articulated, distinct practices ‘out there in the field’” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007: 23) are 
misleading, because there are blurring boundaries of innovative practices (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2007). In a similar vein, we claim in this study that there are blurring boundaries between the 
theoretical domain and the practical domain as well. We do not consider the theoretical domain as a 
central space in which the products of innovation action research are produced and stored, and from 
which they are diffused across organizations. Instead, we consider the theoretical domain as consisting 
of practices that are part of a network that also contains many localized performance management 
practices. Moreover, we do not consider change to be a well-organized global endeavor with a clear-
cut beginning and an end, where local settings in a guided and unambiguous way adopt a well-defined 
and materialized idea from a central theoretical space. Instead, we take the position that ideas travel. 
Travelling across the world, these so-called translocal ideas may land in various places. When they 
land, they are re-embedded in local settings. When they continue traveling, they are disembedded 
from that very local setting. At the local, the idea is translated. The role of agency is important here. 
It is the people who pass the ideas on to each other, each one translating them according to his 
or her own frame of reference (Czarniawska, 2008). Encounters between frames of reference (i.e. 
ideas in residence) and traveling ideas can be called ‘friction’, a clash between ideas in residence and 
traveling ideas, leading to the transformation of both (Czarniawska, 2008). But now friction has a 
positive connotation; it results in energy. Friction will cause both a change in the local settings and in 
the idea or concept; there is ‘dialectical transformation’ (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). Not only do the 
translators and their context change, but changes in the traveling idea are also inevitable; translators 
transform and often enrich it (Czarniawska, 2008). Change, then, is not a centrally controlled affair. 
Although we do not intend to contribute to global theorizing that does not go beyond the dichotomy 
between the global and the local and that takes a diffusion perspective, we do not deny that there 
is global theorizing, inter alia on the basis of an innovation action research program. We see such 
programs as actors in a macro-kosmos (Callon et	al., 2011), as part of the ‘hugely extended network of 
localities’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 22). The innovation action research program is materialized 
in a ‘laboratory’ that produces translations resulting in ‘objectifications’ that may enter the translocal 
Conclusions
123
Ch
ap
te
r
7
organizational networks (the networks of localities). Rather than assuming that, in a centrally 
controlled way, the concepts are implemented in specific local settings it is argued in this study that 
they enter translocal spaces where they may have unexpected consequences.
In sum, our study gives evidence that the practicing of performance management is not the 
mere application of the knowledge produced in an innovation action research program; not an 
implementation of good (or even best) practices guided by conditional-normative guidelines produced 
by researchers. Although there is contingency involved (for example by drawing on work by Kaplan 
and Norton and through hiring consultants), it is through entangled agency of both humans and non-
humans that a BSC comes into shape and develops into an actor-network (Law and Singleton, 2005). 
Such agency does not a priori reject the knowledge that is produced in the innovation action program; 
it is connected to such knowledge in a loose way. Local human actors draw on the categories and 
causal relationships provided by Kaplan and Norton, but in a disconnected way. Apparently, practices 
in the innovation action program offer knowledge as an input for the theorization taking place at the 
local; as such these practices are actors in the process of translation. The local human actors do not 
acquire the knowledge and then apply it. Instead, the knowledge is embedded in situated practices. 
Within situated practices ‘knowers’ and ‘knowns’ co-emerge and define each other (Keevers et	al., 
2012: 100). Thus, practice is relationally constituted rather than individually constituted (Sandberg 
and Dall’Alba, 2009). This also has practical	implications in the sense that change projects could better 
be managed relationally (instead of focusing on the actions of individuals). Our study illustrates that 
knowing-in-practice may be viewed as a situated, mediated, provisional, contested and pragmatic 
activity (Gherardi, 2000; Keevers et	 al., 2012: 100). There are no prescriptions for ‘successful’ 
translation. The process of BSC translation involves many interconnected actors and events that 
can disrupt the process (Pipan and Czarniawska, 2010: 250). A detailed description of translation 
processes and network construction “could be of more help to practitioners than a lineair ideal of 
planned change” (Pipan and Czarniawska, 2010: 250).
 
Our relational and performative perspective on performance management research adds to studies 
that demonstrate that accounting or measurement is not a positive representation of economic reality, 
but an “uncertain faith, fostered by expert-generated inscriptions and rhetorical strategies”, a faith that 
is able to “tie together shifting interests in an actor network” (Chua, 1995: 111); studies that perceive 
accounting technologies as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) that are able to stabilize and 
mediate diverse interests (Briers and Chua, 2001; Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005) and that analyze what 
happens when accounting innovations ‘travel’ from one context to another (e.g. Briers and Chua, 
2001; Preston et	al., 1992); studies that demonstrate how the ties of varying strength in networks 
of human and non-human actors drive performance measurement change in unpredictable ways 
(Quatrone and Hopper, 2001; Andon et	al., 2007); studies that regard a BSC as a loosely related array 
of activities, held together by the purposes of the practitioners (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004, 2007; 
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Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005); a study that analyzes a detailed process of inscription building where 
diverse actors in a consulting firm and in the client organization attempt to edit local specifics (Qu and 
Cooper, 2011), also illustrating how inscriptions might fail (see also Ezzamel et	al., 2004); and a study 
that demonstrates how ambivalence, opacity, bricolage, and practical actions enabled by inscription 
devices strengthen networks of performance measurement to make a BSC acceptable (Dambrin and 
Robson, 2011). These studies acknowledge that although performance management change may be 
centrally initiated, the unfolding process has an a-centered character and produces unpredictable 
outcomes. Quattrone and Hopper (2001) therefore claim that performance management change may 
better be portrayed as a drift rather than a rational and guided top down process. Our study confirms 
that BSC change resembles such an uncontrolled process more than an orderly guided process with 
well-defined outcomes. If organizations are in constant flux and drift rather than change in a lineair 
way, change agents have to cope with that: experimentation, improvisation and bricolage are then 
more important than the mere implementation of grand new accounting instruments (Messner and 
Becker, 2006).
 
In particular, our interpretive study contributes by demonstrating how a BSC gets re-embedded 
in a specific local context (e.g. a bank), how the translation of a BSC is an expression of agency of 
many actors (human as well as non-human), and how translators and the translated (the BSC) are 
dialectically	 transformed. In the discursive-material translation process the idea of the BSC as it is 
loosely connected to the innovation action research program was locally shaped and enacted. Both 
the translators and that was translated changed. Ex-post theorization at the local was communicated 
to the global; the disembodied local translation of the BSC was thus brought ‘back to the globe’ by 
spokesmen of the BSC through speeches and (co-authored) papers. The identities of the translators 
changed through the actor network that was formed. The actor-network (the BSC) never reached the 
position of a macro actor-network that counted as one; it was never fully institutionalized or closed. 
Thus, our study specifically portrays the act of translating the BSC as a social-material practice, and 
it reveals how discursive elements and materializations are intermingled in translating performance 
management. The discursive elements prove to be particularly important in theorizing the ‘solution’ 
of a BSC in the context of local problems and in convincing others of the necessity of developing such 
a scorecard. However, throughout the process discursive elements continue to be important in an 
attempt to institutionalize the idea in a specific form and to create a relatively stable actor-network 
(e.g. a balanced scorecard-network). Materializations occur through the use of inscriptions that serve 
as a base for negotiation during the translation processes of the BSC (see also Qu and Cooper, 2011), 
and that prove to be helpful in getting support of other actors or allies. At Rabobank The Hague, 
for instance, the Champions League contest, the nomination and the award, the trophy (cup), the 
publicity, the documents produced for the contest and after the award, etc. objectified the BSC, and 
were important in getting the support of the employees (compare Isacsson, 2007:30).
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Our study shows that the translation of the BSC proves to be a practice of intra-action, a practice 
through which humans and non-humans (e.g. inscriptions like a trophy or a dynamic website) are 
entangled in translating the BSC. According to Barad (2001: 93), holding the category “human” fixed 
excludes many possiblities in advance, and freezes out important aspects of the analysis of the 
workings of power. Barad (2007) substitutes the notion of ‘inter-action’ with ‘intra-action’ in order to 
stress that in a performative relationship the human and other-than-human actors should not be seen 
as distinct entities, acting upon each other from ‘outside’, but as entangled agencies that establish 
each other as well as being created themselves (Keevers et	al., 2012: 102; Rouse, 2002). Intra-action 
signifies the inseparability of ‘objects’ and ‘agencies of observation’ (Barad, 2001: 102; Keevers et	al., 
2012: 102) and, thus, the inseparability of the BSC as an object and the agencies that produce the 
BSC and draw on it to get informed about what there is to be informed about. The notion of intra-
action opens up a space for material-discursive forms of agency. Agency is a matter of intra-acting; it 
is an enactment, not something that someone or something has (Barad, 2001: 93). It is a matter of 
iterative changes to particular practices through the dynamics of intra-activity and enfolding (Barad, 
2001: 93). Intra-action implies togetherness and entanglement. Matters of being, knowing, doing, 
and valuing are intermingled. As an effect of intra-actions the BSC develops as an actor-network, one 
that is continuously in the making. The definite form is not yet found; the resolution is in the future. 
In the future, the BSC may be impacted by all kinds of actors, both human and non-human, some of 
whom are already known and others have yet to emerge in the future. Translation is a continuously 
ambiguous and uncertain process. Theorizing is part of the translation process; theory is not only an 
input (‘state of the art’-theory), but also an outcome (ex-ante and ex-post theorizing). Human actors 
within Rabobank The Hague were enthusiastic about translating the BSC because its ‘messiness’ 
enabled actors to connect with each other. This messiness provided the ‘glue’ connecting human and 
non-human actors, keeping alive the BSC idea within this organization (Sandhu et	al., 2008). Therefore, 
the translation of the idea of the BSC at this local setting indeed proves to be a social-material practice. 
Convincing other actors of the adequacy of the BSC and interactively objectifying the BSC and what 
it seeks to refer to, occurred through an entanglement of the discursive and the material; through an 
entanglement of discussions, languaging, a champions league ‘cup’, week reports, a confrontation 
matrix, etc.
In conclusion, our study portrays performance management through a BSC not as separate from 
performance, not as a means in a means-end relationship, not as an instrument in the hands of an 
individual manager, but as a situated and material-discursive practice. BSC practices are “materially 
and discursively constructed networks of intra-active performances that constitute something at 
issue and at stake ‘whose definitive resolution is always prospective’ (Rouse, 2007: 51” (Keevers et 
al., 2012: 101). The intra-actions within practices produce actors and categories (Nyberg, 2009). The 
intra-actions (or intra-active performances) are situated and embodied ways of humans and other-
than-humans ‘doing’ things together. Such performances (see our model in chapter 3) may exist of 
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ex-ante theorization to match problems with the solution of a BSC, convincing people that it is in their 
interests to be part of such practices (particularly through naming and the languaging of distinctions), 
materializing the balanced scorecards in the form of inscriptions, searching for allies and ex-post 
theorization about its institutionalization. Thus, the practice of translating the BSC proves not to be a 
centrally controlled affair. However, it is also not a completely uncontrolled affair. The translation of 
a BSC may be viewed as intentionally initiated (and supported) by management, it is an intentional 
structure (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). To a certain extent the change is guided by a change agent. 
Yet, the translation of the BSC has unexpected effects. These effects depend on what other actors 
(human and other-than-human) do with the BSC. It can be a different thing in the hands of different 
people. Moreover, the translation process is often an open-ended, ‘meaning-sensitive’, unfinished 
process where the BSC idea is continuously interpreted and re-interpreted (Johnson and Hagstrøm, 
2005: 372). However, this does not mean that translation processes always are open-ended and 
creative: uniformity, traditions and social control may also characterize them (Johnson and Hagstrøm, 
2005: 372; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).  
research limitations and suggestions for further research
In addition to the limitations regarding methodology (as discussed in chapter 4), we can wonder 
what the significance of the reflexive practice of a researcher in a search for meaning grounded 
in interviewees’ experiences is (Leitch et	al., 2010:70). There are limitations because practices are 
never fully articulated (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Moreover, the outcome of our methodology is 
time-specific knowledge in particular local settings for a particular BSC study (Leitch et	al., 2010:70). 
However, we agree with Leitch et	al.	(2010) that “there are only specific and enacted overlaps between 
provisionally congealed realities that have to be crafted in a way that responds to and produces [the] 
particular...we are left with situated enactments and sets of partial connections, and it is to those that 
we owe our heterogeneous responsibilities (Law, 2004: 155)”. Or as Koro-Ljungberg (2008:988) puts 
it: “researchers can only hope ‘for temporary alliance and agreements, and truths that satisfy our 
corrigible standards’ (Thayer-Bacon, 2003:71)”.
There are a number of interesting avenues for further research. First, translation processes generally 
operate simultaneously at several levels: in the interaction between individuals at micro level; 
within the framework of individual organizations and in the interaction at meso level; and under 
the influence of various economic, political and socio-cultural factors at macro level (Johnson and 
Hagstrøm, 2005:385). This study only focused on the level of individual organizations (two banks) and 
touched upon the interconnectedness between the global and the local. The task of generating an 
all-embracing theoretical framework, which will help us understand the interplay between all these 
levels, is an exciting challenge for future research. Such future research might include other industries 
than banking.
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Second, we touched upon the notion of ‘intra-action’ (Barad, 2001, 2007). Future research could 
examine if and how the “agential realism” proposed by Barad can be incorporated in constructivist-
interpretive management accounting research (e.g. ontological and epistemological concerns). 
According to Barad (2001) agency is an enactment and intra-action produces constraints on what is 
produced and produces particular exclusions. But must intra-actions always be generative (Herzig, 
2004:138)? Herzig (2004: 138) even argues that we are presuming a kind of functionalism now: “in 
the end, all activity serves to produce something”. Additional theorization of the unproductive might 
better attune us to the myriad mechanisms by which performances are rendered (Herzig, 2004: 141).
Finally, our interpretive study focuses on what happens to the BSC idea as it travels through organizations, 
and what happens to organizations when they are putting the landed BSC idea in practice (Johnson 
and Hagstrøm, 2005: 370). Future research from a more distinctly ‘critical’ perspective (Cooper et	al., 
2008) could investigate “which groups benefit and lose out respectively” (Johnson and Hagstrøm, 
2005: 370) from adopting the BSC idea (as in Lawrence and Sharma, 2002).
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appendix 1: interview guide (first rounds of interviews)
adoption
- Can you describe the process preceding the implementation of the BSC?
- What does the BSC mean to you?
- Why is there a need for the BSC?
- Could you tell us about your first experience with the BSC?
- What are the underlying reasons for choosing the BSC?
- Are you dissatisfied with your current performance management system?
- Have alternatives to the BSC (other tools) been considered? Which one?
- Are there cost-benefit calculations of alternatives?
- Who were involved in the adoption of the BSC, what is their position and what role did they play 
in the adoption process?
- Who were involved in the decision-making process?
- How important is strategy for the organization and is the strategy important for the employees?
- What are the goals and expected outcomes with regard to the introduction of the BSC?
- Is the BSC in your organization seen as an instrument to implement the strategy (diagnostic) or 
as an instrument to (re)formulate the strategy (interactive)?
- What influence did political factors have in the adoption process (technical efficiency vs. political 
factors)?
- Who takes the final adoption decision?
- What is the role of the controller?
- How long does the adoption process last?
- What is the influence of other parties on the adoption process (e.g. consultants, conferences, 
books, articles, clients, suppliers, competitors, professional organizations, employees, scholars)?
- Which conditions are ex-ante considered to be important for an effective use of the BSC?
design
- How did the design process take place? Which stages? Who was involved?
- Level of introduction: is there a start level and end level?
- Way of introduction: top down vs. bottom-up?
- Do you make use of the experiences of others?
- What is the composition of the project group?
- What is the role of the project group?
- What is the role of the project leader?
- What is the role of the controller?
- Is there a “champion’ for the BSC?
- What is the role of the external consultant?
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- Was there already consensus about the strategy? If not, how was it reached?
- Has there been a strategic discussion by the higher management? If no: why not?
- Planning vs. realization in design phase?
- What are the causes of deviations from the planning?
- Any obstacles/problems during the design process?
- Are there causal relations between the goals/measures of the different perspectives of the BSC?
- Are there causal relations within a perspective (lead-lag)?
- How does the BSC look like? Example?
- How are the norms/targets determined and who decides on them?
implementation
- How did the implementation process take place? Which stages? Who was involved?
- What is the role of the project group and the project leader?
- What is the role of the controller?
- What is the role of consultants?
- Planning vs. realization in the implementation phase?
- What were the causes for delays?
- What is the role of existing systems/instruments/reporting?
- Training/communication/feedback(intranet?)/understanding?
- Has the management information system changed?
- Has there been a pilot? If yes: why this unit? Results?
evaluation
- What is the vision of the organization with regard to strategic policy?
- What is the role of existing systems after the implementation?
- Are the goals set out when adopting/designing the BSC fulfilled?
- How is the BSC used? As a steering tool? Or for measurement (checking)? Strategy (re)
formulation?
- Is the BSC involved in incentives-systems? How? To managers? Teams? Employees?
- What is your perception of the importance of the BSC at this moment?
- Is the BSC accepted by the whole organization? Why?
- Who keeps score of the BSC? Who maintains the BSC? Who is responsible for collecting the 
data?
- What is the role of the controller?
- How is the BSC connected to the management information system?
- To what frequency and in what form is the BSC reported? Has the BSC led to cllear and useful 
reports?
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- What pitfalls have been detected?
- What actions have been undertaken and what decisions have been made as a result of the BSC? 
Examples?
- Have your relations with other people changed because of the BSC? Examples?
- Have the activities of employees (all employees?) changed as a result of the BSC? Examples?
- Are the results of the organization improved? According to the managers?
- Any follow up plans?
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appendix 2: overview of the most important document sources of field data
rabobank The hague
- Medium term plan Rabobank The Hague 2003-2005 ‘Profitable growth’
- RaboLife magazine: special issue on the BSC and Cohen Brown/Champions League, May 2003
- De Beleidskrant (policy magazine) 2004: special issue on the BSC and CohenBrown/Champions 
League, February 2004
- In Balans Medewerkers Tevredenheid Onderzoek (Employee Satisfaction Research in format of 
the BSC), June 2003
- The story behind the strategy map of Rabobank The Hague, internal document, 2002
- Departmental plan Large companies, January 2003
- Departmental plan Customer Contact Center, January 2003
- Internal memos about the BSC and about policy planning
- Managementhandboek Resultaatgericht Sturen (Management handbook Results Oriented 
Management), 2001
- Heuvelmans, H. (2003), “Strategy? Shouldn’t you be asking top management about this?”, article 
from the book “In	management	–	The	art	and	science	of	management” published because of 
the 50th anniversary of the autonomous Management School of Ghent University and Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven. Also available on www.mercatorma.nl.
iBn
- Diemen, M.P.W. van, Informatievoorziening in de financiële dienstverlening (Information 
provision in financial services), Report about the development of a MIS for IBN, February 1998
- Memo Steering philosophy and the Balanced Scorecard, 12 August 1999
- Memo BSC Development (Masterplan), 28 July 2000
- Memo Communication plan Project BSC definitive site, 5 October 2000
- BSC Defining document (about the defining trajectory), March 2001
- Minutes of the BSC project team meetings and Steering Committee BSC meetings 1999-2000
- Memo Communication plan BSC, 15 June 2001
- Moolenaar, C., Balanced Scorecard: an overview for the ING Bank Nederland, November 2001
- Moolenaar, C., Rollen, taken, bevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden in het BSC proces (Roles, 
tasks, authorizations, and reponsibilities in the BSC process), November 2001
- Moolenaar, C., Balanced Scorecard: Samenhang in operationaliseren, planning en budgetteren 
(Balanced Scorecard: Coherence in operationalizing, planning, and budgeting), January 2002
- ‘Sales Force’: Jaarplan 2004 Verkooporganisatie Kantoren Centraal (‘Sales Force’: the 2004 year 
plan of the Sales Organization Central Offices), October 2003
- Other internal memos about the BSC, information on the BSC intranet and hand-outs of 
presentations about the BSC and about the BSC intranet
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- Boot, D.P., Extern en intern ondernemerschap bij de ING Bank (External and internal 
entrepreneurship at the ING bank), De Accountant 104:576-579, May 1998
- Dijksterhuis, M., Bosch, F.A.J. van den and Volberda, H.W. (2003), “A cognitive perspective on 
strategizing/organizing”, Ch. 5 in Pettigrew, A.M., Whittington, R., Melin, L., Sanchez-Runde, C., 
Van den Bosch, F.A.J., Ruigrok, W., Numagami, T. (eds.) Innovative	forms	of	organizing (pp.95-
122), SAGE, London.
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appendix 3: organization chart rabobank The hague (2003)
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appendix 4: Strategy map Companies
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appendix 5: department plan
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Strategic Ambition:
profitable growth Improve profitability 
substantially
Manage direct and indirect 
costs of operations
Realize profitibality 
demand Rabobank 
The Netherlands
Product / Market Combinations
Customer value proposition: long term relationship
Let the customer 
experience a standard 
solution as custom-made 
work
+++ ++ ++
OD SME GB
0 + ++
OD SME GB
Deliver at a price that is at least in accordance with the market
Product Relationship Image
Be timely informed 
about market-
adaptational 
activities
Prevent narrow-mindedness             
(reinforce relayprinciple)
Develop standard procedures including standard lead times
Manage risks
E
ffectiveness
E
fficiency
Secundary 
processess
Innovation Employees
Develop employees' 
competences
Recruit and keep well-
qualified employees
Create stability within the 
management team
Information (Systems)
Systematically collect and 
share customer and branch 
information
Systematically collect and 
share existing knowledge 
and experience
Computerize business processes and 
improve information facility
Improve external 
communication about 
the succes of 
Rabobank The Hague
Ensure stability and a grip 
on operations 
(management control)
Improve internal 
communication and 
ensure alignment
Anticipate on 
consequences of 
proposition in the chain
Restrict yourself to your 
own function
As a manager set the 
right example
Develop a broad and up 
to date service package
Improve good fellowship amongst managers
Enlarge profitiability of 
portfolio
Improve market position in 
selected segments
Increase GDA of 
existing customers 
through cross- and 
deepselling
Acquire new 
customers with a 
minimal determined 
GDA
Focus on specific 
branches for growth
Signal ppportunities 
for cross-and deep 
selling
Realize a strict seperation between tasks and responsibilities of front and back office
Fathom customers' 
business, speak his 
language and centralize 
his needs
Pro-actively sell integral solutions
Signal customers' needs 
through a prearrangedstructure
Strategic contribution
For Rabobank The Hague companies (RTH-B) objectives are formulated in the context of drawing up a Business Balanced Scorecard. Figure 1 shows the strategy map RTH-B. Company objectives 
to which wholesale directly contributes are coloured in orange. These orange coloured objectives graphically show  wholesale's contribution to the strategic success of RTH-B. Wholesale contributes 
to almost all the other objectives too, but then indirectly.
Offer total 
solutions with  a
total service 
package 
(including non-
banking products)
Offer excellent 
services by 
flawlessness 
and speed
Distinctive power 
of  the 
cooperation
Radiate 'no 
nonsense ' and 
'in the middle of 
society'
Create an image of financial service 
provider with business sense i/o 
creditsupplier
Analysis customer needs OfferMarketing Delivery Service & Maintenance Relations management
Let each customer enter through one portal only but be selective            
(dare to give no for an answer)
Only serve customers exclusively through the service concept determined 
for this particular customer group (OD/SME/GB)
Deliberately say 
farewell to 
unprofitable 
customers
Record all agreements (e.g. about delivery) and always live up to these agreements 
Take only proven 
concepts to the market 
Address one another about 
results and responsibilities 
Culture
Create 'winning team' 
mentality (dare to pass eads)
Sell total solutionspro-actively
Direct contribution of  the large 
enterprise department to the 
strategic success of  
Rabobank The Hague
 
Appendices
150
Appendix 5.2:  Departmental goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Generate a new gross contribution of € 1,2 million 
  Improve profitability substantially 
2. Acquire 12 new customers (6 PS en 6 HID) 
  Acquire new customers 
3. Develop an account plan for all 81 existing customers 
  Signal customers' needs through a prearranged structure 
  Systematically collect and share customer and branch information 
4. Deliver for 100 prospected customers a fully filled in prospect form 
   Sell total solutions pro-actively 
5.  Realize 100% occupation of defined permanent positions 
   Recruit and keep well-qualified employees 
 
6.  Enlarge the 'share of wallet' in The Hague's wholesale market 
   Improve market position in selected segments 
7.  Improve mixture of interest- and commission income on newly generated gross contribution 
8.  Enlarge average gross contribution per customer 
   Enlarge profitability of portfolio 
9.  Enlarge GDA of existing customers to 3,5 
10.  Enlarge GPA of existing customers to 8 
11.  Preserve the 81 existing customers (49 PS en 32 HID) 
   Enlarge GDA of existing customers through cross- and deep selling 
12.  Acquire new and keep existing customers in the following sectors: Charity Institutions,  
  Local & Decentralized Authorities, Commodity Boards, Pension Funds and Construction 
   Focus on specific branches for growth 
13.  Generate leads for product-responsible departments (Treasury, Private Banking, Rabo 
Securities, Rabo NL Insurrance, Robeco, Schretlen) 
   Signal opportunities for cross- and deep selling 
   Create ‘winning-team’ mentality (dare to pass on leads) 
14.  Only serve customers who meet the GB-criteria for 100% 
  Only serve customers exclusively through the service concept determined for this particular  
  customer group (OD/SME/GB) 
15.  Create a cross functional team of product specialists for all 81 existing customers 
   Fathom customers' business, speak his language and centralize his needs 
   Improve internal communication and ensure alignment  
16.  Reduce administrative activities of assistent-accountmanagers 
   Realize a strict separation between tasks and responsibilities of front and back office 
17.  Improve unlocking of product suppliers 
   Develop a broad and up-to-date service package 
18.  Reduce turnover of (assistant-) account managers 
  Recruit and keep well-qualified employees 
19. Realize an exhaustive PDP for all employees 
  Develop employees' competences 
 
 
 
B
ig
 F
iv
e 
  Wholesale 
  Departmental goals 
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Appendix 5.4: Initiatives and confrontation matrix 
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1. Recruit 1 accountmanager √ √     √ √         √ √ √             
2. Co-signing accountplans by 
productspecialists √   √     √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √   √     
3. Annualy cleaning of customerfile                       √   √           
4. Making accountplans for existing customers √   √     √ √ √ √ √     √   √   √     
5. Filling in prospect forms for selected 
prospects √ √       √ √         √ √             
6. Executing market analysis for Public 
segment √ √       √ √ √       √               
7. Executing market analysis for HID segment √ √       √ √ √       √               
8. Arranging and recording appointments with 
aquisitionteams SME (to avoid double 
approach prospects) 
√ √       √           √ √             
9. Selecting appropriate events together with    
M& C department √ √       √ √ √ √ √ √ √               
10. Realize POP for all employees                                     √ 
11. Commitment of contacts with other parts 
of the group √ √ √     √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √   √     
    Wholesale 
     Key Performance indicators 
    Wholesale 
     Initiatives 
1. Recruit 1 accountmanager 
 
2. Co-signing accountplans by productspecialists 
 
3. Annualy cleaning of customerfile 
 
4. Making account plans for existing customers 
 
5. Filling in prospect forms for selected prospects 
 
6. Executing market analysis for Public segment (with aid of Marketing 
& Communication department) 
 
7. Executing market analysis for HID segment (with aid of Marketing & 
Communication department) 
 
8. Arranging and recording appointments with aquisition teams SME (to 
avoid double approach prospects) 
 
9. Selecting appropriate events together with Marketing & 
Communication department 
 
10. Commitment of contacts with other parts of the group (De Lage 
Landen, Interpolis, Schretlen, Stroeve, Robeco, Rabobank 
Securities, Sector teams RNCC, Rof / Rapar / Gilde) 
Confrontation matrix 
 
Appendices
153
Appendices
154
appendix 6: week report
 
 
 
 
Offices Productgoal  All-in-one policy 
insurance 
Year goal all-in-one policy: 5229                                          
non negotiable: 4321 
target result  target result cumulative result % accomplished 
of yeartarget 
%accomplished of 
non negotiable 
Week 27 128 168 100 174 3857 73,76% 89,26% 
Week 28     100     0,00% 0,00% 
Week 29     100     0,00% 0,00% 
Week 30     100     0,00% 0,00% 
Offices Productgoal Year goal all-in-one policy insurance 
target result  target cumulative 
result 
% accomplished 
of yeartarget 
   
1. Laan van Meerdervoort 10 19 500 278 55,60% 
3. Leyweg 15 21 706 448 63,46% 
4. Kempstraat 15 18 540 301 55,74% 
5. Zoutmanstraat 10 13 335 270 80,60% 
6. Loosduinse Hoofdplein 8 8 223 216 96,86% 
8. Sav. Lohmanplein 7 8 253 270 106,72% 
11. Theresiastraat 6 2 307 236 76,87% 
13. Nieuwe Hout 4 2 928 632 68,10% 
15. Benoordenhout 12 26 93 119 127,96% 
18. Ypenburg 5 6 127 143 112,60% 
28. Keizerstraat 8 12 310 279 90,00% 
29. Kerklaan 10 18 219 299 136,53% 
30. In de Bogaard 10 7 317 141 44,48% 
33. Frederik Hendriklaan 8 8 317 225 70,98% 
totaal: 128 168 5175 3857 73,76% 
KPI total sales sales per banker per day     
(40 fte/5 dagen) 
number of IAG's Total/Packages 
target result target result target result target result 
Week 27 845 1206 4 6 150 191 68 90 
Week 28 845   4   150   68   
Week 29 845   4   150   68   
Week 30 845   4   150   68   
KPI leads to week 7 leads specified   
target result   target result 
Week 27 30 NNTM MA 15 NNTM 
Week 28 30 NNTM FA 2 NNTM 
Week 29 30 NNTM H&H 7 NNTM 
Week 30 30 NNTM OD 6 NNTM 
 
Note: 
Payment: 57% 
Loans: 6% 
Membership: 4% 
Savings/Investments: 11% 
Insurance: 22% 
 
Summary weekly report department Customer Advice for Board of Directors 
 
CA: target result Remarks 
product goal: Rabox 128 168   
All-in-one policy 100 174 73,76% of year target 
total sales 845 1206   
SPBPD 4 6   
generated leads 30 i.o.   
number of IAG's 150 191   
TotalPackages 68 90   
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appendix 7: organization chart iBn (2001)
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appendix 8: The mission statement of iBn
ing Bank is the entrepreneurial Bank for entrepreneurial people
We, ING Bank, offer a broad scale of bank, insurance and other services, to six segmented client 
groups: Corporate Clients, Companies & Institutions, Midsize and Small Business, Private Banking, 
Private and Paying.
Via an extensive distribution network of offices, direct channels and channels of third parties, we 
anticipate actively to the demands of our customers.
We offer (tailor-made) services within the Netherlands, Europe and out there, in which creativity 
and high quality are emphasized. Reliability, expertise and commitment are key words. We do this in 
good consideration of entrepreneurship and safe risk policy. We prove what we promise.
The administrative processing takes place in a professional and efficient back-office. Information 
technology will increasingly support our service externally and internally. We combine individual 
actions with teamwork and collegiality. And we like to go one step further in thinking, daring and 
doing.
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appendix 9: The static site
 
Bijsturing is noodzakelijk 
Monitoring is noodzakelijk 
Geen verdere acties noodzakelijk
fictieve cijfers 
Financals 
Achieved Target 
Output 
Output growth 
Capital and volumes 
40 
10% 
30 
40 
10% 
30 
Norm 
35% 
11% 
25 
Learning organization 
Target 
Empl.l  satisfaction 
Sick leave
Maturity in a position 
% Degree profile
Improvement initiative
15% 
4% 
5 
80% 
7,1 
Achived Norm 
15% 
4% 
5 
80% 
7,1 
16% 
3% 
3,7 
60% 
7,5 
Client
Target 
Client satisfaction 
Market penetration
Cross- selling 
Relationship evolution 
85% 
10% 
3,0 
0,03 
85% 
10% 
3,0 
0,03 
Achieved Norm 
75% 
9,5%
2,3 
0,02 
Processes 
Target 
100% 
15 
10% 
60% 
30% 
30 
6
% Action plans 
Visits to clients 
Ratio offers generation 
Hit ratio offers 
     Conversion ratio prospect  
Futher refferencing 
Risk management
 
Achived Norm 
100% 
15 
10% 
60% 
30% 
30 
6 
80% 
16 
8%
50% 
25% 
25 
5
The	static	site. Source: Balanced Scorecard: an overview for the ING Bank Nederland
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appendix 10: The dynamic site
The users log in with their personal number provided with an authorization. The user can select 
through the portal menu various reporting pages. By indicating a personal preference in the menu, 
the user can always log in at a certain organization level. The portal also offers extensive information 
about the BSC, the methodology, the definitions, the intranet site and other relevant information.   
The top-sheet provides an overview of the various indicators with the actual figures, a performance 
indication, the target and the norm. The performance indication makes it clear immediately what 
actions have to be taken based on the performance. No action is needed when the level of target 
meeting is higher than the target itself. The performance has to be monitored when the realization 
level is equal or lower than the target. Finally, action is needed when the performance is more than 
10 percent lower than the target. By selecting an indicator one can get detailed information about it. 
The time-sheet, for instance, provides the actual figures with the performance indications for the last 
thirteen months. In addition, the indicators’ page provides information about the sub-indicators. By 
providing these numbers that determine the indicator, one can manage more precisely when trying 
to meet the target. Examples of the top-sheet and time-sheet are provided in the following figure.    
Example	of	top-sheet	BSC.	
 
Source: Balanced Scorecard: an overview for ING Bank Nederland
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Jan ‘02 Dec ‘01 Nov ‘01 Oct ‘01 Etc.
Sick leave 4,8 ! 5,5 û 5,5 û 4,2 ü 6,8 û
Example timesheet BSC.	Source:	Balanced	Scorecard:	Samenhang	in	operationaliseren,	planning	en	budgettering.
Finally the analysis page allows you to make analyses on your own. Through this page one can compare 
the performance of various districts, areas or sales teams. The analysis page is composed of three 
selection boxes. On the x-axis and the y-axis one selects the class variable, while in the third box the 
analysis variable can be chosen. Examples of class variable are time and organization unit. The analysis 
variables are variables with respect to content. 
 
X-axis y-axis variable
Month/year  Month/year  Sick leave 
Location  Location  Exernal sick leave
Short sick leave
Medium sick leave
Long sick leave 
Analysis page - selectionboxes. Source:	 Balanced	 Scorecard:	 Samenhang	 in	 operationaliseren,	 planning	 en	
budgettering
Short leave jan dec nov oct sep aug jul jun may apr etc
Total 43% 39% 38% 32% 51% etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
Arnhem 23% 27% 25% 31% 10% etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
Groningen 31% 45% 41% 5% 65 etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
A’dam etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
Etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
Analysis page - table.	Source:	Balanced	Scorecard:	Samenhang	in	operationaliseren,	planning	en	budgettering
By putting the BSC on the intranet, the ING Bank makes working with a BSC more accessible for 
the user. One knows better what one is evaluated upon and can see how this evaluation is done. In 
addition, the users can compare their performance with that of other districts or areas, which can 
have a motivating effect. By discussing quarterly the achievement of certain targets, both quantitative 
as qualitative, directed actions can be undertaken.
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The purpose of this study is to portray performance management through a Balanced scorecard as a 
social-material practice. The dissertation demonstrates that such a practice is related to theorization 
in a complex way. The idea of a Balanced scorecard is developed in a macro-kosmos and is translated 
in a micro-kosmos, thus causing performance management change. However, current approaches of 
performance management change (e.g. diffusion theory, planned change theory) are hardly interested 
in micro phenomena and processes and their relation with the macro-kosmos. Moreover, these 
approaches mainly depart from a design perspective (innovation action research) instead of taking an 
interpretive translation perspective. Departing from this gap in the extant literature, Chapter 1 poses 
the following research questions:
1. Why and how do the translation processes of the Balanced scorecard in two case organizations 
unfold?
2. Why and how can the micro translation processes of the Balanced scorecard be connected to 
forces on the organizational field level?
As this study is an interpretive one, Chapter 2 provides a mini-review of interpretive research into 
performance management change. As such, it is positioned against both research from a rationalists 
or mainstream perspective and research from a critical perspective. From a mainstream perspective 
research is informed by both organizational economics and contingency theory. It is acknowledged 
that both organizational economics and contingency approaches downplay processes of change. From 
an interpretive perspective, processes of change are highlighted by placing performance management 
in a relational perspective. The notion of translation is central in such interpretive approaches. These 
approaches reveal how performance management comes to be locally shaped and how it is enacted. 
Moreover, interpretive approaches are sensitive to developments in the institutional environment. To 
a lesser or higher extent there may be isomorphic pressures entailing legitimacy considerations. An 
interpretive approach to performance management inter alia differs from a critical perspective in that 
the latter analyses the archaeology of performance management in order to highlight its disciplinary 
consequences, or demonstrates how performance management systems rely on abstracted, 
disembodied and disembedded approaches to management and subordinates the communicative to 
the instrumental. In general, research from a critical perspective aims to give voices to suppressed 
and/or dominated groups, while interpretive research takes a more neutral stance.
In Chapter 3 a theoretical framework for this interpretive study based on Scandinavian Institutionalism 
is sketched. At the heart of the framework is the notion of translation, a collective act of re-creation 
or re-construction. Both those who translate and that which is translated are modified. Although 
the influence of the organizational environment on a local change in performance management is 
recognized, change is essentially viewed as a product of translation and not as a product of diffusion. 
As a consequence of disembedding a translocal idea is shaped, that, through problematization, 
interessement, idea-materialization, the support of allies and, ultimately, institutionalization is 
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re-embedded in another local context. Processes of translation entail that a translocal idea never 
becomes a global idea that can be diffused across organizations while obtaining its original properties. 
The ‘global’ is no more than a network of localities.
Chapter	4	presents the methodological building blocks of this study. This study adopts a qualitative, 
constructivist-interpretive approach to research on performance management change, rooted in a 
relativistic ontology (multiple valid and socially constructed realities) and a subjectivist epistemology 
(researcher and interviewee co-create understanding). The chapter starts with explaining that this 
qualitative field study collects data (using methods like semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis) in the domain ‘field’ and employs ‘qualitative methodology’. It also explains why a qualitative 
field research methodology was chosen. After a description of the selection of the case organizations in 
terms of a rhizomatic process it explains, in detail, how the research process developed by elaborating 
on the data collection and data analysis processes. The chapter ends with a concise description of the 
limitations of the methodology.
In Chapter	5 the origins and further development by the originators of performance management 
through a Balanced scorecard is outlined. Kaplan’s serendipitous encounter with the scorecard is 
described, followed by a description and depiction of the innovation action research cycle through 
which Kaplan seeks to advance the performance management system that incorporates the Balanced 
scorecard. This chapter shows that Kaplan believes in the development of objective constructs with 
more or less universal applicability – a view that is close to positivistic science ideals. Kaplan believes 
that academics pick up ideas from practice that can be diffused all over the world. However, this chapter 
demonstrates a translocal perspective on the development of the idea of the Balanced scorecard. 
It takes a ‘Scandinavian Institutionalism’- view on the instrumental innovation action approach as 
proclaimed by Kaplan and Norton. The idea and concept of a balanced scorecard is processed and 
institutionalized through networks of localities. It proves to be the local managers and consultants 
who make the idea work in organizations and who advise it to others. During the traveling process 
an on-going spiral of fashion is kept active. Authors as Kaplan and Norton further contribute to the 
‘globalization’ of the idea, e.g. by continuously changing the problematization. The analysis in this 
chapter further reveals that the success of an idea is not only depending on the properties of the idea, 
but also on the extent to which it copes with perceived problems and the extent to which it attracts 
the interest of actors.
In Chapter 6 the translation of a Balanced scorecard as practiced in two Dutch banks is described. For 
each bank, the process of re-embedding the Balanced scorecard is described by drawing on the five 
analytical stages that were distinguished in the conceptual framework (Chapter 3): problematization, 
interessement, idea-materialization, support of allies, and institutionalization. A special focus is on 
(ex ante and ex post) theorization. The chapter demonstrates, among other things, how (ex ante and 
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ex post) theorization at the local is loosely coupled with the ‘theories’ resulting from the innovation 
action research program as initiated and developed by Kaplan and Norton. 
Finally, Chapter	 7 discusses the theoretical implications of previous chapters. This study portrays 
the act of translating the Balanced scorecard as a social-material practice, and it reveals how 
discursive elements and materializations are intermingled in translating performance management. 
A theoretical implication from our field studies is that the local practice of performance management 
may be a practice of intra-action, a practice in which humans and other-than-humans (inscriptions, 
Champions League cups) are entangled. This social-material practice is embedded in an intentional 
structure in a relational network. This differs from a regular conception of performance management 
(and management control) as a system that incentivizes and constrains the behavior of individuals. 
From the perspective that the idea of a Balanced scorecard travels through and changes a network 
of localities, this dissertation demonstrates that the local practice of translation also produces ideas 
and objects that are ready to travel; there is dialectical transformation of the object of a Balanced 
scorecard.
Samenvatting
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Het doel van deze studie is om prestatiemanagement door middel van een balanced scorecard 
te portretteren als een sociaal-materiële praktijk. De dissertatie laat op basis van interpretatief 
casusonderzoek bij twee Nederlandse banken zien dat een dergelijke praktijk op een complexe wijze 
gerelateerd is aan theoretisering. Het gangbare perspectief op prestatiemanagement met een balanced 
scorecard is een ontwerpperspectief. De scorecard is ontworpen op een organisatieoverstijgend 
niveau (een macro-kosmos) en wordt vervolgens verspreid over organisaties (waarbij elke organisatie 
als een micro-kosmos kan worden beschouwd). Dit onderzoek vertrekt vanuit een ander perspectief. 
Het neemt als uitgangspunt dat de vormgeving van prestatiemanagement op het niveau van 
een specifieke organisatie het resultaat is van interpretatie en translatie en dat de verandering in 
prestatiemanagement het resultaat is van een dialectiek tussen micro-kosmos en macro-kosmos. In 
Hoofdstuk	1 worden de volgende onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:
1. Waarom en hoe ontvouwen de translatieprocessen van de balanced scorecard zich in twee casus 
organisaties?
2. Waarom en hoe kunnen de micro translatieprocessen van de balanced scorecard verbonden 
worden met krachten op organisatie-overstijgend niveau?
Omdat dit onderzoek getypeerd kan worden als interpretatief onderzoek op het gebied van 
veranderingen in prestatiemanagement, geeft Hoofdstuk	2 een beknopt overzicht van dit onderzoek 
zoals het tot nu toe heeft plaatsgevonden. Als zodanig wordt dit interpretatief onderzoek gepositioneerd 
tegenover onderzoek vanuit het rationele of mainstream perspectief en onderzoek vanuit het kritische 
perspectief. Onderzoek vanuit het mainstream perspectief wordt geïnformeerd door de organisatie-
economie en de contingentietheorie. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat zowel de organisatie-economie als 
contingentiebenaderingen te weinig oog hebben voor veranderingsprocessen. Het in deze dissertatie 
gevolgde interpretatieve perspectief daarentegen, benadrukt juist processen van verandering 
door prestatiemanagement in een relationeel perspectief te plaatsen. De notie van translatie staat 
centraal in een dergelijke interpretatieve benadering. Een interpretatieve benadering onthult hoe 
prestatiemanagement lokaal wordt vormgegeven en omgezet in actie. Bovendien is een interpretatieve 
benadering gevoelig voor ontwikkelingen in de institutionele omgeving. In meer of mindere mate kan, 
vanuit legitimiteitoverwegingen, druk naar gelijkvormigheid een rol spelen. 
Het interpretatieve perspectief verschilt ook van het kritische perspectief. Het kritische perspectief 
analyseert de ‘archeologie’ van prestatiemanagement teneinde haar disciplinaire consequenties te 
benadrukken of demonstreert hoe prestatiemanagement systemen communicatieve rationaliteit 
ondermijnen. In het algemeen wil onderzoek vanuit een kritisch perspectief de status-quo veranderen 
(emancipatie van de onderdrukten), terwijl interpretatief onderzoek een meer neutraal standpunt 
inneemt.
Samenvatting	(Dutch	summary)
167
In Hoofdstuk	3 wordt het theoretische raamwerk dat aan deze studie ten grondslag ligt geschetst. 
Dit raamwerk is gebaseerd op het Scandinavisch Institutionalisme. De kern van dit raamwerk wordt 
gevormd door de notie van translatie, een collectieve daad van herscheppen en reconstrueren. 
Zowel degene die vertaalt als hetgeen dat vertaald wordt veranderen. Ofschoon de invloed van de 
organisatie-omgeving op een lokale verandering in prestatiemanagement wordt onderkend, wordt 
verandering toch vooral gezien als een product van translatie en niet als een product van diffusie. 
Als gevolg van processen van ‘onttrekken’ (‘disembedding’) uit een lokale context wordt een 
‘translokaal’ idee gevormd dat na een (al dan niet lange) reis via processen van problematiseren, 
interesseren, idee-materialiseren en het verkrijgen van steun van ‘bondgenoten’ in het netwerk door 
(her)onderhandelen opnieuw ‘herplaatst’ (‘re-embedded’) wordt in een (andere) lokale context. 
Translatieprocessen impliceren dat een ‘translokaal’ idee nooit een wereldwijd (‘global’) idee kan 
worden dat over organisaties verspreid (‘diffused’) wordt, terwijl het haar originele eigenschappen 
behoudt. Het ‘wereldwijde’ (‘the global’) is niets anders dan een netwerk van lokaliteiten.
Hoofdstuk	 4 presenteert de methodologische bouwstenen van deze studie. Het onderzoek is een 
constructivistisch-interpretatieve benadering van prestatiemanagement verandering. Het hoofdstuk 
begint met uit te leggen dat het veldonderzoek in dit proefschrift (gebruikmakend van methoden als 
semi-gestructureerde interviews en documenten-analyse) data verzamelt in het domein “veld” en 
een ‘kwalitatieve methodologie’ hanteert. Het licht ook toe waarom een kwalitatieve veldonderzoek 
methodologie is gekozen. Na een motivering van de casusselectie, gebruikmakend van de metafoor van 
het rizoom (wortelstelsel), volgt een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de dataverzameling- processen 
en dataverwerking- processen. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een korte beschrijving van de beperkingen 
van de gekozen methodologie.
In Hoofdstuk	 5 wordt de oorsprong en verdere ontwikkeling door de ‘originators’ van 
prestatiemanagement middels een balanced scorecard besproken. Robert Kaplan’s toevallige 
ontmoeting met de scorecard wordt beschreven, gevolgd door een beschrijving en weergave van 
de ‘innovation action research’ cyclus waarmee Kaplan e.a. kennis omtrent prestatiemanagement 
systemen tracht te genereren. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat Kaplan gelooft in de ontwikkeling van 
objectieve constructen met min of meer universele toepasbaarheid – een nogal naïeve zienswijze 
die dicht tegen positivistische wetenschapsidealen aanligt. Kaplan gelooft dat wetenschappers ideeën 
uit de praktijk oppikken, die vervolgens over de gehele wereld verspreid (‘diffused’) kunnen worden. 
Dit hoofdstuk demonstreert echter een ‘translokaal’ perspectief op de ontwikkeling van het idee van 
een balanced scorecard. Het kijkt met een ‘Scandinavisch institutionele’ blik naar de instrumentele 
‘innovation action research’ benadering, zoals voorgestaan door Kaplan en Norton. Het idee en 
concept van een balanced scorecard wordt vormgegeven en (eventueel) geïnstitutionaliseerd via een 
netwerk van lokaliteiten. Het blijkt dat het lokale managers en consultants zijn, die het idee van de 
balanced scorecard laten werken in organisaties en die het aan anderen adviseren. Gedurende de 
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reis wordt een voortdurende modespiraal in gang gehouden. Auteurs als Kaplan en Norton blijven 
voortdurend bijdragen aan de ‘globalisering’ van het idee, onder andere door de problematisering 
continu te veranderen. De analyse in dit hoofdstuk laat zien, dat het succes van een idee niet alleen 
afhankelijk is van de eigenschappen van het idee, maar ook van de mate waarin het een oplossing 
biedt voor gepercipieerde problemen en de mate waarin het de interesse van actoren weet te wekken.
In Hoofdstuk	6 worden de translatieprocessen van de balanced scorecard bij twee Nederlandse banken 
beschreven. Voor beide banken wordt het proces van ‘herplaatsen’ (‘re-embedding’) van de balanced 
scorecard beschreven, daarbij gebruikmakend van de vijf analytische fasen uit het conceptuele model 
(Hoofdstuk 3): problematiseren, interesseren, idee-materialiseren, steun van ‘bondgenoten’ in het 
netwerk (her)onderhandelen en institutionaliseren. Daarbij wordt bijzondere aandacht geschonken 
aan (ex-ante en ex-post) processen van theoretisering. Het hoofdstuk demonstreert onder andere hoe 
(ex-ante en ex-post) theoretisering op lokaal niveau min of meer ‘losgekoppeld’ (‘loosely coupled’) is 
van de ‘theorieën’ resulterende uit het ‘innovation action research’ programma, zoals geïnitieerd en 
ontwikkeld door Kaplan en Norton. 
Ten slotte bespreekt Hoofdstuk	7 wat in meer algemene zin de theoretische implicaties zijn van de 
voorafgaande hoofdstukken. Dit proefschrift portretteert het vertalen van de balanced scorecard als 
een sociaal-materiële praktijk en laat zien hoe discursieve elementen en materialiseringen vermengd 
zijn in de translatieprocessen. Een theoretische implicatie van onze veldstudies is dat de lokale praktijk 
van prestatiemanagement mogelijk een praktijk van ‘intra-acties’ is; een praktijk waarin menselijke en 
anders-dan-menselijke (inscripties, Champions League cups) actoren in elkaar vervlochten zijn. Deze 
sociaal-materiële praktijk is ingebed in een intentionele structuur in een relationeel netwerk. Dit wijkt 
af van de gangbare opvatting van prestatiemanagement (en management control) als een systeem dat 
prikkels oplevert voor en beperkingen oplegt aan het gedrag van individuen. Vanuit het perspectief 
dat het idee van de balanced scorecard door een ‘netwerk van lokaliteiten’ reist, laat de dissertatie 
zien dat de lokale praktijk van translatie ook ideeën en objecten oplevert die (opnieuw) gereed zijn 
om te reizen; er is sprake van ‘dialectische transformatie’ van het object van een balanced scorecard.
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